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Science of Thought and the Culture of Democracy in Postwar Japan, 1946-1962 
Adam Bronson 
 
This dissertation examines efforts to foster a culture of democracy in postwar Japan, 
focusing on Science of Thought, one of the most influential associations engaged in publicly rethinking 
democracy in the years after fascism and defeat.  The group was founded in 1946 by seven young 
intellectuals whose wartime experiences had convinced them of the urgent need to bridge the gap 
between the world of intellectuals and that of “ordinary people.”  My dissertation shows how the 
group’s many attempts to realize that goal embodied a vision of democratic experimentation that 
had to be re-articulated again and again in response to challenges that arose in connection with 
geopolitical events and also with the social changes that accompanied economic recovery and 
growth. 
For Science of Thought, democracy was not something that could be decreed by occupation 
authorities or conjured into existence by the media.  Its seeds had to be sought in the “thought” 
(shisō) of the “man on the street.” Contributors to the group’s journal espoused a “science of 
thought” capable of enabling researchers to discover the mental worlds and implicit philosophies of 
ordinary people.  Drawing methodological insight from American pragmatist philosophy and social 
science, the group conducted statistical surveys and interviews, and produced content analyses of 
popular movies, novels, and comic books in an unusual experiment to probe the mind of the 
“common man.”   
In the charged political context of the early fifties, members of the group searched for new 
ways to nurture democracy from the grassroots.  Inspired by the apparent success of the ongoing 
social revolution in China, members began promoting and facilitating educational and cultural 
  
 
movements underway in the Japanese countryside.  In the process, Science of Thought became an 
anchor for a nation-wide network of factory workers, engineers, students, and housewives linked 
together by reading groups and writing circles.   
As economic growth began to transform Japanese society in the late fifties and early sixties, 
the group’s earlier faith in the inherent democratic pragmatism of ordinary people gave way to 
promoting a more oppositional stance, embodied in the classless ideal of the citizen-activist 
confronting the pressures of conformism in mass society and white-collar life.  On the basis of this 
ideal, the group became an enthusiastic supporter of the large-scale protests against the US-Japan 
Security Treaty in 1960, which marked the beginning of citizen movements that influenced Japanese 
civil society in the subsequent decades.  
The evolution of the group from a small research circle into a standard-bearer for citizen’s 
activism in the sixties can be seen as a metonym for the experience of postwar progressives, an 
experience that included moments of pro-Enlightenment optimism and anti-American nationalism.  
Rather than through developing a specific theory of democracy or citizenship, the significance of 
Science of Thought lay in the way it exemplified democracy in practice.  The accumulated practical 
experience of the intellectuals and citizens associated with the group remains relevant to those who 
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Introduction: Science o f  Thought and Democracy 
 
Twentieth-century democracy was shaped by the collision of two contradictory modern 
projects.  The first project, associated with the European Enlightenment and ideas of human 
progress, was a struggle to emancipate individuals from traditional ties in politics, religion, morality, 
and economics in order to enable their full participation in representative self-government.  The 
second, often associated with nineteenth-century criticism of the Enlightenment, was directed 
toward ameliorating or overcoming the negative effects of social processes associated with 
modernity, such as the unchecked advance of the division of labor, conformism to the demands of 
mass society, imperialist expansion, the formation of new class hierarchies. These trends made the 
task of popular self-government difficult or impossible, although the same processes might also 
appear to further earlier Enlightenment goals of undermining older social formations that were 
imagined to impede the emergence of free individuals.1  Efforts to grapple in different ways with the 
points of contradiction in these two projects generated a wide range of political and intellectual 
orientations – socialist, progressive, liberal, corporatist, conservative, communist – which became 
broadly aligned with democracy as something to be aspired to, or preserved, by taking measures to 
contain its self-destructive tendencies.  Political theorists have argued that the strength of a 
democratic polity is its adaptability and capacity to “error-correct” over time.2  In other words, 
democracies provide opportunities and institutional mechanisms to mediate creatively between 
ongoing emancipatory projects and emergent criticism of their unwanted side-effects. 
The difficulty of settling on a simple definition of democracy arises in part because of the 
accumulation of different meanings and ideals that have come to be associated with it over the 
                                                
1 Georg Simmel used a similar schema for characterizing the difference between 18th and 19th century 
2 An influential attempt to make this argument appeared in John Dewey, The Public and its Problems 
(Chicago: A. Swallow, 1927). For a more recent attempt, see Jack Night and James Johnson, The 






course of a discontinuous historical genealogy, one that gave rise to democratic political movements 
that deviated in various ways from classical liberal visions centered on political regimes founded 
upon popular sovereignty and the inviolability of individual rights.  Global and local crises, including 
war and economic depression, prompted diverse attempts to rethink the relationship between 
democratic ideals and critiques of modernity.  As a result, the line separating “democratic” from 
“anti-democratic” ” ideas and institutions was redrawn again and again.3   
The mid-twentieth-century political events associated with World War II, decolonization, 
and the Cold War impelled intellectuals around the world once again to debate the future of 
democracy in terms of its ideals and its critics.  In the defeated nations, many believed that the 
uncertain political situation and the urgent tasks of postwar reconstruction offered unprecedented 
opportunities to put democratic ideas into practice.  In Japan, this practice included supporting 
Allied Occupation reforms aimed at promoting democracy, joining political parties, and actively 
engaging in journalism and education at a moment when public opinion appeared promisingly fluid.  
Although some Japanese intellectuals had attempted to influence public opinion and policy 
during the war, many observers believed that the wide-ranging civic involvement of intellectuals in 
the immediate postwar period was unprecedented.  Reminiscing about the period from 1945-1948, 
the legal scholar Kawashima Takeyoshi (1909-1992) wrote that he had the opportunity to join 
dozens of new intellectual associations, ranging from specialist legal associations proposing drafts 
for a new constitution to the Association of Democratic Scientists (Minshushugi kagakusha kyôkai), 
a group of liberal to left progressive scholars who joined to form a nation-wide network of activist 
democrats.  Similarly, associations like the Cultural Union for the Democratic Renewal of Germany 
(Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneurerung Deutschlands) in Berlin, the Heidelberg Action Group for 
                                                
3 For example, recurrent debates about secularism, cultural assimilation, and national identity often 
revolve around the question of what might encourage or hinder participation in democratic political 






Democracy and Free Socialism (Heidelberg Aktionsgurppe zur Demokratie und zum freien Socialismus), and 
the Free German Cultural Society (Freie Deutsche Kulturgesellschaft) in Frankfurt produced networks of 
political and intellectual engagement.  New monthly journals Die Wandlung (1945-1949) and Aufbau 
(1945-1949) in Germany and Sekai (1945-) and Tenbô (1946-1951) in Japan helped to link the shared 
goals of postwar reconstruction to ideas of democracy as a form of spiritual rebirth, providing new 
outlets for intellectuals to reach a non-specialist audience.4  Interest in political engagement among 
intellectuals was not limited to Japan and Germany.  In France, new and relaunched journals such as 
Les Temps Modernes (1945-), Socialisme ou Barbarie (1948-1965), and Esprit (1932-) provided similar 
opportunities for politically engaged intellectuals. 
The journal Science of Thought (Shisô no kagaku, 1946-1996), the subject of this study, originated 
in this moment of intense associational and political activity among Japanese intellectuals across the 
political spectrum.  It was founded by a group of seven young intellectuals -- the political theorist 
Maruyama Masao (1914-1996), philosopher Tsurumi Shunsuke (1922-), sociologist Tsurumi Kazuko 
(1918-2006), Christian activist Takeda Kiyoko (1917-), Marxian economist Tsuru Shigeto (1912-
2006), and physicists Taketani Mitsuo (1911-2000) and Watanabe Satoshi (1910-1993).  Science of 
Thought and its affiliated association, the Institute for the Science of Thought (1949-), became two of 
the longest lasting and most influential examples of intellectual cooperation to arise out of the 
political ferment of the war. 
 Four of the founders -- Tsuru, Takeda, and the Tsurumi siblings -- met while studying in the 
United States before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941.  In 1942, the four returned to Japan.   
Tsurumi Shunsuke became an English translator for the Japanese Navy in Java, and Tsurumi 
Kazuko and Tsuru Shigeto put their knowledge of America to use as researchers affiliated with the 
                                                
4 On the network of engaged democrats in postwar Germany, see Sean Horner, Catastrophe and 
Renewal: Germany’s Engaged Democrats Between East and West, 1945-1960, (Chicago: University of 






Taiheyô kyôkai (Pacific Association).  The Taiheiyô kyôkai was a think tank founded in Tokyo in 
1938 by the politician Tsurumi Yûsuke (1885-1973), father of Shunsuke and Kazuko; it was devoted 
to social scientific research on the United States and the Pacific. 
On the basis of the difference in industrial capability between Japan and the United States, 
the returnees believed that the defeat of Japan was inevitable.   Even as Tsuru and Tsurumi Kazuko 
were still working on essays analyzing the weakness of the “American character” for the Taiheyô 
kyôkai, they had already begun searching for ways to involve themselves in the coming postwar 
reconstruction.  They contacted Maruyama, Taketani, and Watanabe – like-minded intellectuals who 
had begun preparing essays intended to influence public opinion after the war ended.  Tsurumi 
Shunsuke returned from Java and joined this circle of acquaintances in 1944.  In 1945, with financial 
backing from their father, Shunsuke and Kazuko reorganized the Taiheiyô kyôkai as Senkusha 
(“Vanguard Company”), the first publisher of Science of Thought.  Shunsuke, who went abroad to 
attend school in America at the age of 16 and had difficulty readjusting to life in Japan after the war, 
became absorbed in running the journal, which provided him with both an intellectual outlet and 
social network. 
The journal debuted in May 1946 to eager readers who quickly bought out its initial print-run 
of 20,000 copies.  Early issues devoted considerable space to book reviews that displayed its 
founders’ knowledge of America and access to Anglo-American works of philosophy and social 
science. The objectives for the journal laid out in the first issue emphasize the task of “importing 
thought” from America and Britain and applying it to Japanese society.  The initial objectives were 
as follows:  
1) Our journal takes its main objective to be the assimilation of logical and empirical (論理
実験的) methods in areas of thought (思索) and practice.   
 
2) We would like to discuss the various methodological problems that accompany this 






complement the above objective.  As an initial starting point, we will work to introduce 
Anglo-American thought to Japan.   
 
3) Our journal will maintain a critical attitude, taking care that in introducing foreign thought, 
we do not stop at the level of explication.  Furthermore, we will consider how this foreign 
thought can be used as a tool to analyze and critique Japanese society.  
 
 4) Our journal will create a column for readers to contribute criticism to articles to which 
authors can then respond.  In this way, through an active discussion among readers and 
writers, the thought (思想) represented by the journal will gradually be elaborated upon and 
evolve. 5 
 
The journal quickly became a site for innovative projects aimed at bridging the gap between 
the world of intellectuals and that of “ordinary people,” at that time considered the domain of 
tabloid journalism. While intellectually prestigious journals like Sekai debated the merits of socialism 
and existentialism in the context of the Cold War, Science of Thought focused its attention on 
investigating the daily life of firemen and analyzing popular comics.  The group turned away from 
ongoing debates about “-isms” and “-cracies” toward subjects traditionally considered unworthy of 
serious intellectual attention.   
For Science of Thought, democracy was not something that could be decreed by the occupation 
authorities or conjured into existence by the media.  Its seeds had to be sought in the “thought” 
(shisō) of the “man on the street.” Contributors espoused a “science of thought” capable of enabling 
researchers to discover the mental worlds and implicit philosophies of ordinary people.  Over time 
the interdisciplinary social scientific project associated with Science of Thought grew into a nation-wide 
movement aimed at creating a common space where people could participate in the creation of a 
kaleidoscopic democratic culture, one in which it was possible to -- at least temporarily -- step 
                                                






outside conventional social roles, whether that of housewife, worker, or professional, and become a 
public philosopher.   
The Institute membership reflected the founders’ intention to ignore traditional disciplinary 
divisions and social categories, eventually including a political mix of pragmatists, Communists, 
liberals, and anarchists and an occupational mix of professors, scientists, artists, political activists, 
workers, amateur anthropologists, technicians, and university students.  By 1950, the Tokyo-based 
group included 120 members, a number that expanded rapidly with the opening of branches and 
reading groups in cities all over Japan.6  Although the group derived inspiration from the intellectual 
salons of the French Enlightenment and the Metaphysical Club of nineteenth-century America, their 
own meetings, conducted against the backdrop of the Cold War, proved more volatile than they had 
expected.  Members hurled charges of elitism at one another and traded accusations that contending 
factions were trying to undermine the Institute’s openness and turn it into a front for Soviet or U.S. 
propaganda.  Even as it maintained a prominent public presence, the group’s journal folded and 
restarted publication five times before achieving stability in 1962.  Over the course of its first two 
decades of existence, many of the original founders of Science of Thought moved toward other 
intellectual pursuits.  Tsurumi Shunsuke was the important exception.  He began his intellectual 
career as an interpreter of American pragmatism for the journal and achieved fame as an anti-war 
activist involved in protests against the US-Japan Security Treaty and the Vietnam War in the 1960s.  
He remained heavily involved in editing the journal and managing the Institute throughout his long 
career.  To a considerable degree, his intellectual turns both mirrored and influenced that of the 
overall group even as its membership changed and enlarged over time.  
                                                
6 The 1950 member list is reproduced in Tamura Norio, “’Atarashii shinbungaku’ no tanjô to 






 The experience of Science of Thought exemplified several of the challenges encountered by 
postwar thinkers who tried to break from the past and realize a new form of democracy.  In the 
Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci argued that while every political movement “creates a language of 
its own,” the participants in such movements often take for granted the clarity of widely circulated 
concepts to the “average reader.”  Indeed, the intellectual output of the Science of Thought was part of 
a larger struggle to articulate a truly new democratic language for postwar Japan and convey these 
concepts to “ordinary people.” This was perhaps most literally true in early articles in the journal 
Science of Thought, which analyzed artificial languages and promoted dozens of new terms and 
neologisms, most of them drawn from Anglo-American analytic philosophy, Peircean semiotics, and 
new social sciences like communications research.   While these initiatives were intended to make 
intellectual activity more practical, accessible, and scientific, early attempts at constructing a new 
language were susceptible to pitfalls encountered by other contemporary movements that tried to 
propagate a critical consciousness beyond the sphere of traditional intellectuals.  
In time, Science of Thought moved toward a multi-faceted approach to the task of mediating 
between professional intellectuals and “ordinary people.” This task of mediation required both an 
intellectualizing of the quotidian and a quotidianizing of the intellectual.  In other words, the group 
worked to expand the definition of “thought” (思想) and “philosophy” (哲学) to include forms of 
everyday, practical activity associated with people from different walks of life.  Through this effort, 
Science of Thought developed a pluralistic vision of thought and practice that became an important part 
of the intellectual legacy of postwar Japan. 
 
Postwar Intellectuals and the Past 
The founders of Science of Thought shared a skepticism about the sudden enthusiasm for 






including not least themselves.  For with the exception of Taketani Mitsuo, none of the members 
had actively resisted the war.  Yet, even as they participated in mobilization, they also took notes, 
observing linguistic behavior in the military and seeking passive resistance among women drafted to 
work in supply factories.  They thus greeted the end of the war with a mixture of remorse about 
their own conformism and optimism about the prospect of discovering the building blocks for 
democracy among the lived experience of the masses, with whom they had first come in close 
contact during the war.  
Other intellectuals previously wary of political engagement embraced the opportunity after 
the war to break out of the confines of academic specialization and address a wider reading public. 
The new and revived journals, associations, political parties, and Occupation reforms seemed to 
promise a role for intellectuals as participants in a collective effort to reconcile the original project of 
modernity with critical efforts to overcome the pathological consequences of modernization – 
among which the war appeared a proximate and spectacular example. This turn to civic engagement 
was overtly associated with the widespread sense of guilt and regret experienced by intellectuals in 
the aftermath of the war.  Many felt they had not done enough to resist the rise of fascism in the 
thirties, and a shared sense of failed public responsibility, a “community of contrition,” was part of 
the psychological foundation for associational activity after the war. 7 
If recent wartime experiences impelled their activism, the strategies of engagement adopted 
for working through their sense of personal conflict had a deeper history.  Historians point to the 
role of the Dreyfus Affair in fin-de-siècle France in the formation of the ideal of the intellectual who 
makes use of cultural authority derived from specialized knowledge in order to intervene publicly to 
remedy a social problem or injustice in a different field.8  In addition, the proliferation of research 
                                                
7 Maruyama Masao, “Kindai nihon no chishikijin,” in Kôei no ichi kara, (Tokyo: Mirai-sha, 1982) 






universities around the world since the late nineteenth century taught intellectuals in higher 
education to associate their experience with the academic division of labor with broader social 
processes linked to the atomization of the individual in modern society.9  Dividing one’s time 
between specialized research and civic engagement – which could expose negative aspects of 
contemporary society – was one strategy by which intellectuals sought to reconcile the contradiction 
between the ideals of modernity and its trenchant critiques.   
Postwar calls for civic engagement were often framed in terms of reasserting the role of the 
public intellectual in the boundaries of newly permissible speech.  Such calls could sometimes seem 
calculated to avoid political controversy in the context of military occupation.  In his 1945 lectures 
on “The Question of German Guilt,” the philosopher Karl Jaspers advocated increased civic 
involvement while warning intellectuals to avoid engaging in “propaganda.”   
The fact that we have a military government now means, without my having to say so in so 
many words, that we have no right to criticize the military government. 
 
But all that denotes no repression of our research, only a firm compulsion to refrain from 
doing what is never our business: dabbling in political actions and decisions of the day. To 
me it seems that only malice would consider that a restraint of our research into the truth... 
This again does not mean that we have freedom to engage in propaganda.  Propaganda 
might perhaps be tolerated if in line with the political aims valid today. At the university it 
would even then be a calamity.10 
 
In Japan, intellectuals frequently called for wholesale cultural reconstruction rather than 
appealing to a more narrowly framed democratic political program.  The postwar critic Hanada 
Kiyoteru (1909-1974) named his new journal Sôgô bunka (Integrated Culture).  Alongside a translation 
of E. M. Forster’s “two cheers for democracy,” the editorial postscript to the first issue of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
World” Telos  81 (1989). 
9 E.g., Stefan Collini’s account of “specialization and its discontents” in Britain from the 19th and 
20th centuries.  Stefan Collini, Absent Minds, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 20. 






journal Tenbô (Prospect) juxtaposed the task of reflecting on defeat with a cosmopolitan mission to 
overcome the fragmentation of knowledge through a unitary vision of world history. 
The tragedy of defeat is rooted in the vulgarity and weakness of Japanese culture (bunka).  
Everyone knows the great task of constructing a new culture will not be easy to accomplish.  
It requires investigating the past, scrutinizing the present, and foreseeing the future.  This 
must take place at the level of a unified, organic world historical vision (tenbô). 
 
Although the editors asserted that the mission of the journal was to assist in the construction 
of a new culture, the language they used to articulate their vision of the intellectual as a figure 
charged with unifying the disparate fragmented spheres of specialized knowledge and technique into 
a coherent whole was in fact quite familiar.  A poll from 1933, which asked college students whom 
they most respected in contemporary society, revealed that the popularity of the Marxist Miki 
Kiyoshi (1897-1945) and the liberal Hasegawa Nyozekan (1875-1969), surpassed that of Mussolini, 
Gandhi, Lenin, and all other Japanese public figures.  Miki and Hasegawa were public intellectuals 
who wrote timely, politically engaged essays for a non-specialized educated audience.11  Although 
both were eventually silenced or receded from the public scene during the war, other thinkers 
continued to advocate the importance of publically visible intellectuals in mediating between the 
wartime demand for technological modernization and the preservation of a unifying, totalizing form 
of culture – albeit expressed in a political register that was, if not always straightforwardly aligned 
with fascism, at least more difficult to associate with increased demands for democratic participation. 
Dismissing much of the public involvement of intellectuals during the years of total 
mobilization as fascist, while associating democracy with an increased public role for intellectuals 
could also seem to connote the restoration of political normalcy, associated with Taishô democracy in 
Japan and the Weimar Republic in Germany, after the aberrant experience of fascism and war.  
Although this restorationist impulse was most often associated with the return of “Old (Taishô) 
                                                






Liberals” like Hasegawa to public visibility in Japan, the assertion of a traditional public role for 
intellectuals was not necessarily liberal or conservative. Nostalgia for the interwar past could equally 
imply the positive recognition of a suppressed revolutionary tradition in Japan associated with the 
Communist Party, which was founded as an underground political association during the Taishô 
period in 1922.12  During the early postwar years, old liberals linked arms with old revolutionaries in 
the Association of Democratic Scientists  (Minka) and the Peace Discussion Circle (Heiwa mondai 
kondankai). 
Yet within this popular front, the founders of the journal Science of Thought were among the 
many intellectuals seizing the opportunity to form associations and address a wider reading public 
after the war who believed that democracy connoted more than the restoration of any form of the 
status quo.  As younger intellectuals who had come of age during the war – the 45ers in Germany 
and the wartime generation (senchûha) in Japan – they were less likely to associate democracy with the 
parliamentary or leftist politics and pluralistic atmosphere of the 1920s.  Rather than a salvageable 
tradition to be drawn upon in a new postwar beginning, liberal and revolutionary movements 
associated with interwar democracy appeared to them at best well-intentioned failures. 13  They were 
worried more about strands of continuity from wartime and into the postwar years despite the 
dominant rhetoric of democracy.  This generational optic helps explain why younger intellectuals in 
Germany and Japan remained skeptical about the rootedness of democratic ideas and institutions in 
the postwar context.14  
                                                
12 The revived journal Yuibutsuron kenkyûkai worked to recuperate this Marxist intellectual legacy 
after the war.  See Ôi Tadashi, “Kenkyûsha soshiki to minshushugi – Nihon yuibutsuron kenkyûkai 
no koto” (Shin nihon bungaku, Oct. 1961). 
13 Kuno Osamu, Tsurumi Shunsuke, Fujita Shôzô, Sengo nihon no shisô, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2010), 
chapter 1. 
14 For the German case, see Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge: Cambridge 






Such skepticism about democracy during the Occupation did not, however, impel them to 
withdraw from politics or abandon democratic ideals.  It served rather as an impetus to attempt a 
more radical break from the past and to search for new ways to work toward democracy.  The 
journal Science of Thought and its attendant association, The Institute for the Science of Thought, 
stood out as organizations that managed to sustain a creative intellectual movement which sought 
new forms of democratic activity in the changed social and political landscape of postwar Japan. The 
founders of Science of Thought were committed to a broadly shared progressive mission of 
advancing an emancipatory project associated with Enlightenment ideals of democracy while 
remedying its emergent defects, yet they pursued this mission in a way that altered the categories – 
including the social category of the intellectual – which many postwar thinkers took for granted. 
 
Experiments in Democratic Practice 
The intellectuals associated with Science of Thought worked to build a culture of democracy in 
Japan in a trial-and-error process across several decades. While tracking these twists and turns, I 
argue that the group’s varied intellectual activities embodied a vision of radical democracy which had 
to be re-articulated again and again in response to challenges that arose in connection with political 
events and also with the social changes that accompanied economic recovery and growth.  Radical 
democracy entailed making the imaginative life of the mind a public good, of interest to everyone, 
and defending it against attempts to keep it the possession of any single class, political party, or 
institution.  It also meant opposing creeping conformism in schools, workplaces, households, and 
politics, in order to secure a space for free and engaged democratic expression.  To this end, Science 
of Thought searched Japan for examples of grass-roots democracy-in-action.  They drew attention 
to factory workers writing poetry about their daily lives in the “circle movement” of the early 1950s 






phenomena that they believed momentarily negated the functional distinctions among ordinary 
citizens, public intellectuals, and career politicians. 
The struggle in Science of Thought to embrace such a range of ideologies and cultural 
production as worthy of serious consideration led one literary critic to mock the group as a “street 
vendor” peddling ideas as if they were varieties of “fried offal.”15  This characterization, not unlike 
Plato’s critique of sophistry, touched upon the group’s vision of democracy as a messy, chaotic 
system that scrambled what had once been perceived as the natural order of things.  The degree to 
which this radical, egalitarian vision of participatory democracy and intellectual culture was actually 
realized in postwar Japan, and whether a new “post-postwar” vision is now needed are topics of 
debate in Japan today.  These contemporary debates are intertwined with retrospective assessments 
of the legacy of the US occupation, the Cold War, and the rise and fall of Japan’s “postwar 
economic miracle.”   A study of the Japanese Science of Thought movement thus engages the 
familiar and conflicting ideas of democracy found in many societies in the last half of the twentieth 
century, ideas that remain difficult and contentious in the present. 
 
The postwar embrace of democracy began with the characterization of the immediate past as 
hierarchical and wracked with irrational beliefs.  Chapter 1 shows how intellectuals affiliated with 
Science of Thought forged a shared negative image of the prewar and wartime years, centered on the 
elite culture of Imperial Higher Schools, which many of them had attended and later regretted.  
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, educators like Nitobe Inazô promoted a 
cosmopolitan ideal of intellectual and moral self-cultivation (kyôyô) in the liberal arts as an end in 
                                                
15 “After the war, “social scientists,” foremost among them Science of Thought, set up shop as street 
vendors who used everything, even the nest egg of the old lady next door, as ingredients.  They 
seasoned their fried offal (horumon ryôri) with pragmatism or historical materialism as sauce…” 







itself, often in protest against the increasingly specialized and exam-centric world of the university 
and the government bureaucracy.  These educators and the Japanese and Western thinkers they 
promoted became intellectual celebrities, with devoted disciples called “philosophical youth,” who 
pored over their works in extracurricular reading groups.  Their popularity persisted during the 
hardships of war and defeat, when high school graduates roamed used bookstores in search of their 
works.   Many of the new pro-democracy intellectual groups that formed after 1945 were hostile 
toward this display of devotion to thinkers such as Nishida Kitarō, whose philosophy they 
associated with the fascist past.  Progressives argued that his work was a sign of the fanaticism and 
insularity of prewar intellectual culture.   The initial impetus for a rational, easy to understand, and 
radically democratic “science of thought” originated in part from this negative image of the past.  
Chapter 2 addresses the ways in which members of Science of Thought looked to American 
society for solutions to the apparent contradiction between intellectual and democratic culture.  Like 
many disillusioned intellectuals in Western Europe, members of Science of Thought regarded World 
War II as resulting in a shift in intellectual, cultural, and economic dynamism away from Old World 
centers to the United States, with the Soviet Union as its only potential rival. Japanese thinkers were 
attracted to America, not only because of its perceived difference from their own society, which they 
often criticized as rigid and hierarchical, but also because of its difference from Europe, which they 
now associated with fascism and imperialism. When the economist Tsuru Shigeto claimed that in 
America "philosophy melts into everyday life," he was expressing a yearning for a world in which 
politics, popular culture, and intellectual production seemed to reinforce one another in a mutually 
beneficial relationship that contrasted with the fragmentation of Japanese society after the war. In 
order to recreate American patterns in Japan, the group gravitated toward the new science of 
“communication,” a concept invested with considerable intellectual expectations in postwar America 






of Thought to reform intellectual culture after the war were guided by an ideal of clear, transparent 
communication.  Good communicators made good democratic citizens, yet the notion that 
communications science was adequate to the task of realizing democracy came to seem naive in the 
context of the increased political polarization during the Cold War.  Although Science of Thought 
opposed US Cold-War foreign policy, its promotion of Anglo-American thought and the fact that 
four out of seven of its founders had been partly educated in the United States earned them the 
derogatory label "America-nik" (Amerika-ya). 
Suspicion that the group was a vehicle for American interests intensified when some of its 
members received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation in 1949 to study the “Effects of the 
Japanese Language on Communication.”  The group conducted statistical surveys and interviews, 
and produced content analyses of popular movies, novels, and comic books in an unusual 
experiment to probe the mind of the “common man.”  This was part of the early interdisciplinary 
research project on the “Philosophy of Ordinary People,” (Hitobito no tetsugaku), the subject of 
chapter 3.  In some ways paralleling the effort of Mass Observation to study the everyday life of the 
working classes in Britain, the project was significant as an experiment in redefining the scope of 
philosophy in postwar Japan.  Science of Thought members used their empirical work as an 
opportunity to criticize intellectuals who considered popular culture too vulgar to be worthy of 
serious analysis.  They asserted that the implicit “philosophy” (哲学) that structured the everyday 
life of a fireman, for example, was no less worthy of intellectual exegesis than the philosophical 
works of Nishida Kitarô or William James.  The results of their investigation suggested that 
“common folks” were generally pragmatic thinkers who were ambivalent about the political issues 
of vital concern to intellectuals during the Cold War.  I argue that the empirical results of their 
research were less important than their focus on blurring the distinction between highbrow and 






In the early fifties, members of Science of Thought began to feel that the social scientific 
methods they were using to document the lives of the common man were getting in the way of the 
effort to help Japan overcome the separation between intellectuals and the masses.  Disillusioned by 
the rise of McCarthyism in the US and Japan’s continued dependence on US military power, 
Japanese intellectuals began to question their reliance on so-called imported systems of thought 
from abroad and top-down models of intellectual dissemination.  Science of Thought’s intellectual 
cosmopolitanism came under renewed attack, and some members of the group embraced the Left-
wing nationalism that arose during this period.  Others were drawn to the newly founded People’s 
Republic of China whose leaders they saw as pursuing an admirably indigenous path toward 
modernity independent of the Soviet Union.  In this context, Science of Thought shifted its focus 
toward grass-roots educational movements in the countryside, which are the focus of chapter 4.  
This shift entailed more than a change in the object of analysis to include questioning of the status 
of the observer, thus renewing some of the themes of self-cultivation that Science of Thought had 
rejected during the late 1940s.  In 1952 the sociologist Tsurumi Kazuko criticized her earlier use of 
quantitative social scientific methods, saying that henceforth she would become an active part of the 
communities she studied.  Extremely conscious of her elite background as the US-educated daughter 
of a prominent liberal politician, she worked hard as a participant in amateur writing circles 
organized by women textile workers in Yokkaichi and helped to popularize their critical 
observations of everyday life through print and radio.  Although these circles were rooted in local 
communities, many progressives imagined them as parallels to the reading and writing groups in the 
People’s Republic of China.  Circles in both countries were thought to play a role in a bottom-up 
transition toward revolutionary “village democracy” in Asia.   
            In 1952 the Japanese economy had more in common with that of China than that of either 






decade. At that point, Tsurumi Shunsuke worried that increasing material prosperity and the 
homogenization of everyday life caused by postwar consumer society was blunting the critical edge 
and creativity of the circle movement.  Chapter 5 examines how a group of young college students 
affiliated with Science of Thought responded to these changes by teaming up with Tsurumi in a 
collaborative research project on the phenomenon of tenkô (political conversion).  While the project 
ostensibly focused on conversions to fascism among Leftist Japanese intellectuals during the 1930s, 
the researchers’ concerns arose in fact from the political situation of young Leftists in the late fifties, 
caught between conformism to the demands of either the Communist Party or white-collar life 
during the period of high growth.  The social and political difficulties they confronted resembled 
those characterized by the American sociologists David Riesman and C. Wright Mills, but as college 
students, they were particularly concerned about politically active classmates who shed their radical 
beliefs and committed an “employment conversion” (就職転向) upon graduating from university.  
They focused on the ways in which the disconnect between politically radical youthful beliefs and 
later conservative behavior reinforced conformism in both the 1930s and the 1950s.  As Japan 
became an economically more equitable society, the group’s earlier belief in the pragmatism of 
ordinary people gave way to promoting an oppositional stance, embodied in the classless ideal of the 
citizen-activist confronting the pressures of conformism in mass society and white-collar life. 
In conclusion, I consider the role of Science of Thought during and after the large-scale protests 
that erupted in response to the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960.  Science of Thought provided one of 
the central rallying points during these protests, which marked the beginning of citizens movements 
that influenced Japanese civil society in the subsequent decades.  The evolution of the group from 
an elite research circle outside the academy into a standard-bearer for citizen’s activism in the sixties 
can be seen as a metonym for the experience of postwar progressives, an experience that included 






succeed in its sometimes quixotic quest for popular democracy in postwar Japan?   “Not quite” is 
the answer, but they did help to move society toward a more expansive definition of democracy as 
something that depended on the activities of citizens, not just of politicians.  Yet, rather than 
through developing a specific theory of democracy or citizenship, the significance of Science of 
Thought lay in the way it exemplified democracy in practice.  An experimental approach to 
democratic practice lay at the center of the group’s two-front struggle to both realize the 
emancipatory project of modernity and overcome its pathological consequences.  The accumulated 
experience of the intellectuals and citizens associated Science of Thought remains relevant to those who 







Chapter 1: The Negative Origins of Postwar Thought 
Few persons realize how deeply “philosophy” has affected the thinking of modern Japanese.  
Ever since this new discipline had been introduced in Japan under the name of “exquisite 
science,” it caught the hearts of young Japanese students… Many became so engrossed with 
philosophic problems that, unable to free themselves from entanglement, they chose death.  
Modern Japan (1867- ) will be known as a society with the highest rate of “philosophic 
suicides” in the history of the human race.  With the advent of the American Army in 1945, 
Japan is supposed to have been free from old idiosyncrasies and to have taken to American 
ways of thinking that is true, to some extent. But so far, there is no indication of the fact that 
Japan is cured of “philosophy.” 
  -Tsurumi Shunsuke, “An Experiment in Common Man’s Philosophy,” 1951 
 
Philosophy is surprisingly fashionable today. Young men talk about “absolute dialectics” and 
argue about “absolute nothingness.”  Young women carry around a copy of The Self-Aware 
Limitation of Nothingness in their handbags and display The Fundamental Problem of Philosophy on 
top of the piano. 
-Miyagi Otoya, “Fashion in Philosophy,” 1947 
 
 
On July 20th, 1947 the Asahi newspaper printed a captioned photograph that came to 
symbolize the austere yet enthusiastic intellectual atmosphere that rose amid the ruins of early 
postwar Japan.  Taken at 2 AM in the morning in the Kanda district of Tokyo, an area home to 
dozens of used bookstores and publishing houses, the photo depicts a line of young men leeping 
outside at night covered in blankets.  The row wraps around a street corner punctuated by a broken 
pillar. These men were camped outside the headquarters of the publishing house Iwanami Shoten to 
purchase Volume One of the Collected Works of the recently deceased Nishida Kitarô (1870-1945), 
the founder of the Kyoto School of Philosophy.   
The day before, July 19th, 1947, almost two years after the end of World War Two, Iwanami 
had begun publishing the collected works (全集) of Nishida, who died in 1945, months before the 
war ended.  The first volume contained the definitive edition of his most famous work, Inquiry into 
the Good (善の研究), originally published in 1911.  It was the initial explication of Nishida’s 






the standpoint of a Cartesian subject/object dichotomy, yet accessible to creation (poesis) in artistic 
or ethical activity. 
People began lining up the evening of July 16th to buy a copy, and by the morning of the 
18th their number had grown to roughly two hundred.  The short caption, “Sleepy Nishida 
Philosophy,” explained that these “students” were there because they were hoping to catch a 
glimpse of a “facet of eternity” (永遠の相) through Nishida’s philosophy.  They had brought chairs 
and took turns getting food rations while holding places in line.  The author guessed that at least 
some of those queued up intended to scalp the book on the black market at an inflated price.16 
 
 
Figure 1.1, The photo published in the Asahi shinbun on July 20th, 1947 of customers waiting 
for the release of Nishida Kitarô zenshû Volume 1. 
 
Decades later, the photograph remained an artifact tinged with nostalgia for intellectuals 
who had reached maturity during the forties and fifties. It came to represent a bygone age of hungry 
students wandering the war ruins for used books and debating philosophy and politics with strangers 
on street corners.  In a lecture the scholar and public intellectual Maruyama Masao planned to 
                                                






deliver in a joint appearance with Jean-Paul Sartre in the 1960s, he referred to the photograph as 
evidence that students were “starved” for philosophy after the wartime drought, a condition he 
contrasted with growing intellectual apathy of the present.  In retrospect, the photograph 
represented the intellectual ferment that led to the founding of hundreds of periodicals that 
discussed democracy during the Allied Occupation.  Interest in Nishida’s moral philosophy later 
came to seem of a piece with the new, mostly ephemeral periodicals that gave expression to an 
outpouring of “painful, earnest, self-critical, and intensely idealistic” sentiments in defeated Japan.17 
Yet at the time the photo was published, the anonymous “philosophical youth” symbolized 
by the sleeping Nishida devotees invoked suspicion and criticism, particularly on the pages of the 
new journals like Science of Thought that had sprung up to advocate the creation of a new democratic 
culture in postwar Japan.  The caption and early commentary on the photo suggested that it was a 
metaphor for the sleep-like, reality-denying state of young people who had not yet “awakened” to 
the pressing task of rebuilding and reforming Japan.  Critics tried to rouse these philosophical 
disciples from their somnolent state by attacking Nishida for his wartime political activities and 
those of his Kyoto School followers, the “obscurantism and mysticism” of the philosophical 
language he employed, his apparent cultural nationalism, and the pernicious effect of his writings on 
readers, who they imagined might swing violently from political apathy and mental depression to 
fanatical displays of devotion reminiscent of wartime ultra-nationalism.18   
                                                
17 See for example John Dower’s juxtaposition of the photo with the postwar publishing boom in 
support of democracy and science in Embracing Defeat, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 186-187 
18 Later scholars argued that many of these criticisms of Nishida and the Kyoto School philosophers 
were based on poor and irresponsible scholarship with little basis in their actual writings. Some 
pointed to the influence of the Japanese Communist Party during these years to explain the 
outpouring of criticism directed toward the Kyoto School, arguing that the intellectual leadership of 
the Party perceived Nishida and Tanabe’s “bourgeois idealist” moral philosophies to be in 
competition with dialectical-materialism for the hearts and minds of Japan’s youth.  Still others have 
labeled the critique of the Kyoto School’s advocacy of Japanese tradition a form of “deferred 






The criticism of Nishida and his followers played an important role in forging a negative 
image of the wartime past and, out of that image, defining a new democratic intellectual subjectivity 
after the war.  In this context, “Nishida” connoted more than his biography or collected works. He 
was embedded within a larger conception of intellectual culture and sociability in Japan, one that had 
coalesced in the early twentieth century and found its emblematic expression in the “philosophical 
youth” (哲学青年) associated with elite imperial high schools and the ideals of kyôyô (教養), or 
intellectual self-cultivation.   
After World War II, intellectuals who organized themselves into hundreds of small pro-
democracy associations felt the need to combat the archetype of the “philosophical youth,” which 
they associated with the image of their own past. In line with their present selves, they sought a a 
more politically engaged and scientifically minded alternative. The sleepy Nishida followers were a 
manifestation of a shared constitutive other that bound together a diverse ideological coalition 
committed to a redemptive form of democratic subjectivity that would stand in stark contrast to the 
immediate past.   
Early postwar criticism of philosophical youth was a way for progressive intellectuals to 
grapple with a host of issues: the relationship of philosophy to life in mass society, the legacy of the 
liberalism of the 1920s and its ideal of individual self-cultivation (kyôyô), and the urgent problem of 
                                                                                                                                                       
rescue Japan from its fallen state.  Although the adequacy of the anti-Nishida critique has been much 
debated, less attention has been paid to the reasons why this kind of philosophical criticism was such 
a pressing issue for so many intellectuals after the war.  I venture an answer to that question by 
showing the connection between the critique of Nishida and the intellectual culture of kyôyô it was 
perceived to be embedded within across the wartime divide.  For other approaches to postwar 
criticism of Nishida, see Christopher Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan, (London: Routledge, 
2005), 5, J. Victor Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 88, and Bret W. Davis, “Turns to and from political philosophy: the case of Nishitani Keiji” 








facilitating political and intellectual cooperation among progressives with diverse ideological and 
educational affiliations in an atmosphere of deep skepticism toward the climate of moral exhortation 
that had existed during the war. This last demand explains why the behavioral sciences, with their 
future-oriented, modernist aura, played such an important role in the eventual discourse on kyôyô 
and philosophical youth. By diagnosing enthusiasm for idealist ethical philosophy as a symptom of 
psychic depression in modern capitalist society, it offered an explanation and a scientific diagnosis of 
the reticence of many youth to participate in the progressive “democratic front” (民主戦線) of 
postwar liberals and Marxists. 
 
Anguished Youth and the Kyôyô  Culture of Reading 
The critique of Nishida and the Kyoto School was the latest attempt to transform an 
intellectual culture of ethical idealism and self-cultivation – or kyôyô – which originated in the late 
Meiji and Taishô periods (1890s-1920s).19 Kyôyô referred to the holistic cultivation of individuals 
through an appreciation of mostly European canonical works of art, literature, and philosophy 
believed to have stood the test of time. It was associated with the German idealist thought pervasive 
in elite higher schools, and in the bilingual environment there it formed a linguistic cluster with 
terms like Kultur (high culture) and Bildung (cultivation).  The kyôyô ideal remained popular among 
Imperial higher school youth before, during, and even after the war.20 Indeed, the culture of kyôyô 
had been a central part of the intellectual formation of many of its postwar critics. 
                                                
19 Some historians emphasize the links between kyôyô and Confucian ideals of self-cultivation, while 
others emphasize its connections to Europe.  See Hajimu Nakano’s brief description in, “Kuki 
Shûzô and The Structure of Iki” in Culture and Identity, edited by J. Thomas Rimer, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 271. For an account that describes a “Japanese-style” of Kultur 
that blends different traditions, see Tsutsui Kiyotada, Nihon-gata “kyôyô” no unmei (Tokyo: Iwanami 
gendai bunko, 2009).  
20 For statistical evidence of the steadfast popularity of books associated with the culture of kyôyô 






Kyôyô first emerged as a counterbalance to the emphasis on exams, memorization, and the 
mastery of technical subjects in the official school curriculum established in the late nineteenth 
century.  Middle and higher school education, available only to a few, became a valuable source of 
social capital during the Meiji period (1868-1912).  For families who belonged or longed to belong to 
the nascent middle-class, educational success was seen as the primary route to advancement and 
fulfillment of the Meiji ideal of “rising in the world” (立身出世). The competitive struggle to enter 
middle and high schools intensified during the first two decades of the twentieth century, causing 
anxiety over entrance examinations among students and parents.  Preparation for these exams 
consumed an increasingly large portion of students’ time before and after class, and “examination 
disease” (試験病) was soon declared a pressing “social problem” (社会問題).21  Educators and 
child experts voiced concern about the effects of this competition on the development of children 
into healthy adults.  In this context, advocates of kyôyô stressed the need to cultivate aesthetic 
sensibility and build character (人格) through art and physical training.  Early popularizers like Katô 
Totsudô (1870-1949) associated these aims with reviving earlier Confucian and Buddhist ideals of 
self-cultivation (修養) in education which had decreased in importance since the establishment of 
the modern school system in 1872.22 
Early on, kyôyô found a receptive audience on the campuses of imperial higher schools. This 
was partly due to the fact that students who managed to gain admission to these elite schools had a 
relatively smooth path into a prestigious imperial university and experienced less examination 
pressure than students elsewhere.  The cosmopolitan educator and diplomat Nitobe Inazô (1862-
1933) promoted the kyôyô ideal when he became Headmaster of the prestigious First Higher School 
                                                
21 Mark Alan Jones, “Children as Treasures: Childhood and the Middle-class in Early Twentieth-
Century Japan” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2001), 114 






in Tokyo in 1906.  There kyôyô became associated with reading great modern and classical works of 
philosophy and literature – often in informal reading and discussion groups – in a way that focused 
on self-cultivation (bildung) and the search for truth rather than preparation for college entrance 
exams.   
The elite higher school was an environment in which young readers of Nishida thrived. 
Nishida himself was uninterested in promoting the canon of kyôyô, which he believed to be based 
upon obsolescent German idealism and classicism.  Yet his work was first brought to the attention 
of a non-specialist audience in the twenties by one of the stars of the kyôyô world, the playwright 
Kurata Hyakuzô (1891-1943).  Kurata, a self-proclaimed “anguished youth,” claimed that reading 
Nishida’s critique of atheistic materialism in his first book, Inquiry into the Good (Zen no kenkyû), 
empowered him to overcome the mental agony that had troubled him since adolescence and to 
rediscover the world as a place of infinite possibilities. 
Inquiry Into the Good, first published by Iwanami in 1911, was based on philosophy lectures 
Nishida prepared as a teacher at the elite higher school in Kanazawa. Like many classic works of 
early twentieth-century philosophy, including those of Martin Heidegger and William James, the text 
occupied a space between academic philosophy and popular “highbrow culture.”  Nishida 
intervened in ongoing debates in epistemology, providing answers to questions such as, “Where and 
when is the origin of the subject-object divide?” and “What makes the opposition between 
materialism and idealism possible?”  Nishida responded to these longstanding dilemmas with an 
original synthesis of Neo-Kantian idealism and William James’s metaphysical pluralism, combined 
within the rubric of an originary, yet always present, “pure experience” that dissolved the 
oppositions among subjects and objects, idealism and materialism.  It bears certain striking 
similarities to the work of Henri Bergson with its emphasis on intuition as a path to pure experience.  






shared much in common when he encountered the French philosopher’s work after becoming a 
professor at Kyoto University. 
Nishida does not stop at technical questions of epistemology.  From the foundational 
concept of pure experience, he derives ethics, love, and – at the end of this short book – God.  This 
movement reflected Nishida’s intention to reconnect philosophy with practical concerns, moving 
the problem of epistemological foundations, “how is knowledge possible?” to the question “How 
should I live?”  In addressing that question, Nishida saw himself countering the tendency in 
academia to either specialize in a technical subject (science), or to focus on rereading and 
reinterpreting great works of philosophy and literature, full of exemplary life models, without 
creating anything radically new.  This mindset explains why he distanced himself from his teacher at 
Tokyo Imperial University Raphael von Koeber.  Koeber was a professor of Greek philosophy and 
aesthetics who came to Japan from Germany in 1893 and tried to instill an appreciation for the 
ideals of Kultur and Bildung.23  Besides Nishida, his students included Natsume Sôseki, Mori Ôgai, 
Abe Jirô, and Watsuji Testurô, all writers whose works became a part of the canon of kyôyô. 
Yet Nishida’s attempt to make philosophy more relevant to life did not translate into 
accessibility in his writings, which were considered famously difficult by higher school youth.  After 
Inquiry into the Good, Nishida’s published work became even more difficult to understand.  He 
believed that Frege’s critique of philosophical psychologism in Husserl applied to his own work, and 
he internalized his disciple and colleague Tanabe Hajime’s sophisticated critique of his concept of 
pure experience.  Rather than clarifying the glosses in his highly condensed Inquiry, he repeatedly 
revised his system around concepts other than “pure experience,” such as “absolute nothingness” 
and “place.” An anecdote from Kasuya Kazuki’s memoir of the early postwar years is suggestive.  A 
philosophically inclined high school student roaming used book stores in Tokyo shortly after World 
                                                






War II, he was repeatedly drawn towards Nishida’s works, but when he actually managed to acquire 
a copy of a used book amidst the shortages, he wrote that “It appeared to be written in some alien 
language...”24 Yet the seeming incomprehensibility of some of Nishida’s writings seemed to stoke the 
desire among students to decipher their true meaning.25  Belying Nishida’s original intentions, 
postwar critics believed that the obsession with the difficulty of his texts contributed to widening the 
chasm separating intellectuals from the masses. 
Studies on the Good was not widely read outside academic circles until the publication of 
playwright Kurata Hyakuzō’s essay collection Departure with Love and with Consciousness (Ai to ninshiki to 
no shuppatsu) in 1921, a philosophical and autobiographical Bildungsroman of his young adulthood.  
According to a survey conducted in the thirties, this book, affectionately nicknamed Deppa (after the 
French pronunciation of “depart”) by its fans, was the most popular extracurricular text among elite 
students at Kurata’s alma mater, the First Higher School in Tokyo.  Kurata’s chapter on Nishida in 
Deppa catapulted the mostly unknown Inquiry into the Good to the position of fourth most popular 
book on the list, just below Kurata’s play, Shinran and his Disciples (Shukke to sono deshi), the third most 
popular text.26  In surveys conducted from the twenties through the forties, Nishida and Kurata 
were at or near the top of similar popularity rankings at Imperial High Schools throughout Japan.27   
The book was a crossover hit among students of philosophy and literature, who typically had 
widely divergent reading lists.  Kurata played with the opposition of these two groups of students by 
opening Deppa with a letter written from the perspective of his early twenties in which he, a self-
described “philosophical youth,” criticizes a friend who preferred to read works of literature.  The 
young Kurata at first thought his literary friend a sophist because he preferred beauty (literature) 
                                                
24 Kasuya Kazuki, op. cit., 14 
25 Miyagi Otoya, “Tetsugaku no ryûkô” Science of Thought (Jun. 1947), 196 
26 Suzuki Norihisa, “Kaisetsu,” in Ai to ninshiki to no shuppatsu, (Tokyo: Iwanami bunko, 2008), 343 






over truth (philosophy). The narrator Kurata came to see that the opposition between truth and 
beauty was false, and both are united in an all-encompassing concept of the good.  Drawing on 
Nishida, Kurata argued that the different intellectual inclinations separating students in categories of 
philosophical, religious, or literary youth were based on false oppositions and a failure to 
comprehend the unity of the universe in pure experience. 28 The experience of reading Kurata, 
together with authors like Miki Kiyoshi, Abe Jiro, and Ide Takashi, helped forge a collective identity 
among aspiring young intellectuals throughout Japan that transcended their allegiance to specific 
higher schools or reading circles.  
Kurata devoted an entire essay in the collection to outlining the argument of Inquiry into the 
Good, with lyrical embellishments sprinkled throughout. For example, he compared Nishida’s unique 
place in the shallow, vulgar world of philosophy to the scent of a “pale white flower on a hanging 
bell plant in the midst of a barren wasteland in the shadow of a mountain.”29  In the preface to the 
essay collection, he asserts that his understanding of Nishida at the time was “childish, and 
academically it serves as nothing more than an introduction to epistemology, but it was important 
for me at the time, and it is important today because I am reluctant to feel loathing for the precious 
memory of the time during which I wrote that essay.  And also because, even if youth in general to 
do not devote their life to philosophical inquiry, the essence of epistemology, an essence one must 
absolutely know, is contained in the text.”30 
Why was knowledge of this essence so important?  Kurata claimed that a chance encounter 
with Nishida’s work saved him from philosophical anguish.  With the benefit of hindsight, he 
claimed that much of his anguish was brought on by faulty middle-school instruction, in which he 
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was taught natural science and a materialist explanation for existence without learning idealist 
epistemology (唯心論的な認識論).  For Kurata, the mechanistic worldview implied by the study of 
scientific laws deprived life of meaning. The competition for wealth and knowledge among Kurata’s 
elite peers only reinforced what Kurata saw as the nihilistic worldview that everything was 
predetermined in advance by impersonal laws of natural evolution. 
Until this inadequacy in the school system was remedied, Kurata believed that his essay on 
Nishida should serve as a supplement to the general education of all young adults.  He wrote:  
Until I was liberated from the inappropriate demand that the natural scientific knowledge I 
had been taught according to faulty methods in middle school serve as an explanation for 
actual existence - a demand that was beyond the scope of that knowledge’s proper limits –
what unnecessary and truly wretched agonies did I experience!  You could even say that for 
that reason I expended over half my total youthful energy.  My agony could have been 
avoided, or at least lessened by half, if only my middle school natural science teacher had 
added that, as an explanation for existence, this here is just one way of thinking – not the 
only one – and that there are others.  If I only I had known that among these others, there 
exists an idealism completely opposed to the way I had been taught.  I cannot help thinking 
that most youth suffer from the same anguish.31  
  
Kurata had reason to believe that his youthful experiences were not unique.  Both nuanced 
and stereotypical portraits of “anguished youth” (煩悶青年) like himself were ubiquitous in 
literature and journalism during the Taisho period (1912-1926).  Critics eager to grasp the "spirit of 
the age” believed that the appearance of melancholy young people signified disillusionment with 
modernity and progress.  One source of this trope was the media frenzy surrounding the 1903 
suicide of Fujimura Misao, a 16-year-old student at the First Higher School who quoted Hamlet 
before throwing himself off a precipice in order to "measure the space between heaven and earth.”  
                                                






In the wake of the incident, there was much debate over whether his suicide was a statement of bold 
individualism or a cowardly retreat from reality.32 
 The journalist Tokutomi Sohô (1863-1957) defined “anguished youth” as an emblematic 
social type in his 1917 essay “Taisho Youth and the Prospects of Empire” (大正の青年と帝国の
前途).33  Tokutomi argued that anguished youth represented Taishô disillusionment with the Meiji 
ideal of rags-to-riches success (risshin shusse) – a turn away from service to the nation toward self-
oriented inwardness.  Global trends in philosophy seemed to abet this turn, visible in one of the first 
“thought guidebooks” that catalogued fashionable intellectual terms and “isms”.  In this guidebook 
Shimonaka Yasaburô (1878-1961), the founder of the publisher Heibonsha, defined “modern 
thought” (近代思想) as a collection of various philosophies “prioritizing the emotions and 
individuality” – the antithesis of “scientistic panaceism” (科学万能主義).  Excessive exposure to 
modern thought could lead to “über-Kultur” – glossed as “excessive kyôyô.”  He mockingly 
described this condition in a separate entry as “lofty thinking” (高い思想) combined with an 
“inability to associate with common and vulgar people.”  He wrote that in its advanced stages this 
condition could cause one to become completely useless as a human being.34 
According to Shimonaka’s text, three exemplars of “modern thought” were William James in 
America, Henri Bergson in France, and Rudolf Eucken in Germany.35 Euro-centrism aside, Nishida, 
who drew on James and Bergson in his work, could have been added to this list as Japan’s national 
representative.  Kurata and Nishida saw the emotions, and melancholy in particular, as a potential 
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source of creative energy that could be directed toward intellectual and literary pursuits outside the 
confines of academic study.36  The anguish of anguished youth was a manifestation of life itself 
struggling to overturn rigid, overly cultured patterns of thought.  They saw the philosophical revolt 
against Cartesian intellectualism that began in fin-de-siècle Europe, Japan, and the United States as 
finding its sociological embodiment in the figure of anguished youth.   
In the press, the student culture of reading philosophy associated with kyôyô was 
stereotypically presented as excessively inward directed or, in the eyes of less sympathetic observers, 
a cause for mental instability among “troubled youth.”  Extracurricular reading was also associated 
with Marxism and “thought crimes” during the twenties, but following further crackdowns on 
Leftist activity in the thirties, reading philosophy came to seem like a therapeutic or even unpatriotic 
escape from practical concerns and the anxieties of modern civilization. 
In the 1930s, intellectual popularizers like Kawai Eijirô (1891-1944), a professor of 
economics at Tokyo Imperial University, fought back against this view of youthful intellectualism.  
He tried to promote a more politically engaged “kyôyô-ism” (教養主義) to fill the vacuum left by the 
suppression of Marxism in the 1930s.  According to Kawai, the self-cultivation of kyôyô was 
necessary to avoid the pitfalls of Marxism, which erred in trying to change the world under the 
pretense of the false objectivity of a disembodied observer standing outside the capitalist totality.37  
Yet this initial turn towards self-cultivation was just one moment in the creation of culturally literate, 
politically engaged national subjects – liberal, anti-fascist reformers instead of Marxist revolutionaries. 
Given the concerns of the Marxists Tosaka Jun and Fukumoto Kazuo with questions of 
consciousness and epistemology, Kawai’s characterization of Marxism as unconcerned with 
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subjectivity was not entirely accurate, but it did tap into a broad shift in philosophical interests 
toward questions of subjectivity.  This shift was prompted in part by the circulation of ideas derived 
from physics, most notably Einstein’s theories of relativity and Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle, which drew attention to how the position of the observer could impact scientific 
measurements, at a time when Marxist writings were becoming both less available and dangerous.38 
Kawai’s idealistic vision of kyôyô never fully displaced the public image of philosophical 
youth as aloof, melancholy dilettantes, and their presence became increasingly problematic in the 
context of total mobilization for the war in China in the late 1930s.  Relentlessly attacked by rightists 
for being insufficiently proud of Japan’s unique cultural heritage, Kawai, a consistent and vocal critic 
of Marxism – he called it an “infectious mental disease” – eventually suffered the same fate as the 
Marxists.  Indicted in 1939 for “disturbing peace and order” and “corrupting public morals” in his 
writings attacking fascism, he died of a heart attack a few months after his trial finally concluded in 
1943.39  
Yet texts associated with kyôyô increased in popularity among high school students during 
the thirties and forties. At a time when supposed Marxist tracts began disappearing from bookstores, 
high school students eagerly consumed works from the late Meiji and Taishô periods by Natsume 
Sôseki, Abe Jirô, Kurata Hyakuzô, and Nishida Kitarô that adopted a stance of ethical idealism 
against the alienating and instrumentalizing effects of modern civilization. In the twenties and 
thirties, the Marxists Tosaka Jun (1900-1945) and Kozai Yoshishige (1901-1990) criticized these 
thinkers as bourgeois idealists.  When they, too, were driven from the scene in 1937, critics like 
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Minoda Muneki, leader of the rightist association Genri Nihonsha, made increasingly strident attacks 
on kyôyô as the domain of decadent, unpatriotic liberals.  
Despite support from the Ministry of Education, Minoda and other overtly right wing and 
fascist authors failed to make significant inroads against kyôyô among elite higher school students. In 
1938, the Ministry of Education published a list of recommended books and authors for “ideological 
guidance” (思想指導).  Among the top recommended authors, only the Heideggerian ethicist 
Watsuji Tetsurô, a former colleague of Nishida’s in Kyoto, became popular among higher school 
students during the war.  These students were partly insulated from broader trends that favored 
novels about the war with a nationalist message.  Even at the height of wartime mobilization in the 
forties, students at imperial higher schools still preferred to read Natsume Sôseki’s Kokoro (1914) or 
Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment (translated in 1914) over more recent works celebrating the 
imperial cause in Asia – much to the consternation of education officials.40  
After the war, books associated with kyôyô, in short supply due both to the paper shortage 
and their perceived irrelevance to the war effort, retained their popularity among students.  This was 
a source of concern for intellectuals who believed that the war had demonstrated the inability of 
intellectuals associated with cosmopolitan ethical idealism to resist fascism.  The suspicion arose that 
kyôyô had directly or indirectly contributed to the rise of militarism.  Many postwar progressives who 
embraced these suspicions had themselves participated in the culture of kyôyô during their formative 
years.  
Tsurumi Shunsuke (1922-), a self-described “delinquent youth” (不良少年) with a troubled 
relationship to his prestigious family, memorized Fujimura Misao’s suicide note and attempted to kill 
himself several times by overdosing on sleeping pills while loitering in coffee shops in Shibuya.  His 
                                                






father, the liberal politician and famous writer Tsurumi Yûsuke, eventually sent him to live with 
acquaintances in America, where he was able to escape the psychological burden of his family’s 
celebrity.  During his teens, Shunsuke was attracted to the writings of Kurata, but he became 
disillusioned by Kurata’s fervent support of the war effort.41      
Ide Takashi (1892-1980), who published A Notebook of a Philosophical Youth, was ranked 
second only to Kurata in terms of his popularity at the Tokyo First Higher School.  His most 
popular work was the contemplative Before Philosophy (哲学以前), which linked all intellectual inquiry 
to existential sorrow.  He exhorted students mobilized for the war in China effort to “die a beautiful 
death,” but after the war ended, Ide joined the Japanese Communist Party and became a vocal critic 
of the kyôyô culture he had once represented.42 
In the 1920s, Kurata seemed to believe that relief for his sorrows could be found in a kind of 
epistemological pluralism.  Yet during the war Kurata, like Ide, embraced ultra-nationalism, much to 
the dismay of some of his youthful followers.  Tsurumi recalls that his disillusioned reaction to 
Kurata’s behavior during the war instilled in him the desire “negate philosophy” entirely.  As he put 
it in an interview, “I now felt philosophers did nothing but play with words.”43  During the war, he 
channeled anger over his sense of betrayal into the writing of “On the Talismanic Use of Words” – 
his famous debut publication for the first issue of Science of Thought in 1946.  He argued that strictly 
separating emotion-driven from logic-driven speech acts would re-order the potentially dangerous 
state of linguistic confusion unleashed by philosophical idealism. 
Tsurumi and other intellectuals argued that epistemological pluralism had produced an 
atmosphere of linguistic confusion and mass psychosis during the war. Yet Kurata’s lyrical 
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interweaving of epistemological and psychological problems continued to mediate the popular 
reception of Nishida’s work in the immediate postwar years, even as social psychologists and 
existential writers sought to usurp the place of philosophers in addressing the sorrows of youth. 
Different criticisms of the Kyoto School suggested different visions of postwar intellectual 
culture.  In some cases, attacks on Nishida suggested that consistent opposition to anything 
remotely associated with fascism or Japanese cultural chauvinism was more important than 
unconstrained intellectual inquiry.  The young people who came together to form Science of Thought 
tended to focus less on Nishida’s relationship to fascism and the content of his philosophy and 
more on the intense difficulty of understanding his writing.  In a special issue of the group’s journal 
in June 1947 on “Philosophical Trends in Japan,” the psychologist Miyagi Otoya and the sociologist 
Takeda Ryôzô both suggested that the intense effort required to decipher the meaning of Nishida’s 
texts led to the formation of an insular community of philosophers estranged from both the general 
population and other intellectuals less inclined to metaphysical speculation.44  The flipside of this 
critique was that, above all else, postwar critics now had to find ways of engaging with non-
philosophers to erode the barriers separating intellectuals from the masses and philosophers from 
social scientists, who were among the most vocal supporters of multi-disciplinary cooperation in the 
many new associations that formed after the war.45 
 
Science versus Kyôyô   
Attacking the “philosophical youths” who continued to consume texts by Nishida and other 
authors associated with kyôyô was an implicit act of self-criticism.  Before and during the war, many 
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postwar intellectuals eagerly consumed the philosophy they later condemned as “idealistic.”  The 
kyôyô ideal was an important part of the educational experiences of even its vocal critics, most of 
whom who were not opposed to the idea of an intellectual canon per se.  The nuclear physicist and 
co-founder of Science of Thought Taketani Mitsuo (1911-2000) criticized the Kyoto School while 
promoting the works of Roman Rolland, Paul Valéry, Beethoven, Karl Marx, and Galileo among 
others, but he suggested that the traditional canon of philosophy and its relationship to science and 
everyday life had to be transformed in the interests of a new democratic Japan. 
Taketani criticized the intellectual insularity of wartime Japan and proposed a postwar ideal 
of openness and cooperation in the founding issue of Science of Thought of May, 1946.  Neither an 
overt critique of wartime fascism nor a blueprint for Japanese democracy, it was a revised version of 
an article Taketani wrote during the war on the history of science, entitled, “How Can Philosophy 
Recover its Effectiveness?”  He criticized academic philosophers for devoting too much time to the 
insular and “unscientific” task of endlessly interpreting and reinterpreting canonical texts.  He urged 
them to adopt more scientific methods that might allow them to cooperate more effectively with 
other intellectuals in the construction of postwar democracy. Taketani’s conception of science as a 
trail-and-error practice did not imply claiming a stance of methodological objectivity, but instead 
meant repeatedly risking failure through the application of ideas and methods – perpetual works-in-
progress – to the everyday world.  
Taketani argued that the adequacy of all ideas had to be discovered in their practical 
relationship to everyday life.  The unpalatable alternative to this conception of philosophy was 
represented by a member of the Kyoto School, the philosopher and historian of science Shimomura 
Toratarô, whose exegetical work on the neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer Taketani singled 
out for criticism.  He argued that Kyoto School philosophers were interested only in constructing 






scientific experimentalism, rarely exposed them to failure and the need to radically change their ideas.  
As he put it, instead of trying to understand Cassirer’s complicated interpretation of Kant, they 
ought to be searching for new ways to “correct Kant” themselves.  
Taketani’s criticism touched on a broader tendency among intellectuals during the war who 
became enthusiastic participants in democratic associations after it ended.   Later commentators 
noted that many intellectuals active in progressive causes after the war had turned during wartime to 
seemingly esoteric studies of European intellectual history, sometimes with hidden political 
intentions.46 When the war ended, they expressed remorse over their failure to speak out against the 
war and vowed to exercise vigilance over possible signs of a relapse to militarism.  The head of 
Iwanami Shoten, publisher of Nishida’s Collected Works, expressed this remorse by launching the 
politically engaged, Left-leaning current affairs magazine Sekai in December, 1945.  In the first issue, 
he expressed the sentiments of many when he wrote that he felt ashamed over the “lack of courage” 
that had prevented him from openly resisting the war.  He promised that Sekai would be a conduit 
between the public and intellectuals of different ideological persuasions, disparate groups imagined 
to have grown estranged from each other, who were interested in the task of building a democratic 
Japan.47 
Written before the end of the Pacific War and revised only months after surrender, 
Taketani’s article was part of a moment of ideological pluralism between the end of World War II 
and the polarization of the Cold War, a moment that saw the emergence of the journal Sekai, Science 
of Thought, and hundreds of other journals and associations.48 This loose progressive coalition was 
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partly held together by the Association of Democratic Scientists (Minshushugi kagakusha kyôkai or 
“Minka” for short), an organization founded in January 1946 that traced its roots to short-lived anti-
fascist organizations in Tokyo and Kyoto during the thirties. Taketani had written for the anti-fascist 
journal Sekai bunka (World Culture, 1935-1937) and, in addition to helping to start Science of Thought, 
was a founding member of Minka.  He called for a “democratic synthesis” of Deweyian pragmatism 
and Marxism that would supplant the Kyoto School, an urgent task for the popular-front coalition 
of liberals and Marxists in Minka.  
The Marxists, pragmatists, existentialists, and liberals who populated the intellectual 
landscape of postwar Japan could all find reasons to put aside their sectarian differences and band 
together against the Kyoto School and the ideal of kyôyô with which it was associated.  Though they 
disagreed about the proper role of philosophy in postwar Japan, the common enemy was clearly 
marked.  For example, fellow Minka member Yamada Sakaji criticized Taketani’s inaugural article 
for attacking philosophy with too broad a brush, making it difficult for Marxists to develop a true 
“science of praxis” – a task that required reflecting on the problem of subjectivity raised by Nishida 
– yet he made no attempt to actually defend the Kyoto School or philosophical idealism, and he was 
certain that both would vanish in the aftermath of proletarian revolution.49 Taketani responded to 
his criticism in an article entitled “Conditions for Cooperation with Philosophers,” arguing that 
philosophical discussion had to remain as “practical” (実践的) as possible in order to enable 
effective collaboration – anything else was “dilettantism” (ディレタンティズム).  He pointed to 
the fact that he was able to collaborate with Yukawa Hideki, who would soon be awarded the Nobel 
Prize for physics, on scientific matters despite the fact that they did not see eye-to-eye on questions 
of subjectivity and dialectical materialism.  The Yamada and Taketani debate about the scope of 
                                                






practical philosophy and intellectual cooperation took place on the assumption that it was necessary 
to relegate the ideal of kyôyô to the past.50 
For many intellectuals, criticizing the culture of kyôyô and advocating a “scientific” approach 
to philosophy was a way of announcing that they had renounced their wartime opinions and turned 
toward a new democratic future. During the war, many of these critics had contrasted the 
superficiality of American civilization with the depth of Kultur in Europe and, to a lesser extent, 
Japan.  During the build-up to war with the United States in 1938, Tsurumi Yûsuke (1885-1973), the 
father of Science of Thought founders Tsurumi Shunsuke and Tsurumi Kazuko, founded a think-tank 
devoted to strategic research on the United States and the Pacific.  In 1944, the association 
published The National Character of the Americans with contributions from Kazuko and Tsuru Shigeto, 
an American-educated economist who also helped found Science of Thought after the war.  In the 
opening essay “The Intellectual Weakness of the American National Character,” Tsuru pointed out 
the “cultural retardation” of the Americans in regards to kyôyô (教養の匍行性).  He criticized the 
tendency of American pragmatists to use stock-market metaphors when conducting philosophical 
discussions, citing as evidence William James’s famous statement about the “cash-value of ideas.” 
This was in line with the wartime characterization of the United States as a technologically advanced 
yet soulless, materialistic civilization.51 
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After the war, critics commonly asserted that the philosophical idealism associated with kyôyô 
was out of touch with the times because, unlike Marxism and logical positivism, it was antagonistic 
to the sciences. Tsurumi Shunsuke furthered Taketani’s criticism in a short pamphlet called 
“Reflections on Philosophy” (Tetsugaku no hansei), also published in May 1946.  In it, he wrote that 
the division of the sciences into specialized disciplines had the effect of making philosophy appear 
like a fossilized remnant from pre-modernity.  In ancient Greece, all branches of knowledge, 
including natural sciences, were part of philosophy.  Yet in the modern age, scientific inquiry was 
severed from philosophy and developed according to its own autonomous logic, leaving philosophy 
behind as an anachronistic outlet for irrational and narcissistic intellectual impulses.  Avid 
consumption of Kyoto School texts was evidence of the persistent demand for such an outlet.  Yet 
by turning to social science and re-routing these intellectual impulses through critical observations of 
philosophy’s effect on behavior, philosophy could be saved from complete obsolescence, though 
reduced to the auxiliary role of regulating linguistic behavior.  The role of rational philosophy was to 
(1) expose irrational philosophy through linguistic analysis and (2) work with the empirical social 
sciences to explain to people what they were actually doing when they engaged with irrational 
philosophy.  This was to produce a moment of recognition that could release them from the 
jargonistic haze of such Kyoto School concepts as “infinite mediation” and “contradictory 
nothingness.” 
Again and again members of Science of Thought asserted the need to think outside the 
confines of the “bureaucratic establishment” (官僚機構) associated with the imperial Higher 
Schools and universities, which they accused of training the elites that blindly led Japan into a 
disastrous war.  Members hoped to appeal to readers outside this elite stratum by discussing in 
unadorned language works of social science and analytic philosophy from America and England that 






Science of Thought’s internal surveys suggested that the journal was primarily read by young high 
school and college students – the prime consumers of kyôyô – during its first two decades of 
publication.52  The journal and institute were torn between, on the one hand, trying to reform a 
preexisting academic culture of philosophical reading, and, on the other, leaving that culture behind 
in search of a new, vaguely defined, critical reading public after the war. 
 
The Scandal of Philosophy in Postwar Japan 
Kyôyô represented the antithesis of the postwar coupling of science and democracy.  It was 
difficult to understand, impractical, unscientific, elitist, and associated with the past instead of the 
future. In the aftermath of World War II, intellectuals associated with Science of Thought felt the need 
to combat the romanticized archetype of Imperial Higher School-educated “philosophical youths” 
with a more politically engaged, sociable, scientifically minded counterpart. 
Thus while one part of the intellectual narrative of the early Occupation years consisted of 
the resurgence of politically engaged Marxian social science, this was accompanied by a dramatic 
staging of the scandal of philosophy among youth. Disapproving responses to the Nishida boom 
dovetailed with Tsurumi’s assertion that Nishida’s so-called modern philosophy was atavistic.  After 
1945, Japanese philosophy, as represented by Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime, and some of their 
pupils and colleagues at Kyoto University, was dismissed as escapist, faddish, or crypto-fascist in 
popular front journals such as Tetsugaku hyōron (Philosophical Critique), Riron (Theory), the revived 
Yuibutsuron kenkyūkai (Materialism Research), and Science of Thought.  
People sleeping on a street corner waiting to purchase a copy of the first volume of the 
Collected Works of Nishida Kitarô was regarded as a scandalous event, and the discourse surrounding it 
touched on the separation of a degraded intellectual culture from the “present reality of postwar 
                                                






Japan.”  The scale and devotion of the student all-nighter was remarkable enough to prompt a 
critical editorial ten days later in the Asahi newspaper of July 30th.  In an article published in the 
long-established front-page column “Vox Populi, Vox Dei” (Tensei jingo), the journalist Aragaki 
Hideo (1903-1989) ridiculed the Nishida craze.  Aragaki, who mixed progressive ideas and populist 
commonsense (良識) in his commentary on current events, sarcastically wrote of the sleeping 
Nishida devotees that he, “had never heard of students in Berlin or Heidelberg behaving like that in 
order to buy a work by Hegel.”  He complained that while he understood that “during the period of 
confusion after defeat, young people might seek firm support for their mental lives in philosophy” 
this kind of “fanaticism” (熱狂さ) was “a bit over the top,” or at least “un-philosophical” (非鉄
学).53  He continued:  
Professor Nishida used Western philosophy as a starting point from which to systematize 
Oriental thought, and his achievements are considerable.  “Nishida philosophy” is the staple 
of the philosophical diet in Japan, and everything else appears to be a side dish or seasoning, 
but the result has been the transformation of “Nishida philosophy” into an idol (偶像化).  It 
goes without saying that these students need to learn the simple fact that ‘Nishida 
Philosophy’ is not the only philosophy out there.  The Japanese people of today need to 
think over the question as to whether or not “Nishida philosophy” will have any use at all as 
a guiding principle from now on.54 
 
Aragaki presented the postwar Nishida craze as absurdly out of sync with the time of New 
Japan.  For him, the line of sleeping students was vivid proof that philosophy was no longer sacred, 
as perhaps it might have been in the time of Hegel, but now was rather just one commodity among 
others.  “Where people gather to lawfully acquire goods, queuing up is a commonsense rule.  That 
books of philosophy are mere goods (モノ) of a sort is the long and short of it…”55 The absurdity for 
                                                








Aragaki was that, although the current situation made clear that books of philosophy were 
commodities subject to the vicissitudes of an economy plagued by shortages, students continued to 
sacralize them by means of their enthusiastic behavior.   
Aragaki’s satire of the behavior of the sleeping students and the postwar critique of Nishida 
and kyôyô was part of an ongoing debate on the relationship between philosophy and mass culture 
that unfolded throughout the capitalist world.  Philosophical texts associated with kyôyô had become 
mass-produced commodities in Japan after Iwanami Shoten began releasing inexpensive paperback 
versions in 1927. Once philosophy became an object of mass consumption, critics expressed anxiety 
over whether kyôyô was about self-cultivation and the pursuit of eternal truth or about status and the 
competitive pursuit of socially-recognized cultural capital.56  
The Asahi editorial also touched on multiple fault-lines, notably of class and generation, that 
cut across the cultural landscape of postwar Japan. The notion that the experience of Wo pdfrld War 
II had created distinct, sometimes violently opposed, generational identities appeared at a very early 
date.  Less than six months after surrender, the literary critic Ara Masato published an influential 
article in Kindai bungaku (Modern Literature) in which he urged members of his generation to recapture 
the youth they had sacrificed during the war years by renouncing a system of ethics centered on 
martyrdom and embracing rational egotism in its place. Ara’s binary (martyrdom vs. egotism) brings 
the absurdity of Aragaki’s depiction of devotional consumerism into focus.  These ascetic students 
appeared to be martyrs without a cause. 
For Ara, who was involved in heated debates with postwar Marxists, it mattered little 
whether the object of self-sacrifice was the emperor, as in the case of kamikaze pilots, or the 
proletariat, as in the case of Marxist Tosaka Jun, whose posthumously republished works also 
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became popular after the war.  Dying in prison as the war ended, Tosaka was celebrated as a symbol 
of intellectual resistance by the Japanese Communist Party.  Yet he was implicated in Ara’s critique 
insofar as it was directed toward a personality, the martyr type (殉教型), that he argued had become 
hegemonic during the war, and he thought had not changed after 1945.  Despite disagreement 
between some Marxists and rational egotists like Ara over how to characterize a thinker like Tosaka 
Jun, they agreed on the anachronistic irrationality of the Nishida craze, which seemed to them a 
fascist remnant antithetical to postwar democracy. 
 
The Consolations of Social Science  
The period after World War II has been referred to as a “new opening” (atarashii kaikoku), 
with the implication that Commodore Perry’s expedition in 1853 was the old opening of the 
country.57 Writing of her difficulty obtaining new books from England or America during the war, 
Tsurumi Kazuko drew a parallel between that period and the Tokugawa-era policy of isolationism.58 
Yet, although censorship existed under the Allied Occupation, previously banned books by Marxist 
writers gradually reappeared in print, and new books from England and America began to trickle 
into the country through the library run by the Occupation’s Civil Information and Education 
Section (CIE). 
 Many progressive thinkers welcomed this change while remaining wary of the effects of 
unfettered intellectual tolerance, especially when that tolerance permitted “philosophy” to exist that 
appeared to lack a secure foundation in scientific reason. Written long after this period, in the 1970s, 
Maruyama Masao’s essay on Japan’s “old opening” in 1853 cited Bergson’s opposition between 
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open and closed systems of morality to describe the implications of the event.59  Bergson’s 
philosophy had been hotly debated from the 1910s to the 1930s, yet he was generally ignored or 
dismissed as an irrational metaphysician in the years immediately following the war, the moment 
Maruyama was now retrospectively imagining as a “new opening.” Interest in Bergson, along with 
that in the Kyoto School, was problematic for thinkers who wished to make a break from the 
“philosophical fads” (哲学流行) they associated with the prewar culture of kyôyô.  Among those 
who witnessed the rise of militarism, it was feared that extreme openness could lead to a repetition 
of the shift from the liberalism of the twenties to the fascism of the thirties.  Before his death, 
Tosaka Jun argued that Taishô democracy provided a stage for fascism to take hold and negate 
liberalism in Japan.  The stigma attached to idealist philosophers of the Taishô period was connected 
to this fear of relapsing into fascism. 
Progressives of various intellectual affiliations waged a battle in the forties and fifties to win 
the hearts and minds of the youth away from idealist, vitalist, intuitionist thought.60  In some cases, 
exemplars of prewar idealism denounced their early works and former teachers and became 
spokesmen for the effort to reach out to idealist youth and wean them from the philosophy of the 
past.  For example, Yanagi Genjurō, a former member of the Kyoto School of philosophy, became 
the head of “Wadatsumi no kai” an organization that drew secondary school students from all over 
the country into the peace movement.  
Other thinkers psychologically and sociologically analyzed the causes for the popularity of 
idealist philosophy as part of an attempt to combat its postwar influence.  Intellectuals associated 
with Science of Thought argued that its popularity was a result of the incompletely modernized, semi-
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feudal condition of Japan.  One characteristic was the estrangement of intellectuals from the masses, 
an estrangement that psychologically manifested itself in the minds of intellectuals as disjuncture 
between their subjective consciousness and their empirically observable behavior in a variety of 
social contexts.  This gap was a central concern of Maruyama’s famous analysis of Japanese fascism.  
Influenced by Karl Schmitt’s notion that the essence of politics is the decision, Maruyama argued 
that military leaders lacked an awareness of their own decisive acts of leadership.  This rendered 
them incapable of owning up to their war responsibility, a condition he contrasted unfavorably with 
the Nazi leadership.61 The Durkheimian social psychologist Miyagi Otoya applied a similar argument 
to philosophical youth, arguing that there was a disjuncture between their subjective belief that they 
were individualistic thinkers, and his objective observation of their conformist, trend-pursuing 
behavior as aspiring intellectuals. 
Miyagi’s article appeared in June 1947, a month before the famous photo of students 
camped out to buy Nishida’s work. It was part of a special issue on “Research on Philosophical 
Trends in Japan” (日本における哲学流行の研究), in Science of Thought.  Besides Miyagi in 
psychology, the Marxist historian Hani Gorô and the sociologist Takeda Ryôzô analyzed Nishida 
and the Kyoto School as a “philosophical trend” from their respective disciplinary perspectives. 
In the first essay, “The Historical Analysis of Philosophy,” Hani Gorô gave a Marxist 
interpretation that linked the craze for abstruse philosophy to the semi-feudal condition of Japan.  
He argued that idealist philosophy came to stand in for the political activities forbidden by the 
repressive state apparatus.  Yet in a seeming nod to postwar existentialism’s focus on individual 
experience, Hani argued that the experience of producing and consuming philosophy under semi-
feudal conditions in Japan contained universal insight into philosophy as a flight from the reality of 
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class struggle.  According to Hani, Japanese thinkers, including Marxists like himself, had always 
gravitated towards abstract, highly academic philosophical language because direct confrontation 
with the reality of class exploitation was forbidden by the semi-feudal state. Yet there was dialectical 
ambivalence in his recollection of the thirties.  Rather than a purely negative experience, reading 
idealist philosophers brought him into contact with the plight of earlier thinkers who, like himself, 
resorted to unnecessarily complicated language in order to articulate a critique of existing society.  In 
a postwar environment of skepticism toward ethically charged displays of remorse or regret, Hani, 
like many others, characterized the war as a learning experience.  Hani wrote of the time when “the 
obtuse philosophies of thinkers like Hegel, Kant, and Nishida came into fashion”: 
At that time, I arrived at a certain discovery.  It was a notion that the philosophical thought 
of Hegel and Kant did not come in a form that was natural, necessary, and complete, but 
one that was unnatural, incomplete, and unnecessary.  What Kant or Hegel tried to express 
was critical reason or dialectic, but they were unable to assert that directly or completely.  
They expressed their incomplete assertions in a roundabout fashion, and replacing reality 
with an abstraction, they entered into abstraction for the sake of abstraction, and ended up 
adopting a form that was unnecessarily difficult to understand.62 
 
The crux of the essay was that “philosophy” (哲学) had always been, in both Europe and 
Japan, a distorted depiction of the truth of historical materialism, either due to its unwillingness or 
inability to directly confront reality.  Philosophizing was a flight into abstraction.  By engaging in 
self-reflection on the unnecessary abstraction in his earlier Marxist studies, Hani came to the 
conclusion that this conscious or unconscious act of fleeing had a universal quality to it.  It affected 
everyone – from Kant in eighteenth-century Germany to Japanese Marxists working under “semi-
feudal” conditions.  Thus, while the universal tendency of philosophy to distort reality was proof of 
the transhistorical truth of historical materialism and the centrality of class struggle, it also suggested 
that historical materialism, insofar as it was expressed and consumed as philosophy, was always in 
                                                






danger of falling back into distortion and abstraction, in the same way that Japanese democracy was 
always threatened by remnant forces of reaction.63  
This second point, that Marxism was susceptible to counter-productive abstraction, might 
explain why Hani argued in his conclusion that historical materialists must cooperate with logicians 
and psychoanalysts in order to make their thoughts clearer and solve new problems.64   Hani 
explained away philosophical trendiness by pointing to the temerity of the bourgeoisie and the 
power of the repressive state, but he left to psychological analysis the question as to why, in 
Occupied Japan, some people were drawn toward politics and engaged social science, while others 
continued to be attracted by the mystagogy of Kurata and Nishida.   
The psychologist Miyagi Otoya’s contribution “Philosophical Fashions” (哲学の流行) 
addressed this question by pointing out various unconscious motives for reading philosophy.  Miyagi, 
who had studied psychology in France before the war, drew on Emile Durkheim’s analysis of 
communalism among Australian aborigines to argue that, even if students failed to grasp Nishida’s 
concept of “absolute contradictory nothingness,” their ongoing struggle to do so gave them a sense 
of collective solidarity as aspiring intellectuals.  What was troubling to Miyagi was the degree of 
slavish conformism among so-called truth seekers who all tended to gravitate to the same body of 
difficult texts.  To Miyagi, the texts of Nishida, Kurata, and other exemplars of kyôyô were ultimately 
nothing more than totems signifying inclusion in an elite group.65   
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Miyagi’s focus on the practical, social function of reading philosophy was not new.  Kurata 
had connected his original attraction to Nishida to the spiritual anguish he felt as a young man, and 
one of the most widespread interpretations of the postwar “Nishida craze” was that his 
philosophical texts provided spiritual support for troubled youth. Using the language of addiction, 
critics argued that idealist philosophy filled a spiritual vacuum, at least temporarily, but led to 
disastrous consequences over the long-term.  It instilled a propensity toward impulsive behavior, 
manifesting itself in long periods of political apathy followed by irrational bursts of ultranationalism 
or suicide. 
Miyagi and Hani linked the desire for Kyoto School philosophy to Japan’s semi-feudal 
condition and the undeveloped subjectivity of individuals, but other social scientists suggested that 
the need for spiritual support that drove young people to Nishida might be a reflection of the more 
immediate postwar situation.  This was implied in Aragaki’s Asahi editorial on the Nishida craze in 
the Asahi as well as in psychoanalytic research.  The Freudian psychoanalyst and early Institute for 
the Science of Thought member Imura Tsunerô wrote an article in 1949 on “Delusional Psychosis 
in Defeated Nations.” Imura wrote that delusional patients are distinguished from ordinary people 
by:  
a way of seeing things that is marked by an intensely subjective bias… This intense 
subjectivity is different from our everyday fantasies and daydreams.  It is not an imaginary 
fulfillment of desire.  Thoughts of something betraying and threatening one’s self-worth are 
torn from the boundaries of the self and projected outwards as an objective thing.  This type 
of process is a fundamental schizophrenic mechanism. 
 
According to Imura, the most common delusional narrative was that of being pursued by an 
imagined being.  He wrote that in the past these imaginary mental projections usually took the form 
of Buddha, Nichiren, or fox spirits, and delusions concerning menacing radio and electric waves 
were characteristic of modernity.  During and just before the war he had heard of numerous 






incidents of this sort occurred with no relation to the patients’ intelligence or whether or not they 
were cultured (literally, whether or not they had kyôyô).  He gave the example of an unnamed 
progressive intellectual who kept a detailed record of his thoughts of persecution before eventually 
committing suicide.66  
After the war, Imura observed that delusions of grandeur had become more common.  Well-
known examples in the past included people claiming they were of royal blood.  An incident 
occurred in which someone claimed that the enthroned emperor was an imposter and that he was in 
fact the real emperor. After the war, Imura reported an uptick in the number of people who began 
claiming they were related to famous foreigners such as General MacArthur. He gave details about a 
case he was personally involved in concerning a young person who claimed he was an orphan who 
had been born abroad.  This patient refused to speak to anyone in Japanese, preferring English.  He 
refused packages that were addressed to him unless they used a foreign-sounding nickname he had 
been given and were presented as being “packages from abroad.”  He claimed to be unable to 
recognize his own relatives.67 Imura concluded from this case that a new form of psychosis had 
emerged among young people after the shock of defeat.  They felt a sense of guilt and inferiority 
over having been born Japanese. 
Minami Hiroshi (1914-2001), an active member of the Insitute for the Science of Thought, 
envisioned a new discipline of applied psychology that would provide support for these “anguished 
youth.”  He had attended lectures on experimental psychology and Freudian behaviorism in high 
school, which was generally studied in departments of medicine at the time.  He entered the 
University of Tokyo department of medicine with the intention to study physiology, but he dropped 
out of the program after completing the initial course in anatomy, a class that focused on animal and 
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human dissections.68 Around this time Minami recalled a teacher of anatomy walking a few paces 
ahead of a group of students when his hat was suddenly blown off by a gust of wind.  When Minami 
reached down to pick up his hat, his teacher exclaimed, “Hey thanks. I’m glad it was my hat that 
flew off and not my head.”  According to Minami, the teacher committed suicide not long after this 
exchange.69 He argued these kinds of experiences led him away from science and toward 
“fundamental problems of human existence.” Hoping to tackle his existential crisis head on, Minami 
transferred to the philosophy department at the University of Kyoto in 1937, the year the Sino-
Japanese war began.  He wrote of this change as a partial outgrowth of the psychological anxiety that 
had plagued him throughout his entire life. 
Moving from natural science to philosophy was not such a big leap for me.  In my youth, I 
once fell into a state of neurosis thinking about questions like, “What is man?  What is life?  
What is death?”  When I was an elementary school student, I was afraid of dying.  When I 
was in bed I was terrified that someone would sneak in through the window and kill me, and 
for a long time I suffered insomnia.  The mental instability of my youth formed the 
backdrop against which I thought about mental problems (心の問題) for humans in general, 
and not just myself, when I became an adult psychologist. 
 
Thus, as I continued with my studies of natural science, these mental problems (心の問題) 
[that concern all of humanity] never left my mind.  This was entwined with my own personal 
anguish (苦悶), and contained the fundamental philosophical problems of “What is man?  
What does it mean to live?”  In this circumstance, I became interested in the idea of a 
psychological science that would mediate between philosophy and natural science. I went to 
the philosophy department at the University of Kyoto because these kind of inward desires 
matched with what the department provided its students at the time.70  
 
The following year, still dissatisfied in the philosophy department, Minami made the leap 
from philosophy back to psychology and then from Japan to the United States.  With the help of a 
childhood friend of his mother, the Gestalt psychologist Takagi Sadaji, Minami entered a doctoral 
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program in psychology at Cornell University, where he found an audience more receptive to his 
ideas of applied psychology.  After the war he remarked that psychology in America was unique 
because it had become a more popularized discipline there than in any other country in the world.71 
Freudian and behaviorist concepts had entered everyday speech, and psychology seemed less 
dependent on strictly empirical biological research and dissection than in Japan. 
In his early postwar writings Minami attempted to “do psychology” in a way that would 
speak to young intellectuals who he believed were experiencing the same sense of spiritual 
aimlessness he once felt. One of his first publications after the war was a book on suicide, An 
Analysis of the Anxiety of Living (Ikiru fuan no bunseki). It was filled with statistics and Durkheimian 
analyses linking suicide to the social environment in Japan and Europe.  It also included 
symptomatic readings of popular philosophical texts that romanticized suicide, including Fujimura 
Misao’s suicide note of 1903 and the more recent posthumous memoir of the higher school student 
Haraguchi Tôzô, Etude of a Twenty-Year Old (Nijûsai no echûdo), who committed suicide in 1946.  Both 
texts were emblematic of “anguished youth” and the continued existence of a kyôyô-infused culture 
of extracurricular reading in postwar high schools.  Minami’s emphasis on “anxiety” (不安), the 
word chosen by Miki Kiyoshi, an exemplar of kyôyô associated with the Kyoto School, to translate 
Heidegger’s term Angst, was no coincidence, given Minami’s own background in philosophy at 
Kyoto University.  Rather than directly criticizing Nishida’s followers as “idealist,” he offered an 
alternative approach to the topic that many believed formed the basis of the appeal of Nishida’s 
philosophy among the youth, the problem of existential anxiety. 
Using social science to understand something as seemingly individual as suicide was not new.  
Emile Durkheim’s Suicide (1897) was a foundational text in the discipline of sociology, and the link 
he drew between suicide and Protestant individualism, education, and the “spirit of free inquiry” 
                                                






paralleled certain Japanese criticisms of the culture of kyôyô.72  Aside from the question of social 
causality in Durkheim’s text, could social science say anything of significance to an individual 
considering suicide?  Minami opened with a section entitled “Letter to a Young Friend” – obviously 
meant to be someone contemplating suicide.  Minami suggests that in the capitalist society we live in 
today, it is impossible to live a totally guilt-free life, but by identifying the social causes of 
psychological anguish while also objectively understanding the seductive appeal of texts that 
romanticize suicide, we can distance ourselves from our own feelings in a way that is psychologically 
therapeutic.  
Decades earlier, Max Weber had responded to this question differently.  In 1918, the final 
year of World War I, Max Weber addressed a crowd of students at the University of Munich.  He 
noted that his young audience was hungry for “experience” – a hunger that would have been 
familiar to Kurata Hyakuzô and his followers.  In response to the students’ apparent desire for 
spiritual guidance, Weber proceeded to sharply distinguish between the natural sciences’ “technical 
mastery of life” and the question of what makes life actually worth living: 
And still less can it be proved that the existence of the world which these sciences describe is 
worth while, that it has any 'meaning,' or that it makes sense to live in such a world. Science 
does not ask for the answers to such questions. 
 
Consider modern medicine, a practical technology which is highly developed scientifically. 
The general 'presupposition' of the medical enterprise is stated trivially in the assertion that 
medical science has the task of maintaining life as such and of diminishing suffering as such 
to the greatest possible degree. Yet this is problematic. By this means the medical person 
preserves the life of the mortally ill man, even if the patient implores us to relieve him of life, 
even if his relatives, to whom his life is worthless and to whom the costs of maintaining his 
worthless life grow unbearable, grant his redemption from suffering.73 
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For Weber, social psychology’s “value-freedom” was a stoic, tragic refusal to mix questions 
of fact with questions of value, a principle later enshrined in much of postwar American social 
science.  Minami emphasized “value-freedom” as freedom from the urge to succumb to self-hatred in 
a historical configuration that places an impossible moral burden on the individual to harmonize the 
contradiction between the necessity of living in the competitive world of capitalism and ideal moral 
values associated with democracy and cooperation. Minami believed that an awareness of this 
contradiction was in itself therapeutic for anguished young males attracted to philosophy, but it left 
unanswered the question of how to go about resolving that contradiction.  This question led back to 
the issue of articulating a positive conception of democratic subjectivity, one that entailed individual 
involvement in the building of a new democratic culture in Japan. 
 
Conclusion 
The critique of the Kyoto School, kyôyô, and the culture of the imperial higher schools was 
the starting point of the search launched by Science of Thought and other postwar associations for a 
new form of intellectual subjectivity capable of building a democratic Japan.  The ideal of a rational, 
easy to understand, practical, and radically democratic “science of thought” was forged out of the 
negative image of the intellectual culture of a past that lingered on in the present. This past 
manifested itself in the form of philosophically inclined young people camping out on street corners 
or roaming the ruins of Tokyo in search of works of philosophy.  In part, the move to pathologize 
“philosophical youth” was the obverse of the remorse many intellectuals experienced over their own 
earlier embrace of kyôyô in Imperial High Schools during the war.  
By 1950, educational reforms during the Occupation ended the system of Higher Schools in 
which most of these postwar intellectuals had been educated. For the most part, the schools were 






called departments of kyôyô, or general education, but at this time, the attention of the intellectuals of 
Science of Thought was directed elsewhere. After criticizing the Kyoto School and trying to contain its 
influence in early issues of the journal, members turned to the task of articulating a positive 








Chapter 2: Communicating Democracy: America and the Enlightenment of the Intellectual  
 
A loss of faith in the older religious moralities and a failure to develop a rational secular 
morality with world-wide mass appeal has left millions deeply uncertain, both as to their own 
aims and as to those of others.  A deep sense of skepticism arises from certainty of having 
been duped in the past; certainty that men in high places today are seeking to continue that 
dupery; and uncertainty as to what one’s own goals would have been had the dupery not 
taken place. 
-Bruce L. Smith, “The Political Communication Specialist of Our Times” 1946 
 
At any rate, the relationship between nations and people that will allow the fullest use of the 
world’s resources to meet human needs under freedom and order and in peace, calls today 
for nothing less than the building of a world consensus, for a social psychological integration 
of the human race commensurate with the interdependent far-flung and rich material 
resources and human energies of the world. 
 
In mobilizing the instrumentalitites of mass communication for the building of that 
consensus, we cannot fail to remind ourselves that along with the perfection of these means 
of human intercourse science has also perfected unprecedented means of mass destruction.  
But in the case of neither the instruments of mass communication nor of atomic energy do 
the inventors of the instrument dictate the uses to which they shall be put. 
- Louis With, “Consensus and Mass Communication,” 1948 
 
 
 War and defeat left a void that could not be easily filled by professing a new allegiance to 
democracy and other allegedly universal values represented by the victory of the United States over 
Japan.  This occasioned a search for new “guiding principles” (指導原理) that would incorporate 
the experience of the recent past and provide a basis for future action.74  Intellectuals heatedly 
debated the merits of new and old “isms” like Marxism, existentialism, and variants of humanism.  
They sought to determine which philosophy would provide the most appropriate “guiding principle” 
for the present age.   
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 The journal Science of Thought was founded as part of this search, but its founders, influenced 
by their experiences in America and Japan during the war, were less interested in finding an ultimate 
answer to the question of guiding principles. The heroic search for an intellectual panacea was, in 
their view, a part of the problem.  Rather than ultimate solutions, what was necessary was a more 
“workmanlike” attitude to the task of nurturing a democratic, egalitarian culture to break down the 
barrier that separated intellectuals, who brooded about guiding principles, from the people, who 
were more concerned with making a living.  Changing the way intellectuals performed in public 
would make possible “an active debate among writers and readers through which we expect the 
thought (思想) represented by this journal will be gradually elaborated upon and evolve.”75 
 The journal approached this problem from two angles, expressed by the categorization of 
articles in its early issues: “Communications Research” and “The Philosophy of Everyone.”  This 
chapter focuses on communications research, which sought the “democratization” of intellectuals by 
encouraging them to change their public communicative practices.  The problem of communications 
had links with wartime propaganda research in both the US and Japan, but after the war, the 
unfamiliar term “communication” was reintroduced by Science of Thought in a way that tried to 
distinguish between Harold D. Lasswell’s “value-neutral” science of social control and a more 
democratic connotation grounded in John Dewey’s ideal of open, egalitarian exchange among 
groups from different social and educational backgrounds.  Tsurumi Shunsuke drew on the concept 
to criticize the exclusionary, solipsistic “meta-language” (メタ言語), full of philosophical jargon, 
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used by postwar critics and authors and to advocate techniques that could involve a wider audience 
in democratic conversation.76   
 Science of Thought operated within an intellectual paradigm associated with American 
pragmatism and behaviorism, which placed particular emphasis on the loanword “communication” 
(komyunikêshon) as a new American concept and field of scientific research.  The concept was 
bound up with a vision of a society founded upon the transparent exchange of ideas among 
autonomous communicators, and this image in turn suggested practical sites for linguistic reform. 
Their aim was to create an enlightened, communicative, cooperative, and democratic intellectual 
community.  In 1948, Science of Thought hosted the first public lectures on communication at a time 
when the word was largely unknown to the Japanese public.  Besides lectures, articles in the journal 
included attempts to learn from, critique, and understand the success of producers of popular 
culture, such as books, music, film, and even advice columns.  Other articles introduced American 
communications research, books on Peircean semiotics, or artificial languages, like Charles Ogden’s 
BASIC English and Otto Neurath’s Isotype.  This research was conducted against the backdrop of 
official language reform that began in 1946 with the support of the US Occupation.  This reform 
simplified the Japanese writing system by reducing the number of Chinese characters permitted in 
newspapers, magazines, and government documents.  Writers associated with Science of Thought 
supported these reforms but felt that they did not go far enough.  Simplifying the writing system was 
not enough to induce real change in the way the intellectuals interacted with a larger public. 
 Through a twin focus on communication reform and empirical, ethnographic research, 
Tsurumi Shunsuke and other members of Science of Thought tried to move beyond both utopian 
and dystopian accounts of the implications of new media technology and mass culture toward the 
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Figure 2.1, examples of Otto Neurath’s International System of Typographic Picture Education (ISOTYPE) 






reform of both the “text-based, rational” intellectuals and the “visual-oriented, emotional” masses.77   
Science of Thought was premised on the idea that these two groups constituted two distinct, mutually 
estranged cultures that had much to learn from each other.  The urgent task of reconciling the two 
provided Science of Thought with a perspective from which to investigate popular culture and radicalize 
early Occupation-led educational and language reforms intended to “democratize” Japanese society, 
a task that became increasingly difficult in the politically charged atmosphere of the Cold War.   
 In postwar Japan, the term “enlightener” (keimôshugisha) was originally a derisive label 
applied to intellectuals who were accused of condescendingly trying to reform and modernize the 
masses from the top-down.78 The term came out of clashes between Marxists, who claimed to stand 
on the side of the masses, and “modernist” social scientists like Maruyama Masao and Ôtsuka Hisao.  
Marxists argued that these thinkers overemphasized the undeveloped “semi-feudal” subjectivity of 
the masses, who were in need of reform or “enlightenment” from above.  In one sense, this label 
seemed to fit the intellectuals associated with Science of Thought during their period of promoting 
ideals of “communication” soon after the war.  They argued that American “communications 
research” was founded on universal values of science and logic, and that it had an important 
pedagogical role. Yet they seemed to direct their exhortation to become clear communicators more 
at other intellectuals and their past selves than at the masses, who they believed were less responsible 
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Before and After Science: The Origins of Science o f  Thought  
  The journal Science of Thought appeared on newsstands among dozens of new periodicals with 
the word “science” (科学) in the title, including: Science World (科学世界), Science and Life (科学と生
活), Friend of Science (科学の友), Scientism (科学主義), Science and Art (科学と芸術), and Science for the 
Cultured（文化人の科学), all of which appeared between 1945 and 1946.  Between 1948 and 1949 
some readers had a choice between Science of Thought and the Marxist-Leninist journal Science and 
Thought (思想と科学).79 The enthusiasm for science suggested the hope for a transformed future 
far removed from the ruins of the war.  Members of Science of Thought turned to the latest 
developments in logical positivism, communications science, and neuroscience in an attempt to 
satisfy the insatiable demand. 
 Intellectual and journalistic enthusiasm for science was not new.  Alhough the Marxist 
discourse on scientific socialism was suppressed in the 1930s, intellectuals in and outside the 
government bureaucracy promoted the application of scientific practices – hygiene and scientific 
management, for example – to everyday life and fueled enthusiasm for technological achievements, 
particularly after World War I.  In 1930 the ethnologist Yanagita Kunio wrote that the disruption 
caused by the war in Europe alerted government officials to the need to promote self-sufficiency in 
technological research connected with the natural sciences, although he noted that there was 
considerably less enthusiasm for the social sciences, which were associated with dangerous socialist 
ideas from abroad.80   
 It may seem paradoxical that science and nationalism went hand-in-hand at a period when 
the Japanese government and many intellectuals were adopting an antagonistic stance toward many 
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things associated with the “West.”  Yet historians and philosophers active during those years were 
also working to dislodge science from an exclusive provenance in Europe and the United States by 
(1) discovering indigenous sources of science in Japan and (2) emphasizing the contingency of the 
origins of modern science in Europe.  In the thirties, new historians of Japanese science and 
mathematics like Saigusa Hiroto rediscovered pre-Meiji knowledge systems that seemed to 
foreshadow later discoveries - historical research that sometimes unintentionally gave historical 
weight to a wider discourse about the “genius of the Japanese race” and the inevitability of Japan’s 
emergence as a Great Power based on its cultural character. At the same time, members of the 
Kyoto School of philosophy such as Shimomura Toratarô conducted new historical research on 
thinkers like Galileo and Copernicus that stressed the contingent and Christian origins of European 
science. The cosmopolitan Kyoto School, in dialogue with European thinkers like Martin Heidegger, 
stressed that the unique historical experience of the Japanese race equipped it with the capacity not 
only to learn from Europe but to remedy and overcome the technological excesses of Western 
civilization.81 
 Japan’s defeat in 1945 overturned this discourse in two ways.  First, many intellectuals 
decided that the war revealed that Japan was more stubbornly backward and feudalistic than they 
had believed - a refutation of scientific nationalism and a blow to the confident cosmopolitanism of 
the Kyoto School and to Marxists of the internationalist Rôno-ha school who had de-emphasized 
feudalism in their view of Japan’s current mode of production.  Second, government-sponsored 
research into the sciences of social control during the war, including propaganda studies, failed to 
overturn the Marxist and pragmatist views that the social and natural sciences had been neglected, if 
not suppressed, and that what little research existed was dominated by aloof experts and elites.  
After the war, Marxist intellectuals, some of whom were released from prison or returned from exile 
                                                






abroad, were able to resume a discourse on science that stressed the task of replacing bourgeois 
science, fragmented into multiple fields and provincial in origin, with a dialectical, popular 
proletarian science that would ultimately remedy this unevenness.  This science was sometimes 
referred to as a “science of thought” - a concept derived from Engels’s Anti-Dühring and Dialectics of 
Nature, as well as from the recently deceased Marxist Tosaka Jun’s On Science (科学論).  
 This latter approach to science was evident in journals suppressed during the war such as 
Tosaka’s Materialism Research (Yûibutsuron kenkyû, 1932-1938) and Hani Gorô and Kobayashi Isamu’s 
Under the Banner of Emergent Science (Shinkô kagaku no hata no moto ni, 1928-1929).  The name of Hani’s 
journal derived from the Soviet philosopher Abram Deborin’s contemporaneous bilingual journal 
Unter dem Banner des Marxismus, a fact that alludes to their internationalist attempt to associate 
Marxism with such revolutionary scientific developments as quantum mechanics during the twenties 
and thirties.82 Leftists attempted to popularize science in a way that resembled the Red Science and 
Social Relations of Science (SRS) movements in Britian led by thinkers like J. D. Bernal, Joseph 
Needham, J. B. S. Haldane, and Lancelot Hogben, whose Mathematics for the Million was translated 
into Japanese in 1939. In 1942, his Science for the Citizen was translated by a former member of the 
Materialism Research group, Konno Takeo, who was later associated with Science of Thought.83 
 The most obvious successor to this discourse after the war were the publications of the 
Association of Democratic Scientists (founded in January, 1946), with its politically diverse 
membership that included “old liberals” from the Taishô period, Communists, and most of the 
members of the Institute for the Science of Thought.  Thus the task of re-imagining the relationship 
between the natural and physical sciences was never an exclusively Marxist task.  American 
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pragmatists like Max Otto and John Dewey, whose following grew rapidly in Japan after 1945, were 
still engaged in their attempt to overcome the “backwardness” and “isolation” of the social sciences 
through a kind of scientific humanism.84   
 The two shifts, one toward a stronger characterization of Japan as scientifically backward 
and the other towards a revived universalist discourse on science, conflicted with each other insofar 
as the first stressed negative particularism (backwardness) while the second stressed internationalism.  
This contradiction accounted for a number of debates shortly after the war.  If Japan was so 
backward, was it even possible for its working classes to work in concert with the working classes of 
developed capitalist countries?  Should intellectuals first work to enlighten the backward masses on 
the model of the French Encyclopedists, or was this bourgeois model already outdated in a postwar 
world that might be moving toward communism? 
 In the midst of these debates, skepticism about the newfound enthusiasm for “science” was 
widespread among intellectuals: less because science could be quite destructive, as proved by the 
atomic bomb, and more because, like “democracy,” lip service to science could be a mask for 
nefarious intentions.  In part this was because many thinkers had become inured to a barrage of 
moralizing propaganda during the war, some of which exhorted imperial subjects to apply scientific 
principles to everyday life in order to cut down on waste during the war.  It was not hard to detect 
continuity on this point even as the slogans changed.  This did not result in a rejection of the 
proclaimed ideal of democracy per se but in skepticism about preachy and propagandistic methods 
of trying to mobilize support for it.  The Kyoto School philosopher Tanabe Hajime’s notion that a 
peaceful postwar democracy might be founded on collective moral feelings of remorse for the war 
was subjected to intense criticism.  Many progressive intellectuals rejected such an overt appeal to 
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collective moral sentiments as reiterating the tactics of moral suasion during the war.  They preferred 
to appeal to universal values of science and democracy or even pure egotism.  For example, in a 
1946 essay that has come to symbolize “postwar thought,” the writer Sakaguchi Ango glorified the 
“shameless egotism” of the black market and the brothel as the true loci of democracy, and “the 
liberation of mankind.”  The same year Maruyama Masao, the left-liberal historian of political 
thought, wrote that the middling morality of Japanese politicians came off badly in comparison to 
Machiavelli’s prince, who was at least honest about the “satanic” nature of politics.85   
 In this light, overt egotistic behavior was preferable because it signaled moral autonomy, or 
at least an apparent lack of interest in appeasing external moral authorities, whether Japanese or 
American.  The opposite of this was the “talismanic use” of democratic sloganeering out of 
deference toward the status quo during the Allied Occupation.  In the first issue of Science of Thought 
in 1946, Tsurumi Shunsuke argued that the Japanese people had simply replaced one set of amuletic 
slogans for another in order to appease a different, now American, superior.86  In 1948, the China 
scholar Takeuchi Yoshimi, later head of the Institute for the Science of Thought, described the new 
postwar leadership as the substitution of one set of essentially identical “honors students” for 
another.87  In different ways, these thinkers emphasized that fundamental change had to occur at the 
level of self-motivated behavior, not at the level of proclaimed adherence to abstract concepts like 
democracy or science. The slogans might change in the transition from war to Occupation, but the 
basic intention of currying favor with the authorities could remain the same.   
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 Sakaguchi, Maruyama, Takeuchi, and Tsurumi all practiced a hermeneutics of suspicion, 
whereby real democracy was to be distinguished from obsequious propaganda put forth on behalf of 
the American occupiers, and the practical scientific method was to be distinguished from parroting 
scientific facts and fetishizing American or Soviet technology.  Yet insofar as a hermeneutics of 
suspicion could be imagined as part and parcel of real democracy and the true scientific method, 
such skepticism, paradoxically, added to the allure of those two terms as rallying points for critics of 
varying political and intellectual orientations.88   
 The name Science of Thought was itself a compromise among a multi-disciplinary group whose 
individual members wanted to guide it in directions that reflected their individual intellectual 
interests.  Other possible names included “Journal of the History of Thought,” (Maruyama), 
“Science Review” (Taketani), and “Journal of Semiotics” (Tsurumi).  According to an interview with 
Tsurumi Shunsuke years later, the original members assembled to decide on a name in what would 
become the group’s office located in the Shisei kaikan in Hibya Park.  Despite putting the different 
proposals to a vote, they were unable to reach a decision, each candidate garnering only one vote.  
Suddenly Ueda Tatsunosuke, a scholar of Thomas Aquinas, dropped in on the meeting and 
suggested “Art of Thinking” and then “Science of Thought” in English - a name that brought their 
disparate interests together, transcending the disciplinary and ideological boundaries that divided the 
group from the outset.89   
Years later, Tsurumi wrote that some critics believed the name “Science of Thought” was 
derived from Engels’ Anti-Dühring or Dialectics of Nature.  He dismissed the notion, asserting that 
Ueda’s idea of a “science of thought” was derived from the clear, logical argumentation in Aquinas’ 
Summa Theologica, the subject of an article Ueda published in the first issue of the journal.  It may 
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seem odd that a medieval theologian inspired the name of a journal officially founded in part to 
“introduce the methods of logical empiricism in every field of thought and practice,” but Aquinas 
was highly esteemed by modernist philosophers like Otto Neurath of the Vienna School.90  He 
argued that in the future, when anti-metaphysical education had taken root, Aquinas and other 
medieval scholastic philosophers would occupy pride of place in the history of philosophy for their 
examples of logical argumentation, while the stock of German idealists would diminish in value.91  
For his part, Ueda presented Aquinas as a rational philosopher who skillfully blended the “artificial 
international language” of Latin with a colloquial sensibility that was clear, logical, and easy to 
understand.92 
 Whatever Ueda’s precise intention, the name would have carried different connotations for 
the different members present.  One example was the nuclear physicist Taketani Mitsuo, at 34 one 
of the oldest members and the one with the clearest anti-fascist credentials, having been arrested 
twice for his wartime activities in support of the popular front journal World Culture (Sekai bunka) 
and the newspaper Saturday (Dôyôbi, which was modeled on the French Popular Front weekly 
Vendredi). After the war Taketani helped found both Science of Thought and the overtly Marxist 
Association of Democratic Scientists (Minka).  He was also involved in postwar debates with other 
Marxists in Minka and the relaunched Materialism Research over the meaning of “technology” and the 
relationship between dialectics and the scientific method, which drew on the work of Tosaka Jun 
and Engels’s Anti-Dühring.  Taketani was surely aware of the concept of a “science of thought” in 
these Marxist works, which were reprinted during the early years of the Occupation. 
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 In 1937, Tosaka had written an essay on the relationship between materialist science and 
literature entitled “Science of Thought” (Shisô no kagaku).  He also referred to the possibility of such 
a science in his last major work On Science (Kagakuron).93  He believed in the notion of a science of 
thought as a corrective to the tendency of the ontology-obsessed philosophy of his day, the Kyoto 
School, to merge with literature and hermeneutics, becoming unhinged from the objective material 
reality of science.  Tosaka derived the notion of true philosophy as a science of thought from a 
passage in Engel’s Anti-Dühring: 
Modern materialism is essentially dialectical, and no longer needs any philosophy standing 
above the other sciences.  As soon as each separate science is required to get clarity as to its 
position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things, a special science 
dealing with this totality is superfluous.  What still independently survives of all former 
philosophy is the science of thought and its laws - formal logic and dialectics.94 
 
 Some Marxists drew on works like Anti-Dühring to dismiss philosophical texts and scientific 
research that did not support the dialectical materialist standpoint, but according to Tsurumi 
Shunsuke, it was the Marxist physicist Taketani Mitsuo, not the members educated in America, who 
encouraged the group to embrace ideological pluralism.  This included the non-Marxist viewpoints 
of the Bergsonian physicist Watanabe Satoshi and Tsurumi Shunsuke, who was influenced by 
American pragmatism and the New Criticism of I. A. Richards.95  Taketani first suggested the system 
adopted by the journal, the “opposite of the just established UN security council,” whereby each 
individual member of the editorial board had the right to push through the publication of a 
manuscript over the objections of other editors.96   
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 Could there be an ecumenical interpretation of Engels’ “science of thought” in line with 
group’s eclecticism?  Not only did Engels give formal logic pride of place alongside dialectics, he 
dismissed the idea of a “special science” of the totality standing above the individual sciences.  The 
work of Antonio Gramsci also sheds light on the notion of a “science of thought.” In the Prison 
Notebooks, he interpreted Engels’ concern with a “science of thought” as a shift from a concern with 
totalizing philosophy towards a pedagogical concern with “techniques of thinking” that could exist 
alongside techniques of reading and writing.  In a passage that strongly evokes Science of Thought’s 
project to study the philosophy of the “common man,” Gramsci writes: 
The technique of thought will certainly not produce a great philosophy, but it will provide 
criteria of judgment, and it will correct the deformities of the mode of thinking of common 
sense.  It would be interesting to compare the technique of common sense - I.e., of the 
philosophy of the man in the street - with the technique of the most advanced modern 
thought.97 
 
 This sense evokes Ueda’s original idea of the “Art of Thinking,” defined by Aquinas as akin 
to technique as "the right reason about certain works to be made." Linking thought to common 
skills like reading and writing also evoked Tosaka Jun’s call for the “massification of science” at the 
end of On Science.98 Science brought “down to earth” was coterminous with everyday techniques of 
practical reason and communication. 
 By problematizing science along with the boundary between intellectuals and the masses in 
its work on communications and “The Philosophy of Ordinary People,” Science of Thought in part 
continued Tosaka’s project to massify the sciences.  At the same time, owing to its characterization 
of the wartime past as irrational and anti-scientific, the allure of American social science was great 
despite the fact that it was less concerned with overcoming such a dichotomy.  This tension led the 
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group to try to distinguish between the American sciences of social control and the American 
sciences of individual empowerment that might play a role in the formation of democratic 
subjectivity in postwar Japan.   
 
Turning to America, Turning to the People 
 From its inception, Science of Thought looked to American society for possible solutions to the 
apparent contradiction between intellectual progress and political democracy.  They were not alone.  
After the war, many intellectuals who had previously assumed the superiority of European 
civilization over that of both Japan and the “machine civilization” of America were now asking the 
question “What can we learn from the United States?” Science of Thought was in a unique position to 
satisfy this desire for knowledge.  Four out of the seven founders of the group – Tsurumi Shunsuke, 
Tsurumi Kazuko, Takeda Kiyoko, and Tsuru Shigeto – had studied at East Coast institutions of 
higher learning until the outbreak of war with the United States in 1941.  After the war ended, they 
praised their former host country not for its technology and prosperity, but as a nation of 
autonomous, common-sensical citizen-scientists who were capable of cooperation despite 
ideological and class differences. When the Marxian economist Tsuru Shigeto claimed that in 
America "philosophy melts into everyday life," he was expressing a yearning for a world in which 
politics, social activity, popular culture, and intellectual production would reinforce one another in a 
mutually beneficial relationship.  This image contrasted with that of prewar Japan as a fractured 
society composed of aloof intellectuals who worshiped kyôyô, manipulative fascist ideologues, and a 
mysterious mass of ordinary people whose lives seemed remote from the world of the intellectual 
elite.   
 This idealization of America was not naive.  The members’ experiences in America were 






they still caught glimpses of genuine collaboration across ideological lines.  For example, Tsuru 
Shigeto, the oldest of the returnees from America, drew upon his experience helping to found the 
Marxian quarterly Science and Society in 1936 while a graduate student of Paul Sweezy’s at Harvard.  
The relationship with Sweezy that would come back to haunt Tsuru when he was summoned before 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities in connection with the suicide of the Canadian 
diplomat and Japanese historian E. Herbert Norman in 1957.99  Although Tsuru suspected the 
American Communist Party might have been involved behind the scenes in formation of the journal, 
he noted that V. J. McGill’s article in the first issue, “An Evaluation of Logical Positivism,” criticized 
the philosophy of the Vienna Circle from the perspective of dialectical materialism, but then, in a 
possible gesture to popular-front solidarity, went on to praise “the logical positivists at [the 1934 
World Congress of Philosophy in] Prague who provided the strongest counterpoise to the 
nationalism and mystagogy of fascist philosophy.”100  Tsuru claims that McGill’s praise for the 
logical positivists triggered a dispute between orthodox “canon-oriented” Marxists and thinkers like 
Sweezy and Reinhold Niebuhr who were of a more ecumenical, ”popular frontist” mindset.  Articles 
for the next issue by Niebuhr and Sweezy, as well as an article by Tsuru himself on the theorist of 
market socialism Oskar Lange, were put on hold while this dispute played out.101 
 Yet Tsuru could still find much to like in the impetus behind the founding of Science and 
Society, which informed his intellectual career back in Japan.  Although Science of Thought was not 
explicitly devoted to the development of Marxist scholarship, its mission overlapped with that of 
Science and Society in several respects.  Both journals proclaimed the necessity of overcoming the 
fragmentation of individual scientific disciplines in order to investigate the connection between 
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science and society and between thought and action.  Both journals initially recognized that this task 
was only possible if a variety of conflicting perspectives were brought together to develop a dynamic 
intellectual movement.102 
 Science of Thought drew a strategic contrast between the fragmentation of Japanese intellectuals 
into Marxist, Communist, Trotskyist, social democratic, and liberal camps with the “workmanlike 
attitude” of American intellectuals who collaborated across the boundaries of pre-established “isms” 
in order to further scientific progress.  A short article in the 1949 issue of Science of Thought briefly 
introduced the American Journal of the History of Ideas, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and 
Philosophy of Science, with the remark, “What we feel jealous about is the fact that leftists and rightists 
cooperate in the editing and planning of these journals.”  Noting the philosophical diversity of 
Marxists, Platonists, logical positivists, pragmatists appearing in the same journal, the author 
remarked, “The people here, regardless of which camp they belong to, are in accordance insofar as 
they all try to test their assertions through public experience (公け的経験) at the end of the day. In 
Japan there is still no such tradition of “workmanlike-ism” (ワリキリ主義).  There is not even clear 
evidence of efforts to rethink philosophical opinions in connection with experience.  There is much 
we should learn from the field of philosophy in America.”103    
   The returnees drew upon their contacts in America, as well as the Occupation’s English-
language library, to keep up with recent works of Anglo-American scholarship in philosophy – 
particularly on pragmatism and logical empiricism – and the behavioristic social sciences. Long 
reviews of these materials formed the bulk of the early content of Science of Thought, which began 
publication during a time of enormous demand for knowledge about the United States. The 
statement of purpose in the first issue gave pride of place to the “importation” (移入) of Anglo-
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American thought (英米思想). The literary critic Nakano Yoshio criticized the group in its early 
years for “monopolizing the supply of new academic books” and taking advantage of its privileged 
access to information about America.104  
 A few of these early reviews were later recognized as foundational texts in the genealogies of 
various academic specializations institutionalized after 1945, including communications research, 
semiotics, and media studies.  Yet despite this later canonization, the first issue of Science of Thought 
declared its independence from established academia and its perceived division into isolated sub-
disciplines and schools of thought removed from everyday concerns.  Thus rather than becoming a 
mere conduit for American scholarship, it was founded with the intention of redefining shisô (思想), 
a word translated by the group as “thought” but with connotations that extend to “ideology” or 
even “philosophical system,” in a way that would untether it from scholarly texts and make it more 
practical, more visible in everyday life, and more accessible to comparison, critique, and logical 
analysis than it ever had been before.   
 No less than some of its members’ academic experience in America, Science of Thought’s 
orientation toward practical philosophy was informed by personal encounters with the ordinary 
Japanese during the war.  These experiences helped crystallize their conception of the “common 
man” as someone whose mental life was tactically oriented toward adaptation and survival.  Tsurumi 
Shunsuke, who came from an elite political and intellectual family, devised a critique of authoritarian 
language while serving in the wartime occupation of Indonesia and observing the way lower-ranking 
Japanese soldiers navigated the Navy hierarchy.  Takeda Kiyoko was the daughter of a wealthy 
Christian land-owning family in Western Japan who traveled to New York in the 1930s and became 
a student of Reinhold Niebuhr at the Union Theological Seminary.  After traveling back to Japan 
                                                
104 Quoted in Tsuru Shigeto, “‘Shisô no kagaku’ ni yoseta kitai” In Sengo ‘keimô’ no nokoshita mono, 






with the two Tsurumis and Tsuru, Takeda worked in a supply factory in Shizuoka prefecture along 
with other women students mobilized for the war effort.  Her observation there of covert passive 
resistance in the midst of seeming obedience formed the basis of her first articles on “people’s 
philosophy” for Science of Thought.105   
 Their emphasis on practical, everyday philosophy clashed with an image of intellectual 
activity associated with the past, epitomized by those students lining up to buy the collected works 
of the philosopher Nishida Kitarô in 1947. Members of Science of Thought believed that the 
philosophical jargon of the Kyoto School, epitomized by the phrase, “absolute non-contradiction of 
nothingness,” exacerbated the separation of “thought” from the everyday life of the people.  Where 
Nishida wanted to create a distinct domain of transhistorical ontological inquiry insulated from the 
destabilizing effects of scientific progress, Science of Thought worked to bridge the gap that separated 
philosophy, science, and the mental techniques employed by ordinary people in everyday life.    
 Their mission resonated with the mission of two organizations in Japan that quickly came to 
loggerheads in the context of the Cold War.  The first was the Rockefeller Foundation, which 
established contact with Tsurumi Shunsuke in 1949 and funded a project through the journal on 
“The Effect of the Japanese Language on Thought.” In the research proposal for the project, Science 
of Thought included a “logical approach” and “sociological approach” that corresponded to their 
work on semiotics and communications theory, on the one hand, and the “philosophy of everyone,” 
on the other.  The group’s interests converged with the Foundation’s stated objective of 
democratizing Japan by reorienting intellectuals away from German influences and toward Anglo-
American philosophy and social science.  Yet members of Science of Thought opposed to US foreign 
policy during the Cold War argued against accepting funds from the organization, and the 
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Foundation withdrew its support after a member of the group, the social psychologist Minami 
Hiroshi, visited the People’s Republic of China in 1951.106  
 The second major organization that crossed paths with Science of Thought in its early days was 
the Association of Democratic Scientists, a popular-front coalition of communist and non-
communist progressive and liberal intellectuals founded in 1946.  Considered a Communist-front 
organization by the Occupation authorities, Minka’s stated mission was to promote a positivist and 
rationalist sensibility and to replace philosophical jargon with “frank and easy-to-understand 
expressions.”107  From the start, membership in Minka and Science of Thought overlapped a great deal, 
but as the Cold War intensified, Minka-affiliated philosophers became increasingly critical of Science 
of Thought’s emphasis on American thought, pragmatism, and communications studies, labeling their 
work “idealist” and the group itself a collection of “America-niks.”  Yet for a brief time Science of 
Thought managed to straddle these two camps, advocating an ideal of realigning intellectual inquiry 
with everyday life, which persisted long after the heyday of “postwar enlightenment” and the 
“democratic popular front” had ended. 
 
The Semiotic Policeman 
 Tsurumi Shunsuke’s earliest vision for postwar philosophy as clear, accessible, and pertinent 
to the everyday life of non-philosophers appeared in his first book, entitled Reflections on Philosophy 
(哲学の反省), his intellectual debut.  It was published in 1946, the same year Tsurumi, at age 24, 
helped launch the first issue of Science of Thought and contributed the famous article, “On the 
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Talismanic Use of Words.” Both of these publications appeared despite the extreme paper shortage 
thanks to the intervention of his father, the politician and popular author Tsurumi Yusuke, who lent 
office space and the services of his reorganized and renamed publishing house, Senkusha.   
 Both the office for Science of Thought and Senkusha were located in the Shisei kaikan 
(Municipal Administration Hall) in Hibiya Park. Tsurumi’s grandfather, the well known politician 
Gôtô Shinpei, had constructed the building in 1929. Gôtô was a former colonial administrator of 
Taiwan and a modernizing mayor of Tokyo who modeled the Shisei kaikan on the New York 
Bureau of Municipal Research.  The space had previously been the home of the Taiheiyô kyôkai 
(Pacific Association).  The Association was a kind of regional think tank founded by Tsurumi 
Yûsuke in 1938.  It specialized in gathering statistics and strategic knowledge on Pacific Rim nations 
in the years leading up to and during war with the United States.  Tsurumi Kazuko, Tsuru Shigeto, 
and other contributors to Science of Thought worked at the Association, where they drew upon their 
experiences in American academia to write articles elucidating the strategic weaknesses of the 
“American character.”  Inokuchi Ichirô, who wrote an important article in Science of Thought 
introducing the communications research of Harold Lasswell, had also been a researcher for the 
Pacific Association and collaborated with Tsurumi Yûsuke in a mult-volume biography of Gôtô 
Shinpei. 
 Before the war, Tsurumi Shunsuke had been a lackadaisical student obsessed with 
“philosophical suicide” and a potential embarrassment to his politically prominent family.  He was 
sent to attend school in America in 1938 at the age of 16 through an acquaintance of his father’s, the 
historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr., who introduced him to Tsuru Shigeto – then a graduate student 
in the economics department at Harvard.108  After a year at the Middlesex School in Concord, 
Tsurumi entered Harvard University and majored in philosophy.  There he attended lectures by 
                                                






Rudolf Carnap and had his BA thesis on Peirce supervised by W. V. O. Quine.  He also attended a 
class on the “Pragmatic Movement in Philosophy” taught by Charles W. Morris, who was a visiting 
professor from the University of Chicago and would later host the Vienna Circle’s “Unity of Science” 
project at that school with the support of a Rockefeller Foundation grant.  Tsurumi’s relationship 
with Morris helped Science of Thought secure its own grant through the Foundation after the war as 
part of the project, “The Effect of the Japanese Language on Thought.” 
 After war broke out with the United States in 1941, Tsurumi discussed the international 
situation with Tsuru, who confidently predicted that Japan would lose the war on the basis of the 
relative economic power of the two countries.  Tsurumi claims to have felt a strong emotional desire 
to be in Japan during its moment of inevitable defeat.  It is also clear that he, along with other 
returnees who became collaborators at Science of Thought, wanted to be involved in the “era of 
construction” after the war referred to in 1946 Reflections on Philosophy, most of which was conceived 
before 1945.  In 1942, four of the seven co-founders of Science of Thought then studying in America, 
Tsurumi Shunsuke, Tsurumi Kazuko, Tsuru Shigeto, and Takeda Kiyoko, boarded the USS 
Gripsholm, a repatriation ship, and transferred to the Yokohama-bound Asama-maru in the port of 
Lourenço Marques in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.109   
 Tsurumi’s repatriation was an opportunity ethnographically to observe semiotic behavior he 
had learned to separate into Peircean categories at Harvard.  He later remarked in an interview that 
in the transfer of the returnees from one repatriation ship to the other, he was able to observe the 
switch between two all-encompassing “sign-systems” (記号体系).  This switch was marked by a 
reading of the emperor’s announcement of war with the United States on deck aboard the Asama-
maru. Tsurumi believed the everyday behavior of the passengers aboard the ship changed after this 
                                                







point in the journey.  Their mannerisms became stiffer and they became more reticent.  For him, the 
public reading signified the re-establishment of Japanese-style social hierarchy and deference to 
authority among a group that had socialized more casually while aboard the Gripsholm.   
 Tsurumi’s Peircean-inflected Reflections on Philosophy reflected a reorientation of intellectuals 
away from holistic ideals of Bildung and kyôyô toward one of cooperation among the social sciences 
and toward the redefinition of philosophy as a collection of pragmatic, practical mental techniques.  
In line with this general reorientation, Tsurumi argued that in order to avoid being “behind the times” 
(時代遅れ) in a world of increasing scientific specialization, philosophy ought to be redefined as 
fulfilling three major functions - (A) providing the means to the semiotic criticism of linguistic 
propositions, (B) offering sets of guiding principles to decide among multiple courses of action, and 
(C) enabling a sympathetic understanding of different ways of life.  Philosophy increased or 
decreased in importance according to the functional requirements of society, but owing to the 
demands of reconstruction, the widespread propagation of a kind of philosophical thinking was an 
urgent task in the aftermath of the war. 
 As part of this argument, Tsurumi divided history into two different moments: moments of 
construction and moments of crisis.  The significance of philosophy during these two kinds of 
moments differed.  During moments of crisis – his examples were, “war, uprising, or revolution” – 
philosophy could either play a partisan role or issue warnings about the violent side effects of the 
crisis, but these warnings would be largely ineffective.  Conversely, moments of construction were 
ideal times in which to engage in the propagation of philosophical modes of thought in anticipation 
of the next crisis.  Logical criticism was a kind of disaster preparedness for the next crisis, be it war 
or socialist revolution.  Come what may, according to Tsurumi, moments of radical change, which 
he likened to a “surgical procedure,” always have unwanted side-effects that could be alleviated 






 Taking the example of World War Two as an obvious crisis, Tsurumi listed seven “habits of 
inaccurate semiotic sign utilization ” among opinion leaders and the general populace that 
exacerbated the negative effects of war: 
1) During the digestion of propostional statements, people habitually failed to note the 
degree of certainty that could be attributed to such statements at the time of noting their 
signifance.  As a result, they did not distinguish highly certain from uncascertainable 
statements. 
 
2) There was insufficient awareness that generalities are formed out of specificities, and that 
the specific ultimately creates the general.  For this reason, general principles, that of 
liberating Greater East Asia for example, were grasped in a way that implied that they 
were entirely determined by their concepts alone.  No one ventured to think that each 
factual instance of an individual drunkedly insulting a coolie laborer or beating servants 
without reason was actually connected with the principle. 
 
3) Ideas of value were confused with ideas of truth. 
 
4) Ethical value was grasped solely in stark terms of “good” or “evil” instead of an endless 
gradation leading from “better” to “worse.” 
 
5) Many epistemic concepts were arrayed into two columns corresponding to “good guys” 
and “bad guys.”  They lost their original specific meaning and existed simply to express 
something good or bad.   
 
For example, array A consisted of America = material civilization = guerrilla warfare = 
democracy = defeat = global domination = wild ambition = racism = philosophical 
materialism.  Array B combines Japan = spiritualism = Hakkô ichû110 = victory, etc. 
 
6) People lacked the habit of concretely grasping the significance of abstract thought, 
discussions, and policies. 
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7) People had the habit of using unclear words as banners, and philosophical jargon was 
used opportunistically since it was impossible to pin down the meaning of it.111 
 
 Tsurumi was under no illusions that philosophical criticism of illogical language use would 
have had much purchase in wartime, but he did indirectly suggest the counterfactual hypothesis that 
things might not have become so bad had practical philosophical training in logical criticism been 
more prevalent at the time of the global crisis that developed into World War Two.  “Unless 
preparations are made far in advance of a crisis, one cannot expect much from an attempt to 
alleviate by means of philosophical enlightenment the side-effects of that crisis.  The optimal time to 
begin such preparations is when the negative effects that accompany such crises are deeply felt by 
everyone - in other words in the era of reconstruction right after a crisis ends.”112 
 The task of the present, insofar as it was a moment of postwar construction, was to spread 
the elementary principles of philosophy to all the members of society rather than to “push the 
envelope” in terms of metaphysical speculation.  Tsurumi particularly emphasized the role of 
semiotic training in general education.  “For example, each student, when asked for an explanation 
of the significance of a special term, should not constantly try to evade the question by offering 
synonyms, but should clarify the interpretant (解義体) and designatum (指示体) by means of words 
that are transformable into the language of primitive experience.”  How is such training practical?  
Tsurumi’s response was that, “citizens (国民) equipped with such habits will not be charmed by the 
flattery  (美辞麗句) of war-mongering politicians, and will see through to the cruelty that lies 
concealed in their utterances.”  This approach should transform philosophy from an elite symbol of 
social status into a mundane skill wielded by everyone: “In this sense, philosophy would no longer 
                                                
111 Tsurumi Shunsuke, “Tetsugaku no hansei” Tsurumi Shunsuke chosakushû vol. 1, (Tokyo: Chikuma 
Shobo, 1975), 253-254 






be a sophisticated branch of learning that instills a kind of self-conceit in students, but would be 
considered a rather lowly subject like arithmetic.”113   
 Tsurumi’s diagnosis did not imply that he wanted to transform language use into the pure 
exchange of clear, logical propositions.  His emphasis on education and the popular dissemination 
of practico-logical techniques helps explain Tsurumi’s qualified approval of the “pseudo-
propositional” use of metaphor.  Metaphors were easier to understand and efficiently propagate, and 
had the potential to index reality in a more visceral way than did logical propositions.  They were 
useful tools for promoting logical techniques that would eventually lead to a transformation of the 
relationship between “abstract philosophy” and everyday consciousness. At the same time, insofar as 
metaphors were more ambiguous than logical propositions, they could also be dangerous if used 
carelessly.  They would require careful annotation in order to prevent them from running amok and 
contributing to a state of linguistic chaos like the one that had existed during wartime.  In an 
arresting use of a metaphor of his own, Tsurumi argued that to prevent this chaos from getting out 
of hand, philosophers had to call on the “policeman” of semiotic consciousness. 
Semiotic consciousness is the spirit of discerning the limited nature and effectiveness of the 
language one currently uses, and, when necessary, it is the policeman that interrupts 
philosophical discussions demanding a clarification of meaning.  When harmful doctrines and 
empty theories run amok, semiotic consciousness demands the temporary cessation of 
ambiguous language, and ought to specify and recommend that the content of ongoing 
arguments be expressed in clearer language – factual propositions, logical propositions, 
gestural propositions, ethical propositions, or aesthetic propositions.114 
 
 Tsurumi’s advocacy of logical analysis in education helps explain his early interest in C. K. 
Ogden’s BASIC English (short for British American Scientific International Commercial English) 
and its basic Japanese counterpart, Kiso nihongo (基礎日本語), developed just three years after 
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BASIC in 1933 by the scholar of English literature Doi Kôchi.  Ogden devised BASIC English 
partially as a means of facilitating communication among native and non-native English speakers, 
but Tsurumi was more interested in how imposed word limits and simplified grammar forced 
language users to break down complex ideas into simpler units that retained a more obvious 
connection with perceptual experience.115 BASIC English and Basic Japanese both represented ways 
of developing logical skills via education that might come in handy during a future crisis - when it 
was necessary to carefully dissect the statements of politicians in a chaotic linguistic environment. 
 
American Propaganda, American Communication 
 
 In line with Tsurumi’s focus on linguistic analysis and philosophy as a collection of everyday 
techniques that could be brought in line with scientific principles, Science of Thought displayed an early 
interest in the burgeoning new field of communications science in America.  The idea of 
“communication” was invested with enormous intellectual expectations in America after the Second 
World War. In his history of the concept, John Durham Peters writes that postwar Anglo-American 
thinkers believed it was capable of unifying “the natural sciences (DNA as the great code), the liberal 
arts (language as communication), and the social sciences (communication as the basic social 
process).” Psychologists and cyberneticists promoted the idea that therapeutic communication held 
the key to resolving global and social conflicts.116 Harold D. Lasswell’s work, which grew out of his 
studies of propaganda use during World War I, was received in the context of such optimism.  He 
tried to transform the study of politics into a science that confronted empirical reality and 
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communicative behavior, but he was also criticized for trying to remake the discipline into a 
collection of therapeutic techniques of social control.117 
 In the November 1947 issue of Science of Thought, Inokuchi Ichirô introduced the loanword 
“Communication” (Komyunikêshon コミュニケーション) to Japanese audiences in a two-part 
summary and review of Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion (1946), co-edited by Lasswell, 
Bruce Lannes Smith, and Ralph D. Casey. Although neologisms existed to translate the English 
word communications into Japanese (通信、伝達), and there existed a government ministry with 
the English translation of its name “Ministry of Communications (逓信省), the article was notable 
for simply transcribing the word into the Japanese script, implying a break from earlier 
understandings of the word that associated it more with the development of communications 
infrastructure, like telegraph lines, rather than the communicative practices embedded in Lasswell’s 
famous definition: “Who says what to whom in what channel with what effect.”118  Inokuchi 
introduced Lasswell’s concept of communication research as a science of the “mutual bonds among 
the people,” that attempts a methodological solution to the problem how to realize the “new 
construction of the world” (世界の新しい建設) after the war.119 
 Inokuchi was among a small number of specialists who were already familiar with the 
conceptual space carved out by Lasswell’s work before 1945.  Although beginning the story in 1947 
aligns the origins of communications research with Japan’s postwar democracy, like many such 
narratives that began during the Occupation, this translated term had a complicated prehistory, one 
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that parallels the US development of communications studies out of propaganda studies after the 
First World War.120  Since the 1920s, the Japanese government had been sponsoring studies of 
foreign propaganda research that emerged out of that conflict, acting on the assumption that the 
superior propaganda techniques of the US were an essential component of their march to victory in 
Europe.121  A translation of Lasswell’s book Propaganda Technique in the World War had been translated 
into Japanese in 1940 by Komatsu Takaaki, then head of the National Spiritual Mobilization 
Operations Division (国民精神総動員事業部), a section of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s 
cabinet created to coordinate propaganda activities after the Japanese army advanced into China in 
the wake of the Marco Polo incident in July, 1937.122   
 Inokuchi was linked to Komatsu’s research network while teaching in the Japanese puppet-
state of Manchukuo, where from 1943 until the end of the war, he was a professor of journalism at 
Kenkoku University.123  He could read English and German, and he was already familiar with 
Lasswell’s work from research on propaganda and public relations (弘報) at Kenkoku.124  He 
returned to Japan in 1946 and may have found a copy of the recently published Propaganda Technique 
in the World War at the library in Hibiya run by GHQ’s Civil Information and Educational Section 
(CIE).125 The library was established on November 15th, 1945 to “supply Japanese public, editors, 
and writers with reference and background material on the war, international affairs, and American 
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life in order to assist in carrying out the democratization of Japan in accordance with established 
policies of the Supreme Allied Commander.”126 In support of Occupation policies, the library not 
only lent out books, pamphlets and magazines; it also provided English lessons, organized concerts, 
and held film screenings.127  
 The CIE Library was located just a block away from Science of Thought’s office, and was 
frequented by members of the group.  Its collection formed the basis of many of the early book 
reviews in the journal, which was in keeping with its stated intention to introduce new intellectual 
developments from England and the United States.  This was a self-conscious shift away from an 
intellectual culture that the founders of the journal believed to have been dominated by German 
idealism since the turn of the twentieth century.  Insofar as early articles in Science of Thought heavily 
relied on the CIE Library for material, it might seem that in its early years the journal, for better or 
worse, was simply a vehicle for the aims of the Occupation’s educational outreach, disseminating 
information in Japanese pertaining to the CIE’s mostly English collection of academic books. In fact, 
the reviews, sometimes written from an economistic Marxist perspective, were often quite critical of 
American thinkers like John Dewey.  The closest the journal came to running into serious trouble 
with Occupation censors was when it tried to publish a summary of Niebuhr’s critique of the Stailin 
in a review of Children of Light, Children of Darkness in 1946.128  Though ironic in light of subsequent 
events in the Cold War, the article was deemed unacceptable due to the Soviet Union’s status as a 
member of the Allied forces. 
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 Inokuchi’s article on Lasswell receives most of the attention in institutional histories of 
communications research in Japan, but it was in fact the second article in that issue of Science of Thought 
that dealt with the loanword “communication.” It followed Tsurumi Shunsuke’s review article of the 
pragmatist philosopher and semiotician Charles Morris’s Signs, Language and Behavior (1946).  The 
review consisted mostly of definitions of a bewildering array of semiotic and behaviorist terminology 
(“appraisor,” “preparatory-stimulus,” “formative ascriptor,” and the like).  Tsurumi gave a brief 
definition of “communication” as something that “becomes possible when mutual meanings are 
evoked, not necessarily through language, via the production of signs.” 
 Whereas Lasswell saw propaganda as necessary to guide collective action in both 
democracies and despotic regimes, Morris believed that the need for propagandistic communication 
could be overcome via education.129 Like Tsurumi in Reflections on Philosophy, Morris believed in the 
anti-totalitarian potential of an education in semiotics as a kind of vaccine against manipulative 
propaganda.  
The totalitarian society will give no widespread attention to the semiotic in its educational 
plans for the total population, for knowledge of sign phenomena makes it less easy to 
manipulate by signs those who have this knowledge.  But precisely because of this fact 
semiotic should have a prominent place in the educational system of a democratic society.130 
 
Instead of obedience, this education would aim toward the creation of a “spontaneous and 
responsible democratic citizen.”  In line with the broader attempt to re-imagine science after the war, 
Morris argued this education could overcome the uneven development between science and the 
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humanities, connect science with everyday life, and resolve the problem of imposing “democracy” 
on an unwilling populace from the outside. 
An education which gave due place to the semiotic would destroy at its foundations the 
cleavage and opposition of science and the humanities.  For the importance of accurate 
knowledge in the formation of preferences and decisions would in no way weaken the 
importance of forming preferences and decisions relevant to the insistent problems of 
personal and social life.  And in work upon the common cultural heritage of its students 
such an education would help to recreate and transmit the common symbols required by a 
democratic society, while at the same time preparing the student for playing his own 
dynamic and constructive role in the extension of democratic processes.  For in a democratic 
society a common language is not enough, and a rigid and inflexible language imposed from 
the top is not desirable.131 
 
Morris reappeared in Tsurumi’s work a few years later, in a multi-volume series on American 
intellectual history published in 1950 by the now formally organized “Institute for the Science of 
Thought.” Tsurumi drew a sharp distinction between Lasswell and Morris as representatives of what 
he considered to be two opposed traditions in communications research: control-oriented 
propaganda studies versus pluralistic, pragmatic semiotics.  
 In The History of American Thought members of the Institute pored over historical materials in 
search of the economic and social foundations of American intellectual culture, characterized by 
widely held beliefs in self-reliance and progress.  Contributors pointed to the legacy of Puritan self-
reliance in New England (Abe Kôzô), the presence of the frontier in the American imagination 
(Hanada Kiyoteru), and the conditions of American capitalism developing outside aristocratic 
Europe (Tsuru Shigeto), to take a few examples.  By the end of the series, a sedimented tradition of 
democratic sociality – a democratic mode of communication – emerges as one of the central 
concerns of American social science and the symbol of the United States’ ascendant intellectual 
power in the postwar world. 
                                                






 Turning to contemporary thought in volume four, Tsurumi Shunsuke, in an odd turn of 
phrase, wrote that the 1930s effectively scooped up the "top athletes" (一流選手) in the intense 
methodological battles in European philosophy and deposited them in America. 132 He was mainly 
referring to members of the Vienna Circle, founded in Austria in 1922, who went into exile in the 
United States and Britain after Hitler rose to power.  His account of how these European 
intellectuals were influenced by their experience of living in America could be read as a parable of 
the lessons Japanese intellectuals should learn from the American Occupation, in particular, to 
become more practical and to focus on everyday communication. 
 The Vienna Circle, which included thinkers such as Rudolph Carnap and Otto Neurath, who 
remained in England rather than relocate to America, was committed to the task of making 
philosophy more scientific by criticizing its metaphysical foundations.  Their founding manifesto, 
“The Scientific Conception of the World,” called for a reawakening of enlightenment ideals against a 
“theological” trend in philosophical thinking: “Many assert that metaphysical and theologizing 
thought is again on the increase today, not only in life but also in science…. But likewise the 
opposite spirit of enlightenment and anti-metaphysical factual research is growing stronger today, in that 
it is becoming conscious of its existence and task.  In some circles the mode of thought grounded in 
experience and averse to speculation is stronger than ever, being strengthened precisely by the new 
opposition that has arisen.” 133   The Circle initially positioned its critique of metaphysics as part of a 
wider political struggle in Vienna against unreason, which included such initiatives as John Dewey-
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influenced educational reform, the democratization of universities, and the foundation of secular 
“Free Schools” by Leftists. 134  
 In any case, by the time the Circle relocated to America, Tsurumi believed that increased 
political repression had directed the Circle's orientation toward problems in formal logic and 
methodology that were far removed from "practical" (実践的) concerns.  He argued that life in 
America and contact with American philosophers shifted the concerns of these thinkers toward 
problems of content (semantics) rather than form, and toward a position closer to critical realism.  
Most important, after the project to create an Encyclopedia of the Unified Sciences moved to the 
University of Chicago, the logical empiricists became involved in a multidisciplinary inquiry into 
human culture, considered a "system of the means of communication (通信手段の体系)" centered 
upon the semiotic sign. 135 They collaborated on their encyclopedic project with American 
pragmatists John Dewey and Charles W. Morris, who was the faculty host of the Vienna Circle at 
Chicago and a former teacher of Tsurumi’s. 
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 According to Tsurumi, communications was a new field of enquiry that rested upon a 
bedrock of American tradition: "Communications research (通信（コミュニケイション）研究) 
is a field that has only recently taken its place among the existing academic disciplines.  
Communications research could practically be considered a unique product of America, one that 
appears to originate directly from the essence of American culture." 136  He went on to distinguish 
between Harold Lasswell’s approach to communications and policy science and Charles W. Morris’s 
pragmatic semiotics in terms of their susceptibility to government control.  Tsurumi argued that 
Lasswell insisted on a distinction between cognition and values, while Morris held that a strict 
distinction was untenable, given the diversity of value-infused sign-systems that always already 
mediated cognition. 137 Tsurumi seemed to prefer the latter approach since it was less susceptible 
than Lasswell’s framework to co-option by the “powerful government of the 30s to 50s.”   
 Yet as the Cold War escalated, Morris’ pluralism, along with the broader optimism invested 
in the term “communication,” was vulnerable to accusations of political naiveté.  A renewed 
engagement with social reality among members of the Vienna Circle and the Unity of Science 
movement was cut short by the “climate of fear” that swept through American academia in the 
1950s, a moment that coincided with the Rockefeller Foundation’s decision to end funding for both 
the Unity of Science project and Science of Thought’s linguistic research.138 
 
Reorienting Thought 
 Before their survey of American intellectual history was published, Science of Thought had 
already taken steps toward trying to reorient the public toward communications-oriented reform, a 
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field they hoped to align with the development of democracy in postwar Japan. In 1948 the Institute 
rented an auditorium in Tokyo owned by the Mainichi newspaper for the first public lecture series on 
communications.  The physicist and Science of Thought co-founder Watanabe Satoshi introduced the 
talks and may have played a key role in securing funding from Shiseido, a cosmetics company, and 
the Ministry of Communications.139 He was the grandnephew of a former head of the ministry, 
Watanabe Chiaki, and a more distant relative of the president of Shiseidô, Fukuhara Shinzo.   
 Fukuhara had studied at Columbia University at the turn of the century, and his sons were 
students in America when they were repatriated on the Gripsholm along with the Science of Thought 
returnees.140   He was a pioneer in introducing American-style marketing techniques to Japan in the 
teens and twenties, collaborating with the brilliant graphic designer Yamana Ayao to redefine the 
Shiseido brand.  The elegant feminine ideal associated with Shiseido became problematic during the 
push for austerity and mobilization for war in the thirties.  Yamana and other Shiseido designers 
participated in propaganda efforts during the war in connection with Lasswell translator Komatsu 
Takaaki’s Spiritual Mobilization Division of the Konoe cabinet.141 
 The Science of Thought communication lectures were held under different circumstances.  They 
were part and parcel of an age of “postwar enlightenment” - a moment of increased civic activity on 
the part of progressive intellectuals, many of whom offered public lectures on topics related to 
democracy.  Though in line with the times, a lecture on “communication” occasioned certain 
difficulties.  In his introductory remarks, the physicist Watanabe Satoshi immediately noted the 
English language origin of the term.  He flatly asserted that there was no proper equivalent for the 
term in Japanese, which he said could designate everything from books to television to everyday 
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conversation to thought control.  Tsurumi Shunsuke later noted that the unfamiliarity of the term 
“communication” at the time of the lecture made it difficult to sell tickets to the event.142 
 Beginning with this translation difficulty, Watanabe drew an unfavorable contrast between 
Japan and the West from the standpoint of communication habits.  He speculated that the absence 
of an equivalent term “indicates that in our Japanese society, communication, a mechanism that 
operates between and among our fellow human beings, is in a state of torpor.” (不活溌の状態にあ
る).143  Words, actions, and feelings were in communicative disarray.  At stake was the 
transformation of democracy from an abstract ideal into a living reality.  “Even if we reform the 
constitution and pay lip service to democracy, unless we make this thing that exists as part of our 
everyday lives – in other words, mutual communication, understanding, respect, and persuasion – 
into the basic motif (基調) of everyday life, I believe we will not be able to realize a fortunate 
society.”   
 Although Watanabe initially specified a very broad semantic field for the term 
“communication” – a breadth that attracted the Science of Thought members interested in the 
investigation of mass culture – he implicitly emphasized face-to-face interaction and personal 
communicative bonds. In another section, he argued that, without a change in habits, Japanese 
society would conform to the image of an unnamed commentator who remarked that, “Euro-
American society is animalistic while Japanese society is vegetative.” He noted that this image was 
true insofar as the Japanese people, like individual trees basking in sunlight, “lacked horizontal 
bonds” - a necessary condition for democracy.  He then referred to another anonymous 
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commentator, this one foreign, who referred to the Japanese people as “liars” (嘘つき日本人) as 
prelude to an attack on empty formalities in language use: 
While we Japanese do not lie with the intention to deceive people, we often do end up 
deceiving them through our actions and words.  I think this is deeply related to the fact that 
we have not forced ourselves to develop the social habits of stating, listening to, and 
understanding our opinions.  The habit of uttering empty words, formal words, and words 
we don’t really mean is deeply rooted in our lives.  This is our tradition from long ago, and it 
still naturally exists now, in the world referred to as democratic Japan.  Despite the saying we 
have that “eyes say as much as words,” it is a fact that our manner, our attitude, and our 
words do not necessarily perform the function of transmitting our feelings. I think that as 
long as this is not reformed, we will be unable to make our society more close-knit and full 
of hope for the future.144 
 
 Watanabe then cited a line from a haiku by the 17th-century poet Matsuo Bashô that 
exemplified the negative Japanese attitude toward communication, “Say something/ And the lips go 
cold.” 145 This mistakenly associated speaking with loss, sadness, and guilt.  Watanabe retorts, “If 
thought (思想) were like the contents of a bucket of water, then ladling it out would cause it to 
diminish, but thoughts and feelings gush forth more and more when you try to make them visible 
and transmit them.”  
 One might dismiss Watanabe’s speech as an unabashed assertion of the inferiority of 
Japanese society and so-called traditional values vis-a-vis the rational West, or a symptom of the 
notion of negative particularism among early postwar theorizers of Japanese culture.146 Yet through 
this binary comparison Watanabe was calling for a reorientation of values towards collaborative 
work, cooperation, and communicative sharing rather than individual achievement, a demand 
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echoed in Hatano’s lecture.147 Their emphasis here is different from postwar thinkers like the literary 
critic Sakaguchi Ango and the political theorist Maruyama Masao, who made use of this same binary 
to attack Japan’s traditionalism from a different angle, arguing that it was necessary to liberate the 
egoistic individual from the domination of a collectivity imagined to have enforced total conformity 
to the demands of the war effort.148 In Watanabe’s view, the individual was linked to the collective, 
but at the level of communication, the individual “genius” was an isolated individual. 
 Watanabe juxtaposed the scientific aptitude of individuals with their communicative isolation, 
“It is said that in Japan science, philosophy, and profound thought (深い思想) never progresses, 
but that is not to say that there were no smart people, and even in mathematics, geniuses emerge.  
Yet without discussing things with colleagues or transmitting teachings to disciples, these people 
think alone.  This is where a low level of learning originates.  I think communication is deeply 
connected to this.”149 The specific reference to mathematic genius was probably not accidental.  
Popular new research on the history of mathematics had appeared during the war in the early 1940s 
that, in line with the cultural nationalism of the times, highlighted the talent and tradition of 
Japanese mathematicians active during the Tokugawa era.150 Watanabe’s brief acknowledgement of 
mathematic genius is evidence that, rather than simply negating a chauvinistic view of Japanese 
cultural superiority, Watanabe and other members of Science of Thought were attempting to effect a 
reorientation of intellectual and reformist interest toward a subject that they considered neglected.  In 
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Hatano’s lecture this also implied overturning the perception, common during “the old days of the 
omnipotence of the Japanese spirit,” that the English language implied a “crude” way of thinking.151 
 Watanabe and Hatano were calling for a shift of interest away from subjects of “deep” 
intellectual speculation concerning the unity of human existence to the ostensibly “superficial” 
observation of communicative interaction in everyday life.  Calls for this shift resonated across 
academic disciplines.  In another article in Science of Thought published a few months after the 
communication lecture entitled “What Ought We Learn from American Psychology?” the 
sociologist Daidô Yasujirô compared the Japanese reception of the German Gestalt tradition in 
psychology with that of American behaviorism.  He wondered at the tendency of Japanese scholars 
to gravitate toward German rather than American scholarship during the war, a tendency that 
existed in many other academic fields.  He proposed that these scholars had secretly embraced a 
“sense of nostalgia towards the Orient” (東洋への郷愁) that made them receptive to the holistic, 
anti-structuralist, anti-Wundt approach of the Gestalt school.  He asked rhetorically, “In attempting 
to restore humanity via totalistic methods, did we smuggle back in a kind of irrationalism?”152  
 Daidô asserted that, in contrast to Gestalt philosophy, behaviorism mechanistically viewed 
humans and animals in the same way.  Rather than trying to restore humanity to a privileged place in 
psychological research, it “aimed to see the animal in the human being.”  He suggested that this 
approach may at first appear superficial, but it was nonetheless an important corrective.  He 
concluded his comparison by saying, “Gestalt psychology taught us to view phenomena realistically 
(リアールに).  We Orientals (われわれ東洋人), who had highly valued grasping truth behind a 
false reality, were easily able to familiarize ourselves with it.  In contrast, American psychology will 
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probably teach us to look at phenomena objectively.  I have a feeling that learning how to do this 
thoroughly will by no means be easy.”153   
 One way to explain the conceptual importance of communication for this broader 
reorientation is that it called for an intellectual shift toward “superficial” topics, and a behavioral 
shift, directed at both intellectuals and non-intellectuals, toward communicative techniques that may 
have seemed remote from culture but were logical and efficient.  The founding statement of Science of 
Thought asserted that it was not enough for intellectuals to exchange one set of nationalistic ideas 
pertaining to the particularistic superiority of the “Japanese spirit” in exchange for a new set of 
ostensibly democratic and internationalist ones.  Such a change indicated a return to “Taisho 
democracy” – which they saw as fragile, dysfunctional, and polarized between the elites and the 
masses.  Change after 1945 occurred in a way that was “self-negating,” not only in the sense that 
intellectuals associated with Science of Thought adopted a negative attitude toward perceived 
particularities in their own society, but also in the sense that they always had in view the ultimate 
objective of eliminating the gap between intellectuals and the masses, necessitating a reorientation of 
intellectual interests away from metaphysical speculation and toward everyday behavior and 
techniques of thought.  Despite the descriptive nature of the term “communication” - it implied the 
normative transformation of both intellectuals and masses, the subjects and objects of knowledge, 
into communicators.  
 
The Paradox of Communications Reform 
 
 The imported term “communication,” whether derived from Lasswell or Dewey, brought 
with it a good deal of specialized jargon.  The difficulty of selling tickets to the inaugural lecture 
because of the unfamiliarity of the term “communication” was only part of the problem. Tsurumi 
                                                






Shunsuke and other contributors to Science of Thought also coined neologisms for “sender,” “receiver,” 
“interpretant,” “response disposition,” and other semiotic terms. Tsurumi expressed a retrospective 
sense of embarrassment over the unreadability of these early articles, explaining them as due to his 
lack of practice writing in Japanese after returning to Tokyo from Harvard during the war.154 
 Seemingly in response to this conundrum and in the context of a broader debate on language 
reform during the Occupation, a number of articles appeared in late 1948 devoted to the 
simplification of academic prose. The ethnologist Yanagita Kunio, who was not a member of the 
group but was cited as a source in many of the early communication studies, seemed pessimistic 
about the possibility of revising academic jargon by fiat. He warned the group that movements 
spearheaded by intellectuals immersed in the written word would end up promoting ineffective 
reform that lacked an organic connection to the lives and oral habits of ordinary people.155  
 In spite of Yanagita’s pessimism, members revised their own semiotic jargon in an attempt 
to make it as understandable as possible.  For example, Tsurumi initially translated “interpretant” as 
“kaigitai” (解義体) before settling on “tokiguchi” (解き口). 156 Like most of these revisions, this one 
substituted a “Japanese” reading (“toki”) of the relevant Chinese character compound for the 
“Chinese” reading (“kai”).  These changes reflected the influence of Yanagita, who argued in his 
ethnographic work that the Japanese reading reflected oral culture while the Chinese reading 
reflected written culture, whether imported from China or the West.  To Yanagita’s nativist 
ethnographic observation was added the logical argument that new terms should minimize the 
number of possible synonyms in order to facilitate free oral communication of academic subjects 
among non-specialists, a task in line with Tosaka Jun’s prewar call to “massify” science.  
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 The structure of the Japanese language itself appeared as an obstacle to this task in a way 
that was not amenable to attempts to substitute easy-to-understand words for abstruse jargon.  This 
was evident in the work of Ôkubo Tadatoshi, a frequent contributor of articles on linguistics in early 
issues of Science of Thought and a key member of the linguistics group in the Association of 
Democratic Scientists.  Ôkubo worked to popularize linguistics in his 1947 book Linguistics for the 
Million (Hyakuman-nin no gengogaku), a text aimed at general readers that was named after the British 
“Red Science” popularizer Lancelot Hogben’s book Mathematics for the Million (Hyakuman-nin no 
sûgaku). 
 In 1948, Ôkubo published “The Psychology of Word Order” in Science of Thought and argued 
that the usual subject-object-verb word order of Japanese constituted “fetters on thought” that 
made logical communication more difficult than in English.157  According to Ôkubo, this point had 
passed unnoticed by language reformers because they were biased towards the “standpoint of the 
speaker” instead of the “standpoint of the listener.” Ôkubo grasped the essence of Science of Thought’s 
communications research as an attempt to shift attention away from the authoritative speaker 
toward the everyday listener.158  From such a standpoint, the ambiguity that persisted in a Japanese 
sentence until the verb appeared at the end affected the entire communicative process, weakening 
the impression of argument and new information on listeners.159   
 In a sense, Ôkubo transposed the Kôza-ha argument regarding the nature of Japanese 
capitalism to linguistics.  This argument, dominant among the Marxists in Minka, held that despite 
the external appearance of capitalist development, the mode of production in Japan was still 
characterized by a feudal core because the modernizers associated with the Meiji Restoration had 
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failed to displace the large landowners from their exploitative position in the countryside.  Capitalist 
elements were externally grafted by the state onto a predominantly feudal, rural core.  Reform of the 
writing system, undertaken several times since the Meiji period, failed to remedy the unscientific 
structure of the Japanese language.  The word order of Japanese did not correspond to the universal 
language of mathematics (1+1=2) in the same way that the history of the Japanese economy did not 
correspond to universal laws of capitalist development. 
 Tsurumi Shunsuke had a different view of the perceived ambiguity of the Japanese language, 
one that downplayed Japanese particularism and suggested a way around the dilemma of 
disseminating logical techniques without sacrificing readability.  He drew upon the definition of 
ambiguity advanced by the American philosopher of the behavioral sciences Abraham Kaplan, who 
was in turn inspired by the British literary critic William Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity.  Kaplan 
translated Empson’s definition of ambiguity into the language of semiotics, arguing that ambiguity 
was an irreducible feature of language insofar as, “one cannot speak… of the meaning of any symbol, 
but can only specify its range of responses and the clusters into which these tend to be groups.”160 
 In a 1949 article titled “The Form of the Postwar Novel” published in Hanada Kiyoteru’s 
journal Sôgô bunka (Integrated Culture), Tsurumi referred to Ôkubo’s research with an 
acknowledgement that the word order of Japanese might be an inconvenience in scientific writing, 
but went on to argue that the same ambiguity could be exploited to encourage intellectual activity on 
the part of the reader of postwar fiction.   
 Citing the work of novelists like Shiina Rinzô, Noma Hiroshi, and Nakamura Shinichiro, 
Tsurumi characterized Japanese postwar literature as highly introspective, and he noted that it often 
drew on a philosophical “meta-language” (Meta-gengo) to describe the existential angst of characters 
                                                







in search of meaning in a world in which hitherto secure wartime moral values had been uprooted 
by defeat, and in which values associated with postwar democracy were greeted with hesitant 
skepticism. He cites a passage from Nakamura Shinichirô’s Beneath the Shadow of Death (Shi no kage no 
shita ni). 
Yet I first recalled a kind of metaphysical terror upon learning that things cease to exist.  
This occult sense of terror was the same as that which came into existence among the 
ancients for whom the word “to be spirited away” took root.   A mother and child walking 
down the road are suddenly torn asunder into a world that exists on a more rarefied 
dimension.161 
 
 Tsurumi embraced the sensibility behind the earnest attempts among postwar writers to reflect 
on the war, make sense of their conflicted feelings, and retain an independent, skeptical perspective 
on the present.  At the same time, he decried their use of philosophical jargon – including 
“metaphysical, and “rarefied dimension” – because he believed it made this irreducibly ambiguous 
experience unintelligible to a mass audience.  Citing I. A. Richards’ 1942 translation of Plato’s 
Republic into BASIC English, Tsurumi claimed that an extensive vocabulary was by no means 
necessary for philosophical depth.162  He argued that the perceived correlation between difficult 
vocabulary and depth was a false notion propagated by a hierarchical educational system, one that 
correlated academic progress with the number of Chinese characters memorized by pupils.  Linking 
the educational system with another hierarchical organization, Tsurumi wrote that the number of 
Chinese characters packed into a single sentence reminded him of the official language of the 
military - which tended to use impersonal-sounding Chinese character vocabulary when issuing 
orders like “Forward march” (前進).  With irony, Tsurumi wrote, “These writers, who sincerely 
celebrate a certain liberation following the war and seek greater liberation in its aftermath, work still 
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shackled to unfree words.  This fact says a lot about the state of the postwar psyche.”163 Instead of 
mimicking philosophical writing, postwar authors ought to exploit the ambiguity of Japanese 
sentence structure in order to surprise readers and shock them into viewing the world of everyday 
experience in a new way. 
Novels have one big advantage over the language of typical philosophy.  That is the power 
to surprise.  Philosophy tries to give a new interpretation and teach a new way of interacting 
with the tired elements of a world one experiences every day.  Yet in order for this to be 
achieved, the reader’s spirit must first of all be startled and come to see that world with new 
eyes.164   
 
 Tsurumi cited as an example the 1948 novella The Eternal Preface (Eien-naru joshô) by the 
existentialist writer Shiina Rinzô.  The novel is set in the ruins of postwar Tokyo. The protagonist 
Sunagawa Yasuta has just learned that he has three months to live as a result of lung cancer.  In a 
series of flashbacks we learn about Yasuta’s early obsession with death after his mother and father 
passed away in his childhood.  Before the war, he flirted with leftist ideas after meeting an anarchist 
painter, but became disillusioned with the inability of these systems of thought to take death 
seriously.  Death, after all, would exist even in a socialist utopia. He nihilistically enlists in the army, 
expecting to die.  Upon his miraculous return, knowledge of his impending death from cancer fills 
him with a sense of freedom and he repeatedly sees a vision of young children playing in a grassy 
field.  Despite his skepticism toward “the materialist view of history,” Yasuta spends his last day full 
of optimism, joining in Communist-led May Day demonstrations, then dying surrounded by 
comrades (仲間). The motivation for his last-minute political commitment was never made explicit, 
though it is clearly a life-affirming gesture, one made possible by his newfound sense of freedom.165 
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 With its praise of existentialist literature like The Eternal Preface, “The Form of the Postwar 
Novel” represented a stronger endorsement of linguistic ambiguity than Tsurumi’s earlier Reflection on 
Philosophy.  Postwar authors, Tsurumi argued, used literary ambiguity not to criticize and overcome 
modernity and rationality but to reformulate it in a way that was resistant to sloganeering.  Rather 
than trying to establish philosophy as a semiotic policeman to be mobilized in case of emergency, 
Tsurumi ended his essay on literature with the hope that through a creative use of such ambiguity, 
literature could perhaps – if it could rid itself of elitist meta-language – supplant philosophy entirely, 
achieving the aims of philosophy more effectively than philosophy itself could. He compared this 
ambition with the postwar hope, held by “some materialist thinkers,” that science might construct a 
classless society, usurping the place of both politics and ethics.  He argued that both sorts of wild 
ambition, aspirations toward semiotic “genre shattering,” were necessary for change.  He asserted 
that, “… nothing new is born out of a pan-sectarian cooperation committee.  Rather it’s when the 
thumb, pinky, or ring finger strains to become the whole that healthy development of the entire 
hand can be expected.”166  
  This turn toward ambiguity was even more evident in 1952, with the publication of the edited 
volume Dewey Research: A Critique of the American Way of Thinking – a multi-disciplinary critique of 
Dewey’s pragmatism published by the Institute for the Science of Thought immediately after his 
death.  Tsurumi Shunsuke contributed an article entitled “Communication,” in which he argued that 
the recent suicide of the linguist and Russian interpreter Kan Sueharu (1917-1950) cast doubt on the 
optimism implicit in Dewey’s concept of communication.  In Tsurumi’s interpretation, Dewey 
assumes that (1) the normal state of things is roughly describable in term of the symmetrical 
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exchange of signs, and (2) we should adopt “perfect communication” as an ideal to be striven for in 
everyday life.   
 Kan Sueharu committed suicide after he was harshly interrogated in the National Diet about 
his role as interpreter in a Russian POW camp before his repatriation to Japan in 1949.  The issue 
here was whether Tokuda Kyûichi, the secretary-general of the Japanese Communist Party, 
intervened to prevent the return of non-Communist prisoners to Japan, an accusation that was 
believed to hinge upon the precise wording of a message communicated to the Russian authorities 
and, with Kan interpreting, read aloud to the POWs.  In his message, had Tokuda “demanded” that 
the Soviets repatriate only “well-prepared democrats” (understood by the Diet to mean 
“Communist”), or had he merely “hoped” for their conversion to his ideal of democracy? Kan 
approached the question as a linguist, arguing that his translation of the Russian word “nadeetsya” as 
“hope” (期待) was the most accurate choice, an assertion that the Communist Party newspaper 
Akahata published as proof of Tokuda’s innocence. At the same time, Kan’s testimony was 
skeptically received by the investigating Diet members, who prodded Kan to admit that his 
involvement with Tokuda went beyond merely providing an objective translation.  The investigators 
eventually found their own Russian “expert” who testified that “nadeetsya” could also mean 
“demand” (要請).  Kan committed suicide soon after his ordeal, leaving a note that described his 
powerlessness and disillusionment in the face of political demagoguery.167 
 Tsurumi, reviewing the Diet transcript and Kan’s suicide note, concluded that Kan’s testimony 
revealed a similar naiveté regarding communication to that of Dewey.  In Tsurumi’s eyes, Kan’s 
disillusionment suggested that we should be aware that “discommunication” is often the normal 
state of things, with language users attempting to manipulate and use one another for political ends. 
                                                






Yet like the postwar author’s use of literary ambiguity, “discommunication” offers opportunities for 
creative, or tactical, expression. 
 There was a marked difference between Tsurumi’s “philosophical disaster prevention” in 
1946 and his embrace of discommunication in 1952. Apart from the passing of time since the end of 
the war, this difference is understandable conisdering that Tsurumi left unresolved in Reflection on 
Philosophy the problem of clearly distinguishing between a preparatory “era of construction” and an 
“era of crisis.”  Tsurumi assumed that, with the war having just ended, his contemporary moment 
was one of construction.  By the late 1940s and 50s, It was far more difficult to take for granted that 
distinction between past crisis and present construction.  When Tsurumi published “The Form of 
the Postwar Novel” in 1949, the Occupation authorities, increasingly fearful of Communist 
influence in Asia, had already halted a General Strike in 1947 and put an end to labor disputes at 
Toho Film Studios in 1948.  In 1949, the Japanese Communist Party was accused of terrorist activity 
in three widely publicized criminal episodes: the Shimoyama, Mitaka, and Matsuakawa incidents. The 
intensification of the Cold War dampened any hopes that one could remain aloof from the 
fluctuating political exigencies of the present in order to remain undistracted from the longer-term 
goal of preparation for a future moment of crisis.  Tsurumi’s eventual response was to shift away 
from trying to promote logical techniques “from the outside” - in other words, through the 
introduction and dissemination of his philosophical system and an artificial language – and more 
toward extracting and sharpening already-existing critical techniques dormant in everyday life in 
Japan.  These were central goals of the project launched by the Institute for the Science of Thought 










 Though many thinkers after the war derived inspiration from abroad in their attempts to 
articulate a new vision for postwar democracy, the focus on communication among the intellectuals 
affiliated with the Institute for the Science of Thought was unusual.  For Tsurumi Shunsuke, 
exposure to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, Peircean semiotics, and the New Criticism of 
William Empson, I. A. Richards, and C. K. Ogden as a student at Harvard affected how he 
analytically approached the “atmosphere of linguistic confusion” he confronted upon returning to 
Japan after the outbreak of war with the United States in 1941.  In addition, the notion that 
American success was connected to the ability of intellectuals to communicate across disciplines and 
political affiliations, and the need in the Institute for intellectuals from various disciplines to 
cooperate effectively helps explain why there were so many articles on communications, logic, and 
analytic philosophy in early issues of the journal.  The American science of “communications” 
aligned this research with the scientific universalism promoted by dozens of other journals and 
intellectual associations with this period, and it suggested ways in which clear communication might 
fulfill the urgent task of narrowing the gap between intellectuals and the masses after the war.  
Through its lecture series, Science of Thought promoted the idea that the ability to communicate 
complex ideas clearly, logically, and constantly was a key to democratic subjectivity.  Yet in the early 
fifties, the Kan Sueharu trial demonstrated to Tsurumi Shunsuke that it was naïve to think that being 
a good communicator was sufficient to realize democracy in the intensely “discommunicative” 
atmosphere of the Cold War.  Tsurumi argued that intellectuals should not just criticize this 
discommunicative situation from the standpoint of logic; they should also take advantage of it to 







Chapter 3: The Philosophy of Ordinary People 
 
For example, Professor Kawai Eijiro is proposing a philosophy of liberalism.  Yet suddenly 
constructing a philosophy named “liberalism” based on an economic, political, and cultural 
ideology that ignores the opposition between materialism and idealism is no different from 
speculating about the philosophy of the shoemaker or contriving the philosophy of the 
barber.  Even if you manage to produce an idea by such means it will never become systemic 
thought (思想).   
 -Tosaka Jun, On the Japanese Ideology, 1935 
 
It would be interesting to compare the technique of common sense - i.e., of the philosophy of 
the man in the street - with the technique of the most advanced modern thought. 
 -Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 1929-1935 
 
For us, philosophy is not the ideological, conceptual being of metaphysical investigation; it is 
something that ceaselessly manifests itself in the real behavior of each person; the real being 
that belongs to the world of experience.  In other words it is the object of “scientific” 
research.  It is for this reason that we call the discipline we pursue the “science of thought.” 
 -Kawashima Takeyoshi, My Philosophy (Vol. 2), 1950  
 
 The intellectual history of the first half of the twentieth century can be recounted as a series 
of varying responses to the perceived emergence of the masses as a catalyst for political, cultural, 
and social change.  Some observers projected hope for a utopian future onto this collective subject, 
pointing to events like the Russian Revolution as evidence of the masses’ active, emancipatory role 
in historical events.  Others blamed the passivity of the masses for contributing to the rise of fascism 
and the decline of intellectual values associated with the Enlightenment and democracy.  Alongside 
these polemical reactions, there existed genuine curiosity as to who or what the term “mass” either 
designated or blocked from view.  This was especially true during moments of intense ideological 
fragmentation, such as 1950s Cold War Japan, when journalists and intellectuals strove to transcend 
polarized political arguments on behalf of the masses through an appeal to documentary and 
ethnographic evidence of the masses themselves.168  
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 Ideological polarization helps explain why the founders of Science of Thought at times tried to 
reject the word “mass” (transliterated マス) in favor of other terms like “common men” or 
“ordinary people” (hitobito).169  They believed the word had already become too loaded with pre-
conceptions that obscured the actual lives of the people it was supposed to represent, yet their work 
occupies a similar conceptual space as that of thinkers who tried to investigate the daily life of the 
masses before, during, and shortly after World War Two.  Science of Thought tried to set aside the 
question of whether or not the ultimate triumph of the masses was something to be welcomed or 
feared in favor of preserving and encouraging what John Dewey called a  “scientific attitude” vis-à-
vis an emerging, subjectively alien object of inquiry.  At the same time, the young intellectuals 
associated with Science of Thought were not disinterested observers.  They claimed that their research 
was a part of building a real culture of democracy in Occupied Japan, yet they also believed that this 
was best achieved by making visible the thoughts of ordinary people rather than through intellectual 
arguments in favor of one philosophical system or another. 
 Besides Dewey, early reference points for the project on the “philosophy of ordinary people” 
included the work of ethnographers who promoted the application or adaptation of qualitative 
ethnographic methods to the study of contemporary society (Yanagita Kunio, Bronislaw Malinowski, 
and Clyde Kluckhohn) as well as early attempts statistically to quantify and categorize “value-
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patterns” and “personality types” (Charles W. Morris, Eduard Spranger, and Gordon Allport).170  
Technological developments also played an enabling role. In 1950 Tsurumi Shunsuke enthused over 
the possibilities opened up by the portable (yet still quite bulky) tape recorder for the study of the 
“logic of the everyday.”171 
 The application of empirical methods to this domain of inquiry and debate was fraught with 
difficulties.  In the thirties, Tosaka Jun had argued that the “massification of the sciences” (科学の大
衆化) was itself a prerequisite for a science of the masses.172  From the turn of the twentieth century, 
the investigation of the masses coincided with and contributed to epistemological quandaries across 
the sciences that occasioned a search for new ways of organizing intellectual activity. This search 
tended to impinge upon (1) the existing division of intellectual labor among the academic disciplines, 
(2) the divisions among existing intellectuals and between intellectual-subjects and mass-objects, and 
(3) the division between scientific and political activity. 
 These tendencies were all more or less present in research conducted around the world that 
approached the masses through the application of documentary or ethnographic methods to the 
study of contemporary society.  Examples range from Japan (Kon Wajirô, Ishimoda Shô) to 
Germany (Siegfried Kracauer and the Frankfurt School), Britain (Mass Observation), and the United 
States (Robert Park, Margaret Mead).  Mead was an evangelist for interdisciplinary studies of 
national character in the US and abroad.  Science of Thought openly endeavored to overcome divisions 
among quantitative sociology, qualitative anthropology, and speculative philosophy through an 
investigation of the thought of ordinary people.    
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 In regard to relations between intellectuals and the people, the ethnographic results of a 
similar, temporally overlapping experiment to study the everyday lives of the British working class, 
Mass Observation (1937-1949), prompted critics to wonder whether its name designated 
“observation of the mass or by the mass.”173   The founders of Science of Thought aspired to have it 
both ways, asserting that the purpose of the journal was to propagate “the methods of logical 
empiricism in thought and practice” on the one hand, and to invite non-specialist readers to actively 
participate in the interest of the “gradual evolution of the thought that this journal represents.”174 
This was a difficult balancing act.  The journal’s contributors were alternately criticized for lacking 
academic rigor – a critic remarked that they had a lot to learn from Alfred Kinsey in this regard – or 
for sounding too much like stuffy professors from an earlier age when they conducted interviews. 
 Debates over the intellectual and political legacies of these group experiments to study the 
masses often seem to reproduce the varied and ambivalent responses that had been directed toward 
the masses themselves.  In the United States, mid-century interdisciplinary projects to study 
contemporary society often displaced political and class conflicts onto questions of socialization, 
psychological adjustment, or, especially in Japan’s case, modernization.  At the same time, in 
deliberations over funding decisions, the Rockefeller Foundation struggled over whether to 
categorize the Institute for the Science of Thought as an organization devoted to social research or a 
front for a radical social and political movement.175  A similar reaction, summed up in the question 
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“social research or social movement?” existed among critics attempting to define the work of Mass 
Observation, a collaborative project founded by the anthropologist Tom Harrison and the poet 
Charles Madge in 1937 that produced ethnographies of the contemporary British working class.176 
  In turning the ethnographic gaze inward, these thinkers tried to grasp a particular historical 
trajectory associated with the nation-state as well as an emergent global condition that seemed to be 
on the verge of dislodging tradition from its secure, visible place. Charles Madge asserted that Mass 
Observation surveyed the public reaction to the abdication of Edward VII in order to get at 
“repressed elements” in the British psyche that only come to the surface during major upheavals and 
contradicted the stereotyped portrayal of the “man on the street” in the press.177 The Marxist 
historian Ishimoda Shô, a contemporary of Science of Thought who was interested in investigating and 
documenting the lives of ordinary people, famously titled one of his works The Discovery of History and 
the Nation (民族), thereby emphasizing his belief that the multitude that really constituted the ethnic 
nation had been suppressed in the official historical record.178 
 Yet the weight of historical tradition seemed to vary from place to place.  The reception of 
Ruth Benedict’s Chrysanthemum and the Sword showed that the new alien quality ascribed to an 
emergent mass - a quality that made it stand out as an object of intellectual curiosity - was commonly 
overlaid with the assumption that, in the case of Japan, this opacity might have to do with the non-
Western, semi-feudal character of the Japanese nation and its attendant culture rather than its 
participation in a global conjuncture characterized by capitalist unevenness. The tendency to link the 
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investigation of the masses with the excavation of feudal remainders and national particularities was 
strongly evident after World War Two, when theories linking the rise of fascist militarism in Japan to 
its backward, incompletely modern condition gained widespread acceptance. 179  By associating the 
investigation of the life of the masses with the search for the lingering presence of the feudal past, 
intellectuals associated with Science of Thought obscured certain commonalities their project shared 
with movements abroad. They interpreted war and defeat as evidence of Japan’s difference from the 
West, turning their gaze back toward feudalism and transhistorical cultural characteristics in order to 
explain the present. 
 Three critical features of the Institute’s early studies of “the philosophy of ordinary people” 
and popular culture come into view that broadly parallel the work of intellectuals in America and 
Europe.  First, the project attempted to overcome the gap between intellectuals and the masses 
insofar as it treated the thought of the “ordinary people” as objects of study that were as worthy of 
critical exegesis as the thought of philosophers and the work of literary aesthetes.  The leveling 
impulse behind this choice of topic, which members associated with the creation of a democratic 
culture, undergirded their repeated assertions of the philosophical, as opposed to simply the 
ethnographic or documentary, significance of their work.180 As Tsurumi put it in his essay “The 
Logic of the Everyday,” the project was not to be a dumbing-down of philosophy for mass 
consumption, but a kind of “popularization” of philosophy that recognized the difficulty and 
complexity of everyday life.  At its most optimistic, the collection of data was itself meant as a 
consciousness-raising exercise, one that made people who did not identify as intellectuals aware of 
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their right to intervene in philosophical debates on their own terms. They also hoped to spark the 
interest of “philosophical youth” who were uninterested in the pedestrian facts of everyday life by 
using the language of philosophy to talk about the views and behavior of ordinary people.  The 
perceived impact of the “average American” on the development of pragmatism, “almost the official 
philosophy of America” was a key reference point for some of them. 
 Second, members of the Institute for the Science of Thought intentionally conducted 
research on contemporary society to counter more popular sources of information and imagery on 
the everyday life of the masses.  The project to study the “philosophy of ordinary people” was partly 
intended as an enlightening corrective to distorted, anachronistic, or moralistic images of the masses 
in popular circulation.  
 Finally, the stance of the scientific investigator became increasingly difficult to maintain due 
to a combination of increasing political polarization and methodological tensions that arose in the 
early fifties, tilting the balance between social research and social movement toward the activist side 
of the scale.  While studies of mass society in the US often ended up subsuming political conflicts 
under the category of psychology or socialization, political events during the 1950s moved to center 
stage in Science of Thought’s studies of occupational groups.  Discomfort with studying people as 
objects of research led some members, Tsurumi Kazuko in particular, to move toward more direct 
forms of collaboration with non-intellectuals in the “circle movement.”  
 Despite this change of course, the “Philosophy of Ordinary People” was a project important 
for the questions it raised about the implicit philosophy of non-intellectuals and the popular literary 
and media products they consumed, topics generally neglected by other intellectuals in Japan before 
the advent of media and cultural studies in the 1980s and 1990s.  The project shared important 
parallels with synchronous attempts to investigate the life of the masses in Europe.  Yet in part due 






more acute concern over the separation between intellectuals and their imagined public, placing 
particular emphasis on the need to simultaneously popularize philosophical thinking and 
intellectualize popular culture.  Their task was to scramble traditional social distinctions they 
believed would impede the growth of a democratic culture. 
 
The Reception of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword  in Japan: Opacity versus Otherness 
 In 1949 the journal Minzokugaku kenkyû (Ethnography Research) published a special issue on the 
bestselling 1948 Japanese translation of cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum 
and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture.181 Benedict had passed away that year, and the journal invited 
the moral philosopher Watsuji Tetsurô, the folklorist and ethnographer Yanagita Kunio, as well as 
two members of the newly formed Institute for the Science of Thought, social psychologist Minami 
Hiroshi and legal scholar Kawashima Takeyoshi, to write reviews of her book, a study 
commissioned by the US government during the war in anticipation of the occupation of Japan.  
Benedict never set foot in the country, relying on written materials and interviews with first and 
second-generation immigrants and prisoners of war in the US.  On the basis of this evidence, she 
produced an analysis of Japanese culture that focused on what she perceived as fundamental ethical 
relationships of obligation and indebtedness in a hierarchically structured “culture of shame.”182 The 
mixed reception of Benedict’s work in Japan was indicative of a conflict among Japanese 
intellectuals over their relationship to the masses and the problem of “feudal remnants” in Japan. 
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 The reviews were for the most part harshly critical of Benedict’s work.  Echoing many of the 
points aired by Tsurumi Kazuko, who wrote the first review of the book in 1947, contributors 
attacked The Chrysanthemum and the Sword for (1) promoting an overly homogenous, conformist view 
of Japanese culture that failed to distinguish regional and socioeconomic differences, and (2) failing 
to account for the fact that the more “traditional” ethical values and relationships noted by Benedict 
were in a state of flux owing to rapid historical changes that had been underway since the late 
nineteenth century.183  Watsuji Tetsurô, whose positive analyses of Japanese culture were influenced 
by Heidegger, argued that Benedict mistook the ethical views of the militarist and fascist cliques 
during the war for the entirety of the Japanese people across time.  This led him to conclude that the 
book should have been subtitled “Patterns of Japanese Soldiers” rather than “Patterns of Japanese 
Culture.”184 
 The two associates of the Institute for the Science of Thought, Kawashima Takeyoshi and 
Minami Hiroshi, were somewhat more appreciative.  Minami criticized Benedict for her lack of 
attention to class and historical change, but he praised her for elucidating certain “everyday” social 
tendencies that escape the notice of the Japanese.185  Kawashima, while echoing the substantive 
complaints of the other reviewers, was full of admiration for Benedict’s emphasis on qualitative over 
statistics-centered research, even though his own survey research on Japanese villages had a 
quantitative element.186  He argued that it was in fact the heterogeneity of Japan’s social structure, 
composed of both modern and feudal elements, which accounted for the insightfulness of the 
methodology employed in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.  While other reviewers criticized 
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Benedict’s “patterns of culture” methodology for producing results that lacked empirical-grounding, 
Kawashima praised her generalizing work as an essential preliminary step toward more fine-grained 
analyses of Japanese society. He approved of her critique of the direct application of American 
quantitative social scientific methods to the study of Japan. 
American studies of societies have not often been planned to study the premises on which 
civilized cultures are built.  Most studies assume that these premises are self-evident.  
Sociologists and psychologists are preoccupied with the ‘scatter’ of opinion and behavior, 
and the stock technique is statistical.  They subject to statistical analysis masses of census 
material, great numbers of answers to questionnaires or to interviewers’ questions, 
psychological measurements and the like, and attempt to derive the independence or 
interdependence of certain factors.  In the field of public opinion, the valuable technique of 
polling the country by using a scientifically selected sample of the population has been highly 
perfected in the United States… 
 
Americans can poll Americans and understand the findings, but they do this because of a 
prior step which is so obvious that no one mentions it: they know and take for granted the 
conduct of life in the United States. The results of polling tell more about what we already 
know.  In trying to understand another country, systematic qualitative study of the habits 
and assumptions of its people is essential before a poll can serve to good advantage.187 
 
 Kawashima pushed Benedict’s argument about studying an ostensibly “alien” culture further, 
asserting that “by no means is this methodology essential and useful only for Americans studying 
our culture... The same thing must be said for us Japanese scholars even when the cultural object of 
research is our own.” This was because, while America was an “archetypal modern civil society” (典
型的な近代市民社会) that had achieved the uniformity in its fundamental thought, behavior, and 
relationship patterns necessary for American-style quantitative social scientific analysis, “our social 
structure is a ‘hierarchy’ (Eng. in original) composed of various heterogeneous elements.  At the very 
least, many of our actions and ways of thinking have up to now been determined, in the last instance, 
by a structural moment referred to as feudal ‘hierarchy,’ and the various concrete forms of this 
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‘hierarchy’ are of essential importance to us.”188  By taking the “conduct of life” for granted in the 
same way as American sociologists and psychologists, Japanese social scientists had failed adequately 
to expose and critique the heterogeneous, incompletely modern aspect of everyday life.  
 Kawashima himself claimed to have been unaware of the fully heterogeneous nature of 
Japan’s social structure until he traveled to the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1941.  Then an 
assistant professor at the University of Tokyo faculty of law, he went there in April of that year to 
assist in the writing of a new law governing colonial farming. At the time, the Japanese-controlled 
government was gathering information on the “customary law” of various ethnic groups in 
Manchukuo.189  In the process he became aware of the huge gap between customary practices and 
the official legal code.  He also noticed certain similarities between village practices in Manchukuo 
and rural Japan, and this recognition in turn made him more cognizant of the systematic differences 
between official law and customary practice in the Japanese countryside. 
Things akin to native religious forms of Japan existed there.  For example, that something 
facing this direction on the compass is auspicious, or that there are sacred stones or boulders 
or trees. Although a rope is not tied around them, these sacred stones or trees are 
customarily worshiped.  Also things like frogs and worms having spirits, and foxes deceiving 
people – these beliefs exist broadly among the Japanese people, especially in rural villages, 
but they appeared in a clearer form in Manchuria.  In this way, things came to the surface 
that one would have overlooked in Japan.  With entirely new eyes, I became aware of things 
I had not noticed until then, and I was able to reassess Japan.190  
 
Generalizing from the similarities between Manchukuo and rural Japan, Kawashima in effect 
transformed Benedict’s argument about the subjective position of the American social scientist vis-à-
vis a foreign culture into an objective statement: the homogenous structure of modern American 
civil society formed a stark contrast with the modern and feudal dual-structure of Japan.  The 
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analysis of the latter required a qualitative, structural grasp of the culture before quantitative social 
scientific methods could be employed.  At the same time, he also argued that Benedict’s qualitative 
structural approach was appropriate for Japanese social scientists who studied European and 
American cultures, objects of research assumed to be subjectively alien to them.191  Thus in 
Kawashima’s view, Japanese social scientists were doubly estranged – both from their own 
incompletely modern culture, and from the foreign cultures they tried to study or learn from.  Put 
another way, they were ignorant of the masses both in the sense that their quantitative, opinion-
survey research on the masses lagged behind that of the United States, and in the sense that they 
lacked a common sense connection with the masses that would enable that kind of research in the 
first place.  This dilemma was the key to explaining Benedict’s advantage over most Japanese social 
scientists– unlike them she took nothing in Japanese culture for granted. 
Kawashima’s praise of the methodology of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword hinted at a more 
general difficulty facing Japanese, or more broadly “non-Western,” intellectuals confronted with the 
assumptions of European or American social theory.192  Yet such a reading should not foreclose a 
discussion of how his dilemma, his sense of double estrangement from the US and Japan, might 
have resonated with his contemporaries in Europe, such as British intellectuals who wanted to turn 
the ethnographic gaze onto their own society (Mass Observation) or German thinkers who criticized 
the assumptions of positivist sociology while supporting empirical, quantitative social scientific 
methods (the Frankfurt School).  
Kawashima and Benedict’s assumption that Western social scientists took for granted a 
homogenous “conduct of life” in their own cultures did not fit every case. The fact that thinkers in 
                                                
191 Kawashima. “Hyôka to hihan,” 265 
192 For example Kawashima’s double-estrangement could also be interpreted as typical of the 
obsession with “negative distinctiveness” associated with the Marxist Kôza-ha derived postwar 
modernist social science.  See the analysis of Benedict’s reception in Japan in Andrew Barshay. The 






Europe wanted to apply ethnographic methods to the study of their own society suggested that 
common sense, the assumed jumping off point for social scientific research, had become fragmented 
and opaque.  More broadly, Benedict’s assumption about the perceived transparency of domestic 
common sense did not apply to observers in Europe, the United States, and Japan who were attuned 
to the emergence of a new, sometimes mysterious,  “mass society” over the course of the first half 
of the twentieth century that repeatedly redefined the limits of common sense.  It was an awareness 
of this blurring of common sense that later led Tsurumi Shunsuke to assert that philosophy should 
become a “pseudo-science” that embraced an intermediary position between the everyday life and 
science. 
When Kawashima emphasized the heterogeneous, incompletely modern condition of Japan 
and Manchukuo, he was asserting the non-West’s otherness vis-à-vis Western social science.  Yet 
insofar as it indicated an unknown variable, this otherness could coincide with and blend into the 
opacity of an emergent, partly autonomous everyday condition associated with mass society, and in 
some cases fascism, in both Japan and Europe. The latter interpretation becomes clearer if one 
considers the importance Kawashima, as chairman of the Institute of the Science of Thought, 
accorded to the nexus between thought and action for the masses (taishû) as an emergent subject of 
history.  Without denying that Kawashima’s typical focus on feudal remnants in rural Japan and 
Manchukuo bolstered arguments about non-Western heterogeneity, it is impossible to disentangle 
that search for difference from an awareness, in no way limited to Japan or the postwar, that rapid 
change was rendering modern society opaque and transforming it into a potential object of 
ethnographic research.  The sense of double-estrangement experienced by intellectuals associated 








Science o f  Thought  and Mass Observation 
In his review, Kawashima made no attempt to criticize the academic division of labor 
observed by Benedict – cultural anthropology as a qualitative discipline that attempts to elucidate the 
common sense of alien, non-Western societies, while sociology as a quantitative discipline that takes 
the common sense of Western societies as its initial starting point, relying upon hard data to criticize 
the commonsensical assumptions that had earlier provided it with material for a research hypothesis.  
Yet at the time he was already engaged in an intellectual experiment that challenged such disciplinary 
assumptions, not least of those that divided qualitative, speculative philosophy from the empirical 
study of the masses.  In 1949 Kawashima became the first chairman and Minami Hiroshi the first 
executive director of the Institute Science of Thought, newly organized to coordinate group research 
projects associated with the journal Science of Thought and facilitate the publication of their work in 
book form as well as in general circulation periodicals like Chûô kôron.193  In his manifesto for the 
group, the unknown mental landscape of the masses was of foremost concern.  He wrote: 
We consider our problem to be thought (思想) that supports and determines the behavior of 
historical creation (歴史創造の行動) and must in turn manifest itself in such activity… It 
goes without saying that thought in this sense is not merely limited to the thought found in 
texts written by professional thinkers (思想家).  Rather, it is in the heads, and it both 
determines in reality and manifests itself as the actions of the many people who directly or 
indirectly participate in the creation of history – and this means in the present age first and 
foremost the masses (大衆).  It follows that it is not something fixed on a sheet of paper, but 
is ceaselessly fluctuating and developing in the midst of real relationships.194  
 
 Kawashima’s founding statement noted that grasping the ceaselessly fluctuating object that 
was thought, presented numerous methodological difficulties.  It was thus necessary to enlist the 
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cooperation of scholars in every field of research who had an interest in the “thought of ordinary 
people” (人々の思想).  Cooperation was also needed from scholars who could assist in tackling 
general and fundamental problems in math, logic, statistics, and other sciences.  Kawashima 
concluded, “Through the cooperation of scholars on such a broad scale, we hope to achieve 
academic results unachievable through isolated methods.”195  As a point of contrast, Minami Hiroshi 
noted in his review of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword that the flaws in Benedict’s work (ahistoricity, 
over-generalization) revealed the limits of cultural anthropology working in isolation to analyze 
people in modern society.196  Science of Thought embraced the ideal of interdisciplinarity, championed 
at the time by American organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation and Harvard’s Department of 
Social Relations.  
 Yet anthropology remained an important reference point for both Kawashima and another 
key member of the Institute, Tsurumi Shunsuke.  Kawashima was impressed with Benedict for 
drawing attention to details that Japanese scholars took for granted, and Tsurumi was inspired by the 
work of the folklorist Yanagita Kunio and the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who 
encouraged the application of ethnographic techniques to modern European society.  Malinowski 
lent his support to the British Mass Observation project in 1937, which called for the application of 
methods “hitherto identified with ‘folk-lore’” to the contemporary British psyche.  Mass 
Observation strove in fact to produce an “Anthropology of Ourselves” by observing the working 
classes at work, home, and during their leisure time. 197  Although there is no evidence of a direct 
connection of influence between Science of Thought and Mass Observation, their missions clearly 
overlapped, and one could posit an indirect link between the two in the inspiration both derived 
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from Malinowskian ethnography and, especially in the case of Tsurumi Shunsuke, the semiotic New 
Criticism of I. A. Richards, who had been Charles Madge’s mentor at Cambridge. 
 After Tsurumi returned from the United States, he was drafted and sent to Java in 1943 as a 
non-combat recruit.  There he read C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards’s The Meaning of Meaning while 
observing language use in the Navy.  Tsurumi made sense of communication in the hierarchical 
structure of the Navy by drawing upon Ogden’s idea that widespread “verbal superstition” endowed 
certain words with a manipulative power independent of their understood meaning (or lack of 
meaning).  Ogden associated word magic with primitive peoples, but argued that the “widening gulf 
between the public and the scientific thought of the age” had exacerbated the tendency toward 
verbal superstition in the twentieth century.198  Bronislaw Malinowski’s supplementary essay to 
Ogden and Richards’s text (“The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages”) further inspired 
Tsurumi with its ethnographic observations of language-use and its emphasis on primitive language 
as essentially pragmatic: “a mode of action and not an instrument of reflection.”199    
 In the Jakarta Library he discovered Malinowski’s Myth in Primitive Psychology, a text that ends 
with the call for the cross-pollination of a “science of myth” across primitive and the “living higher 
cultures,” of China, India, Japan, and “last but not least” Britain.200  Malinowski also demanded that 
the anthropologist “relinquish his comfortable position in the long chair on the veranda of the 
missionary compound, Government station, or planter’s bungalow” and “go out into the villages, 
and see the natives at work…”201 a demand analogous to Science of Thought’s pursuit of the 
philosophy of the “man on the street.”  Tsurumi claimed that these texts by Ogden and Richards 
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and Malinowski were the main inspiration for his first article in Science of Thought “On the Talismanic 
Use of Words,” which drew a direct link between wartime propaganda and the new enthusiasm for 
democracy by emphasizing the pragmatic character of slogans as a means to win favor with the 
ruling authorities.202   
 As with Kawashima’s praise of Benedict, Tsurumi’s juxtaposition of primitive myths and 
propaganda slogans was made by possible by an awareness of the opaque, indecipherable quality of 
routine semiotic behavior in mass society.  Due to their respective experiences in Manchukuo and 
America, both Kawashima and Tsurumi viewed Japan through a comparative optic that de-
familiarized this behavior, rendering it an appealing object of ethnographic investigation.  At stake in 
this investigation was more than an increase of knowledge about society.  The thought of ordinary 
people also contained the key to overcoming the division between intellectuals and the masses.   
 
In Search of Japan’s Pragmatism 
 The Institute’s first interdisciplinary investigation of the life of the masses was its project 
entitled  “The Philosophy of Ordinary People” (ひとびとの哲学), a title chosen in contrast to the 
usual emphasis in academia on the “Philosophy of Philosophers.”203 Introducing the critical impetus 
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behind the “Philosophy of Ordinary People” project to an English readership in 1951, Tsurumi 
portrayed the intellectual culture of Japan in starkly negative terms, drawing upon imagery that 
associated postwar “philosophical youth” with obscurantism, elitism, and fanaticism.  He wrote that 
the neologism coined to translate the term “philosophy” during the Meiji period literally meant 
“exquisite science.”  This attitude, symbolized by the youthful devotees of the philosophy of the 
Kyoto School, who “clothe their wills, testaments, and love-letters in [its] philosophic terminology,” 
was a “caricature of the role of philosophy in the contemporary world.”  Perhaps conscious of his 
own morose youth before the war, he wrote of these young intellectuals that “Many became so 
engrossed with philosophic problems that, unable to free themselves from this entanglement, they 
chose death.  Modern Japan (1867-) will be known as a society with the highest rate of “philosophic 
suicides” in the history of the human race.”204  
 Pragmatism represented an alternative to this sort of Japanese philosophy..  In the forties 
and fifties both American and Japanese historians assumed that pragmatist thought, at least in its 
origins, had an essential connection with the commonsense attitude of ordinary people in a way that 
contrasted with philosophers in Japan and continental Europe.  Philosophers like Charles Sanders 
Peirce, William James, and other members of the Metaphysical Club at Harvard were merely 
responsible for systematizing and labeling it as a recognizable “ism” at the turn of the twentieth 
                                                                                                                                                       
In one of the books published as part of the project, Yume to omokage, Kawashima Takeyoshi glosses 
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century.205  For figures like Lewis Mumford and the historian Henry Steele Commager, to debate the 
merits of pragmatism was to put “American culture” as a whole on trial.   
 Yet the specific verdict was beside the point for many young critics in Japan.  In comparison 
with his depiction of prewar Japanese intellectuals as aloof or inclined to “philosophical suicide,” the 
perceived link of pragmatism to the lives of ordinary Americans was more important to them than 
its solutions to specific epistemological or social problems.  As a result of this emphasis on 
pragmatism’s organic origins, it was futile to expect Japan’s philosophical environment to change by 
translating the collected works of Dewey into Japanese or disseminating his simplified views to 
school children.  This was an overdetermined argument against “imported thought” (輸入思想) that 
seemed to parallel the critique of the “rationed democracy” of the Occupation, which was imposed 
from the top down.  
 A contemporary advertisement for the Institute’s My Philosophy series exemplified an 
alternative approach by promising an equally organic philosophy for Japan that would replace the 
elite kyôyô tradition of the past:  
The Philosophy of Ordinary People Series.  A new must-read educational book (Bildungsbuch 
教養書) for everyone that answers the question, “How should I live?” by teaching, with the 
facts, how people have lived brilliant lives.  The people of America created an American 
philosophy (pragmatism).  This was above all else a living philosophy born out of everyday 
life.  This book is philosophy created by the Japanese, born out of the lives of the people of 
Japan.206 
 
Science of Thought thus tried to rectify the failure of Japanese intellectuals to articulate a popular 
Japanese analogue to pragmatism by conducting philosophical investigations of the lives of non-
philosophers. 
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 At the same time, this task was not only relevant to Japan’s intellectual situation.  Tsurumi 
Shunsuke strongly emphasized that the “revolutionary spirit” of the Metaphysical Club in America 
owed a great deal to the participation of non-philosophers: “They were a mathematician, physicist, 
evolutionist, physiologist, and three lawyers. But although not philosophers, they got together to 
discuss philosophic problems.  Hence was started one of the most prolific movements in 
contemporary thought.”207 Yet during the twentieth century, the  “Pragmatist Movement” had 
degenerated to the degree that pragmatism was becoming a specialized discourse of little interest to 
people outside philosophy departments.  It was necessary to “go back to Ur-pragmatism” through a 
direct appeal to the thought of “people at large.”  
Shortcomings of the Pragmatic Movement in the twentieth century teach us that it is 
ineffectual to reform philosophy with the formula, “Bring philosophy into close union with 
action.”  However frequent the pronouncement of the formula, it will not get results, as long 
as it is applied by “philosophers.”  “Philosophers” are naturally drawn together by their 
common interest to preserve the status-quo, and they are, therefore, the last people to stand 
for a complete change of the situation… “Philosophy” must go, but philosophical problems 
will remain as part of human destiny… When philosophers are banished, we must 
amalgamate the memoranda of sick persons, children, men, women, farmers, mechanics, 
anthropologists, biologists physicists, and engineers, and, with the sum total of all their 
wisdom, try to solve the philosophic problems for our age.  When such a time arrives, 
philosophy will become an “open room” where anybody may come in, talk as long as he 
likes, and leave when he is tired of being in philosophic atmosphere.  This is just a room, a 
common property, with no host or hostess in it.208 
 
 The metaphor of an “open room” could also have been applied to the ideal toward which 
Tsurumi and the founders of Science of Thought strove when they solicited the participation of non-
intellectuals in a collaborative “thought movement” of their own, inspired in part by an 
interpretation of the Metaphysical Club as an interdisciplinary movement to transform philosophy.  
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At the same time, Tsurumi’s metaphorical language soon shifted from an open room to the terrain 
outside, among people who are currently immersed in daily life: 
At the present stage of thought, we must work for the evacuation of philosophic problems 
form their domicile and try to disperse them as far apart as possible among the amateurs of 
“philosophy.”  Get them to believe that they are the real bearers of philosophy and that, 
aside from them, philosophy cannot subsist.  Get them to think about philosophic problems 
in the context of their business, farming, and engineering so that they may add some new 
twist to the traditional method of handling the same problems.  When this evacuation is 
complete, we may again bring together these philosophic problems, compare our 
memoranda, and improve our respective solutions.209  
 
In short, the pressing task of intellectuals was not to work for progress through the advancement of 
knowledge but to assist with this task of dispersion, taking advantage of philosophy’s position as a 
“pseudo-science” that constituted a “link between science and everyday life.”210  
 The Institute’s methods for accomplishing this task were appropriately eclectic, eventually 
including interviews with celebrities, philosophical interpretations of popular novels, and studies of 
occupational groups with anonymous informants.  They made free use of methodologies originally 
developed to make the study of society more scientific, adapting them for their own popularizing 
aims.  The earliest progress report, written by Tsurumi Shunsuke in 1948, indicated that the project 
would begin with an attempt to quantify and categorize the conscious and unconscious views of 
ordinary people (一般人) and associate their ideas with a set of “philosophical-types.” (哲学型)  The 
group embarked on an investigation that Tsurumi argued had been unfairly neglected by “thinkers 
and philosophers belonging to reformist (革新的な) circles who devoted their energy to criticism of 
the works of a small number of philosophers from the past.” He acknowledged that such criticism 
was necessary, and yet:  
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If the work of philosophers is intended to change the world, then, as a weapon for change, I 
think grasping and criticizing the philosophical thought of the masses in general (一般大衆) 
is more effective than criticizing and interpreting the philosophy of a small number of 
philosophers.  Especially when you think about the case in our country, where the 
philosophical thought of this minority is cut off from the philosophical thought of the 
ordinary person, the necessity of researching the latter is much more urgent than in the other 
civilized countries (他の文明諸国).211 
 
 At the beginning of the project in 1948, psychologists, sociologists, and philosophers 
associated with Science of Thought designed a simple questionnaire to fulfill Tsurumi’s aim of 
unearthing the thought of non-philosophers and relating that thought to philosophy.  Their 
methodological approach was inspired by the personality-type tests devised by the German and 
American psychologists Eduard Spranger and Gordon Allport.  Allport was a professor in Harvard’s 
department of social relations and a leading proponent of interdisciplinarity across the social and 
behavioral sciences after World War Two.  He advocated a rapprochement between empirical 
psychological research and philosophy, arguing that empirical psychology could help “reduce 
discord among our philosophers of man” and that psychologists ought to be made more aware that 
of the fact that “whether he knows it or not, every psychologist gravitates towards an ontological 
position.”212  His hope that empirical research might help resolve longstanding philosophical debates 
would have resonated with members of Science of Thought, who hoped to get past the postwar 
factional debate over the “3 –isms”: “Marxism, pragmatism, or existentialism?”   
 The Institute’s project was even more ambitious than Allport’s vision for the behavioral 
sciences.  Not merely empirical supplement to philosophy, the project would assist in transforming 
the relationship between philosophy and the public.  The collection of data would itself contribute 
to the democratization of philosophical discourse by making “ordinary people” aware of their right 
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to engage in a debate with professionals.  It would also ideally attract the interest of intellectuals, 
especially young intellectuals, who were thought to prefer philosophical speculation to the neglect of 
empirical, ethnographic research. 
 In order for this reconciliation between intellectuals and ordinary people to work, the 
questions had to be answerable by people who had no specialized training in philosophy.  As the 
progress report put it: 
In trying to draw out the philosophical thought of ordinary people (人々),  if we ask 
theoretical questions like ‘Do you believe in idealism or materialism?’ we will be unable to 
obtain an answer.  We only start getting responses when we put out questions that allow the 
respondents to apply knowledge they already have.213 
 
For example, respondents would be asked to mark down “I believe,” “I don’t believe,” or “I don’t 
know,” to questions such as: 
- A benevolent god is in control of the world. 
- Things like mountains, rivers, and clouds do not really exist. They are merely illusions. 
- The world operates according to laws taught by science, and laws other than those of 
science are not true. 
- Even if all humans died, the sky and the ocean would be blue.214 
 
Other questions dealt with views of the Meiji Emperor, the Japanese Communist Party leader 
Nosaka Sanzô, General MacArthur, Buddha, and Jesus.  Still others dealt with Japan’s war 
responsibility and the respondent’s view of happiness.  The latter question assigned the respondent a 
“value system” that roughly corresponded to Spranger’s six “value attitudes:” theoretical, economic, 
aesthetic, social, political, or religious.215 
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 Answers to the questions would elicit an “opinion constellation” corresponding to a 
typology of metaphysical, societal, existential, ethical, and historical viewpoints “temporarily 
borrowed” from the “history of traditional philosophy” to aid in categorization and comparison of 
“the philosophy of ordinary people” to “the philosophy of philosophers.”216 Examples from various 
typological categories included moral relativism, historical determinism, critical realism, and 
optimistic or pessimistic views of human nature.   
 The survey shared some surface features and intellectual antecedents with Theodor Adorno’s 
study of the authoritarian personality in the United States, the results of which were not published 
until 1950. One set of five questions dealt with attitudes toward the pre-1945 Imperial Rescript on 
Education - a pledge of loyalty to emperor and nation that schoolchildren recited countless times at 
school events and were required to study and memorize.  Various answers supportive of the 
Rescript corresponded to ethical authoritarianism.  At the same time, opposition to the Rescript 
combined with the response “General MacArthur” to a question that asked respondents which 
person on a list of famous people they most respected also corresponded to the authoritarian-type.217  
This showed that the continued salience of the question of democratic subjectivity that Tsurumi 
raised in his 1946 article on talismanic words: did the Occupation simply substitute an 
authoritarianism oriented toward the Emperor for one centered on the US in the person of 
MacArthur?   
 Over eighty percent of respondents in the survey’s initial test-run were categorized as 
holding some authoritarian ethical views. Nonetheless, in contrast to the Authoritarian Personality, 
Science of Thought’s project aimed more at popularizing philosophy and excavating elements of a 
usable intellectual tradition than criticizing and explaining the lingering authoritarian views of the 
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majority (a subject already broached elsewhere by Tsurumi Shunsuke, Maruyama Masao, Kawashima 
Takeyoshi, and many others).  The report emphasized that most of the respondents in the initial test 
of the survey had an eclectic mix of individualist, utilitarian, relativist, and authoritarian views.218  
Whatever the case, the aloof attitude of philosophers and intellectuals toward the thought of the 
masses was more problematic in this context than the lingering authoritarianism of the majority.  
 Aside from developing a way to assess the current philosophical views of the non-
intellectuals, the progress report argued that it was also important to indirectly examine the “mold” 
(イガタ) and “materials” (素材) of their thought.  The “mold” referred to compulsory ideological 
education, expressed in school textbooks in use until the end of the war, and the “materials” were 
“the things most often encountered and interacted with every day.”  They were accessible through a 
content analysis of the things the “average person” (平均人) listened to and read: “movies, popular 
songs, popular novels” and Japanese oral performances like “naniwabushi, rakugo, and manzai.”219  
 This notion was developed further in a 1950 collection of articles on popular culture and the 
mass media, Dreams and Images (Yume to omokage). The articles here emphasized that different kinds of 
popular media were embedded in a network of inter-textual borrowing.  The language and pacing of 
mass-market novels drew from both newspaper headlines and oral storytelling genres like kôdan. 
These novels were then adapted into popular movies that were in turn vehicles for popular songs.  
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In this way, the group tried to refine its critique of the estrangement of intellectuals from the masses 
as an analysis of the gap between two mostly self-contained communication systems. 
 They argued that this gap would never be overcome unless intellectuals made an attempt to 
take popular media as seriously as literature and philosophical thought.  Tsurumi argued that, “it 
could be said that popular novels more often grappled with the question ‘how should one live?’ and 
in that sense are probably more philosophical than ‘pure literature.’”220  Nonetheless, in his 
introduction to an essay on the popular novels of writers like Sasaki Kuni and Yoshikawa Eiji, he 
complained that despite the mass-market popularity of these works, critics had largely neglected 
them.  He complained that adherents of “pure literature” (純文学) considered these texts too vulgar 
to warrant analysis, and Marxists, who were ostensibly interested in reaching out to the (proletarian) 
masses, quickly dismissed the works as reactionary without expending the effort necessary to 
understand their popular appeal.  He argued that orthodox Marxists substituted one normative 
concept of literature for another, leaving the elitist attitude toward these popular works unchanged. 
Instead, what was needed was a more descriptive approach to literature as a communicative practice 
that could illuminate its connections with other popular forms of entertainment.  
 The typological questionnaire created for the “Philosophy of Ordinary People” project was 
to act as an aid to this descriptive analysis.  In this case, researchers would try to guess how authors 
or even the fictional characters that populated novels might answer the the philosophical survey 
questions. Tsurumi used the questionnaire to evaluate the implicit philosophical viewpoint expressed 
in the works of a popular author of comedic “dime novels,” Sasaki Kuni, filling it out on the basis of 
recurring details in his many published works.221 He summarized his typological findings as follows:  
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Sasaki’s novels emphasize the role of communication and reconciliation in social affairs, are 
radical in regard to petty details and bow to the authorities in all the major issues of society, 
are incredulous of supernatural power and idealize common man, see only the brighter side 
of life, adopt the way of thinking that is logical and positivistic, take a relativistic and 
indeterministic view in regard to value problems, believe strongly in contingency as a force in 
human history, are quite desirous of the application of scientific knowledge to personal life, 
are all for long-range planning in life, and teach the Japanese people many techniques and 
devices that would help in building a normal family life.  The analysis of Sasaki’s novels 
serves as a lesson that Pragmatism ferments quite naturally in the living conditions of petty 
bourgeois life in the big cities of financial capitalist society, even when it is not instigated by 
the readings of James, Dewey, and Peirce.222 
This analysis laid bare Tsurumi’s critique of the intellectual status quo in Japan.  Intellectuals were 
too busy burying their heads in the works of James, Dewey, and Peirce to notice Sasaki’s 
homegrown variant of pragmatism and its social basis.  Yet Tsurumi’s “discovery” of pragmatism in 
Japan was problematic from the standpoint of critics who questioned the Institute’s methodology 
and found the researchers’ attitude toward non-philosophers and popular literature patronizing.  
 
“Popularizing” Philosophy 
 An article sharply critical of Tsurumi’s approach to literature appeared in the Tôkyô shinbun 
newspaper in 1948.  It noted that Science of Thought was one of many voices demanding that the 
chasm between popular literature (大衆文学) and pure literature (純文学) be filled.   The author 
agreed that it was strange that popular novels were not considered worthy of literary criticism, and 
he found Science of Thought’s “satirical remarks about the lethargy of literary critics” interesting.  At 
the same time, he was skeptical of their methodology.  The difference between popular novels and 
oral entertainment was too ambiguous, and he predicted that Tsurumi’s analytical technique of 
subjecting literature to a “scholastic achievement test” would not yield much fruit.223 
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 Criticism did not only originate from outside the group.  From the beginning, members of 
the Institute raised doubts about the accuracy of the typological labels in the philosophy 
questionnaire. They criticized the fact that they were all drawn from the history of European 
philosophy, and were thus unsuitable for categorizing Buddhist and Confucian-derived popular 
beliefs that Kawashima, in his review of Benedict, associated with Japan’s heterogeneous feudal and 
modern condition. 224   
 Despite these criticisms, the progress report suggested that, unlike specialized opinion 
research, the act of collecting data might have been more important than the accuracy of the final 
results.  Tsurumi, who embraced philosophy as “pseudo-science,” had suggested in his work on the 
talismanic effect of words like “democracy” that the practical effects of labels could be more 
important in everyday life than their descriptive accuracy. The typology employed in the “philosophy 
of ordinary people” was part of the group’s effort to spark the interest of intellectuals uninterested 
in discussions of “concrete facts,”yet enthusiastic about the Kyoto School or the existentialism of 
Sartre.  In his second report, Tsurumi lamented the lack of interest in “the individual facts and 
values that form the main constituents of everyday life” displayed by young students “charmed by 
philosophy,” joking that such students could care less about the pencil they were writing with unless 
someone decided to call it “being in-its-particularity.”  To overcome this “pathological” tendency 
among the youth, intellectuals had to find a way of anchoring the abstraction loved by students in 
the “concrete facts and values of everyday life.”225 It was necessary in his eyes to wean young 
intellectuals off of their obsession with abstract debate and get them to start looking at the everyday 
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life of people unlike them, even if that meant anchoring the language of philosophy in simple 
questions as a “hook.”226 
 Tsurumi emphasized the pedagogical possibilities implicit in this approach to philosophy.  
The survey could be used to teach philosophy to students by having them imagine famous thinkers 
filling it out – in effect, training them to imagine a philosopher’s take on contemporary issues. 
Conversely, “Newspapers are very important materials from which applied problems of philosophy 
should be drawn.  Students should be taught to read daily papers carefully so as to be able to pick 
philosophic positions taken by their own contemporaries – officials, laborers, farmers, movie-stars, 
Russians, generals.”227  By linking philosophical types to actions and way of life, it would be possible 
to ask questions like: “Imagine that Platonists, Thomists, and Deweyists are among the middle-
classes in postwar Tokyo.  How do you think they would live?” Tsurumi further speculated about 
the group’s research contributing ideas for novels, modern philosophical dialogues, and plays.  Thus 
despite the employment of quantitative techniques, “The Philosophy of Ordinary People” project 
was not intended only to be an objective “excavation” of Japan’s popular philosophy, but also an 
attempt to create, through trial-and-error, a new democratic culture that blurred the line between 
intellectuals and the masses. 
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 The test run of their philosophical survey aspired to contribute to this blurring, though its 
“one-size-fits-all” approach to questions and survey technique ran into problems.  The survey 
involved 225 respondents in categories ranging from college economics professors to labor union 
members, department store clerks, three homeless people living in Ueno Park, four legal prostitutes, 
and a single “woman of the night” (illegal prostitute) in a tunnel near Ueno Station.  Although the 
group separated the data by occupational group, everyone, regardless of class, was to contribute to 
an overall portrait of “The Philosophy of Ordinary People.”  The survey was also intended as a kind 
of test run for the overall project.  Some participants of the group retrospectively criticized the 
whole project for having an overly vague, empty conception of who qualified as an “ordinary 
person.”228   
 The questionnaire was mailed to most of the subjects and the results were matched with 
types listed on a separate answer key.  Tsurumi noted that a few attempts to administer the survey to 
the itinerant population (放浪人口) failed, running into what fellow team-member Kobayashi 
Hideo229 called “aphasic limitations” (失語症制約).230  As a result they adopted a free interview style 
based upon the written questionnaire.  The results of this tactical change impressed Tsurumi, not so 
much due to the contents of the answers (which suggested that homeless people “had escaped into a 
naïve mental world detached from reality”), but because the interviewees seemed to have carefully 
thought through these questions. 
Though they pick up cigarettes off the street, beg for food, and engage in prostitution, six 
out of the seven people gave us truly articulate answers.  They gave us sincere, non-cursory 
responses, as though they were taking an object out of a bag, having already thought over 
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the problem a number of times before and reached a certain conclusion.  Without a doubt, 
philosophy is of interest to everyone.231 
 
 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Institute attempted to popularize philosophy and 
anchor its abstractions through interviews with successful individuals and media celebrities.  
Published in 1950 and intended as a prefatory work to “The Philosophy of Ordinary People,” the 
two-volume My Philosophy (私の哲学) seemed to occupy a space somewhere between journalistic 
coverage of celebrities and “round-table discussions” of political and intellectual topics aimed at 
educated readers in general magazines like Chûô kôron.   
 Though Kawashima’s preface to My Philosophy emphasized the importance of the thought of 
“common men,” (民衆 glossed in English as “common men”) the focus was on uncommonly 
successful individuals based in Tokyo.232 The first volume focused more on establishment figures: 
politicians, businessmen, literary authors, and scientists, all men born in the nineteenth century who 
were well known in their respective fields before the war.233 Examples ranged from Tokuda Kyûichi 
(1894-1953), chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, to Ikeda Shigeaki (1867-1950), former 
Finance Minister and head of the Bank of Japan, and Suzuki Daisetsu (1870-1966), a renowned 
scholar of religion whose introductions to Buddhism were popular around the world.  Each chapter 
contained a text of an interview or an essay written by the individual along with a photograph.  The 
interview questions and essay topics were for the most part loosely based on the philosophical 
questionnaire, although they made no attempt to quantify the results or assign philosophical types to 
these non-anonymous subjects.  The interviewers (“scientists of thought”) also explored the 
relations between an individual’s creed and his personal biography.  
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 The second volume had the same format as the first, but it included women and focused 
more on figures involved in the “formation of mass culture.”  The preface explained that this was 
meant in one of two senses: either the individuals were involved in popular culture through “mass 
communications” (print, radio, or film), or they were involved in it through their political or social 
activism (the labor movement, progressive educational movements, etc.).234  The fact that some of 
the mass media figures were quite famous; the radio performer Tokugawa Musei, the popular writer 
Yoshikawa Eiji, or the director (and Kurosawa Akira mentor) Yamamoto Kajirô undoubtedly helped 
bolster the book’s mass-market appeal.  In a situation not unlike their early reviews of difficult-to-
obtain American academic texts, the personal networks of Science of Thought associates  played a key 
role in securing these interviews.   
 In the editor’s introduction to the two volumes, Tsurumi tried to justify the choice of 
prominent individuals chosen for the study.  First, the personal philosophies collected here were 
important insofar as they contained beliefs that circulated widely.  Their trajectories might then 
represent successful experiments in living, a crystallization of the best of “practical philosophy,” 
some of which was worth preserving for future generations.  This was not certain however.  
Tsurumi wrote that, “The creeds of these representative figures, in direct exchange with the thought 
of the unnamed masses (大衆), who are emerging as the true heroes of this series, will either be 
confirmed and form part of a new tradition, or be rejected and thrown out of the stream that 
constitutes the philosophy of ordinary people.”235   Besides signifying a commitment to pluralism, 
the diversity of viewpoints was thus in part justified as a result of uncertainty regarding the outcome 
of a future increasingly determined by the thoughts and actions of the masses.   
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 Rather than a selection of exemplary lives to emulate, the individuals examined in the series 
were to be “models” for the democratization of philosophy in a different sense.  By voicing 
untrained opinions to philosophical questions, they were to give readers the confidence to do the 
same.  
We would be overjoyed if readers of this book came to think that, besides philosophers, 
active members of society (社会人・行動人) actually have the solemn right to voice an 
opinion on philosophical problems, and, going even further, that the true bearers of 
philosophy are not the characters in these two volumes but each person for him or herself 
(人々各自), and that the formation of a philosophy for a new age should not be left to a 
small group of scholars.236 
 
Perhaps in line with this confidence-boosting objective, some of the interviews displayed the 
naïveté of the interviewee regarding academic matters. This was true of the interview with the 
popular film and radio star Takehisa Chieko. The group fortuitously managed to secure an interview 
with the actress owing to the fact that she was living in America before the war and happened to 
return home on the same repatriation ship, the U. S. S. Gripsholm, as Science of Thought founders 
Takeda Kiyoko, Tsuru Shigeto, and the Tsurumi siblings.237  Tsurumi Shunsuke opened the 
interview by announcing that the questions would deal with “problems of thought” and “problems 
of communication.”  Takehisa soon after pleaded, “As much as you can, please just use ordinary (普
通な) Japanese and not academic words, since ordinary Japanese is all I know. (laughing)”238   
Perhaps as a result of this miscommunication-prone interviewing experience and the 
criticism directed toward the group’s typological approach to philosophy and literature, Tsurumi 
proposed delving deeper into the analysis of “ordinary speech” in 1951.  In his article “The Logic of 
the Everyday,” he distinguished sharply between two senses in which the “popularization of 
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philosophy” could be understood.  He contrasted the “quotidianization of logic” (論理の日常化) 
with the “the logic of the everyday” (日常論理).  The former was an attempt to simplify the study of 
formal logic for everyday use by the masses, while the latter was not a simplification of formal logic 
at all, but a distinct domain of empirical analysis that would make use of methods derived from 
quantitative linguistics, the psychology of thinking, and symbolic logic.  The logic of the everyday 
was a “difficult” field of study consisting of the detailed annotation, contextualization, and 
psychological analysis of transcribed speech.  
 The creation of this new field was facilitated by advancements in recording technology: 
Machine civilization has created a perfect tool for this work, the portable tape recorder, by 
means of which it possible to record, preserve, and play back people’s conversations in the 
same impersonal way as a camera.  By means of this product of modern civilization, it has 
become possible to take up questions never before problematized by the study of logic.239 
 
Tape-recorders were prohibitively expensive for most researchers at the time, but the Institute used 
the grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to purchase a tape recorder and begin carrying out their 
research project on “The Effect of the Japanese Language on Thought.” They described their 
method of dealing with “the common man’s colloquial speech” in the sociological section of their 
research proposal to the foundation.  It is worth quoting in its entirety as an exposition of their 
project on the “Philosophy of Ordinary People”: 
We drew up a handbook of “strategic” questions (covering strategic points in drawing out 
people’s philosophy) which we drive at concrete individuals.  By using this handbook of 
stereotyped questions, we hold a series of long interviews with farmers in a village not far 
away from Tokyo.  As answers are given, we shoot “tactical” questions which are improvised 
to throw light upon the characteristic features of the particular man’s philosophy.  These 
tactical questions then improvised are entered in the notebook together with the answers 
given.  Thus, we have compiled several documents of philosophic dialogues with Japanese 
farmers, in a form somewhat akin to the philosophic dialogues of Diderot’s “D’Alembert’s 
Dream”, etc.  In this way, we try to preserve stereotyped rigidity and flexibility, objectivity 
and capriciousness both of which are required in drawing out living philosophy.  We then try 
                                                






to give an annotation of these documents, interpreting the scara and marks left in the 
person’s expressions and trying on the basis of these scara and marks to get at a fairly 
objective characterization of each man’s personal philosophy.  This task of annotation meets 
with a number of difficulties, among which the problem of ambiguity is one.  And we feel 
that, here, we need knowledge of some kind of universal scheme of characterizing ambiguity.  
Finally on the basis of these annotated documents of people’s own expressions of their 
personal convictions, we try to segregate certain forms of basic logical assertions and to 
interpret them over against the forms of the like instances drawn from the more public 
language of primary school textbooks.240 
 
The “village not far away from Tokyo” referred to in this passage was Tsurukawa-mura, a 
small village incorporated into Machida city in 1958.  Kawashima Takeyoshi led an attitude survey 
there in the summer of 1950.  The results were first published in the article “The Actual Condition 
of ‘On’ Awareness” in the magazine Chûô kôron in 1951.  It was one of the first in a series of articles 
on the “The Philosophy of Common People” (庶民の哲学) in that magazine attributed to the 
Institute of the Science of Thought.  The concept of on (恩) which could be translated as “moral 
indebtedness,” was central to Ruth Benedict’s analysis of Japanese morality in The Chrysanthemum and 
the Sword.  The article was in part an attempt to test Benedict’s claim about its pervasiveness in 
everyday speech through empirical methods.241  Kawashima surveyed villagers about their sense of 
indebtedness (on) toward their parents, teachers, and the emperor.   
He concluded that while the findings corroborated Benedict’s argument about the 
importance of on in face-to-face social relations, the responses diverged from the “public language of 
primary school textbooks” in significant ways, particularly since few villagers claimed to feel a sense 
of indebtedness toward the emperor.242  The search for a divergence or, to use Tsurumi’s term, 
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“discommunication” between official ideology (the “mold” of thought) and everyday practice was a 
recurring theme in their articles published in the “Philosophy of Ordinary People” series. 
 
Political Polarization and the Inertia of Everyday Life 
 The difficulty of “drawing out living philosophy” on the basis of interviews and surveys was  
apparent in several of the articles in the “Philosophy of the Common Man” series published 
published in Chûô kôron from 1951 to 1952 and later collected in the book Modern Man’s Mode of Life 
(現代人の生態) in 1953.  In addition to methodological and communication difficulties, this was due 
to the turbulent political context of the studies, during the Korean War and around the time of the 
signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty in connection with the San Francisco Peace Conference in 
1951.  Both events were over-determined by Cold War tensions, which only exacerbated mutual 
suspicion and polarization along ideological lines. “The Philosophy of Ordinary People” project, a 
product of the heady optimism of the early Occupation years, could seem oddly out of place, 
interested as it was in overcoming divisions and building a broad consensus at a time when many 
intellectuals feared a relapse into fascism was imminent. 
 The articles began to appear on the pages of Chûô kôron amidst a profusion of fiery essays 
about Japan’s involvement in the Korean War and the peace movement, although the Institute’s 
articles were not political in an immediately apparent sense.  They tried to correct media stereotypes 
about workers in different occupations, depict their way of viewing the world, and promote interest 
in understanding the lives of others.  Yet the project soon became entwined with ongoing political 
events. References to issues connected to current events appeared in the articles with increasing 
frequency over the course of the series, sometimes due to the choices of the interviewers (i.e. asking 
politicians and nurses their thoughts about remilitarizing Japan), and other times because the 






 The latter was true for the article “The Philosophy of the Constable,” published during a 
period of rising political tension between the government and oppositional groups sympathetic to 
the Japanese Communist Party.  The head writer of the article was Hironaka Toshio, a student of 
Kawashima who used a pseudonym (Honda Takakazu) because of the politically sensitive subject 
matter.243 It appeared just three months before the Left accused the police of brutality during a 1952 
May Day demonstration in front of the Imperial Palace.   
 Though Left-wing critics believed the police had become a politically biased reactionary 
organization, Hironaka wrote that the people he interviewed had been socialized into not airing their 
political opinions at work.  Their reticence may have been aggravated by the fact that many  of the 
policemen they attempted to interview suspected the Science of Thought researchers of being 
Communist agitators.244  He was given the following response when he asked one policeman his 
views of the emperor: 
Policeman: “If I say something about that, it’ll come out as something a policeman said and 
there’ll be trouble, so I won’t say anything.” 
 
Interviewer: “But unless you say something, ordinary people will have no idea what kind of 
people policemen are, and I think that’s no good.” 
 
Policeman: “That won’t be the case.  They should be able to understand us well enough 
based on the things published in newspapers.  Aren’t there lots of things published about 
that?  Things like bidan.”245  
 
 Bidan (or “tales of heroism”) was a genre of moralistic storytelling that celebrated good deeds 
performed by the police or, before 1945, soldiers that appeared in newspapers, popular magazines, 
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radio, and film.246  Hironaka commented on this reference to bidan in the interview in an attempt to 
pre-empt attacks on the article as biased toward criticism of the police, explaining that he left 
reporting on the heroic, virtuous side of police work to the writers of popular bidan. In effect he 
accused the popular media of a one-sided representation of reality.  The Science of Thought 
collective imagined its work on the “philosophy of ordinary people” as a corrective to romanticized 
accounts of the “common man” in the press and popular media. 
 A few months later, in “The Philosophy of the Fireman,” poet and Institute member Sekine 
Hiroshi framed this critical impulse in relation to popular superstitions and images circulated by the 
popular media.  He noted that people were usually uninterested in the lives of their local firemen.  
This attitude led to ignorance and the spread of harmful “superstitions” (迷信) about them – the 
belief that they were lazy or demanded exorbitant fees in return for putting out fires.  According to 
Sekine, people knew more about the fictionalized exploits of Tokugawa-era firefighting day laborers 
(“tobi”) than firemen in their own community.247   
Through films, plays, and kôdan (professional oral storytelling) or novels… we know a lot 
about the ancestors of firemen.  Perhaps there is some reason why, despite the affinity we 
feel toward these figures, we lack common sense (常識) concerning firemen of the present 
day?  In other words, perhaps this is because, although old-fashioned firemen are archetypal 
commoners, and thus they form a basic theme for the “philosophy of common people,” 
today the tradition of firemen is no longer preserved in any form, and this tradition is now 
no more than an empty shell? (形骸)248 
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 Here, the particular images and stereotypes associated with firemen may be linked to a 
particular historical or cultural context, but the lack of interest or first-hand knowledge about their 
lives spoke to a broader condition other thinkers associated with the demands of everyday life in 
mass capitalist society.  Sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann attempted a 
phenomenological description of this condition when they asserted that everyday life was dominated 
by incipient anonymity and “recipe knowledge of the workings of human relationships.”  This 
knowledge allows one to call upon the expertise of others when a problem, such as a fire or a 
broken telephone, appears in the course of everyday life, but it provides little incentive for 
understanding their lives.  They wrote that, in the midst of complex social interdependency, “my 
knowledge of my own occupation and its world is very rich and specific, while I have only very 
sketchy knowledge of the occupational worlds of others.”249 
 For Science of Thought, peeling away the shell of tradition aimed less at a naturalistic or 
phenomenological description of everyday life than at overcoming its inertia, replacing stereotypes 
and lack of interest with a kind of empathetic understanding of the lives of others and the political 
and ethical dilemmas they faced.   For example, at the time of the article, firefighters in Tokyo still 
used watchtowers to spot conflagrations in their districts. The US Occupation authorities proposed 
to modernize this surveillance system but ended up leaving it mostly intact.  The article contained an 
anonymous account of the shared experience of psychological stress experienced by firefighters on 
watch-duty.  They were punished if they caused a delay responding to a fire, if they called a false 
alarm, or if another nearby company spotted smoke and rushed to the site first.250  The interval 
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between on-time and late detection was “paper-thin,” occurring in the time it took for “the fire chief 
to slam down his telephone receiver.”  The article concluded with the assumption that, despite the 
stress, passersby gazed up at the watchtowers and thought, “looks cool in the summer, and no 
mosquitoes” – thoughts that fed into a stereotype of firefighters’ laziness and clashed with the actual 
experience of being on watch-duty.251 
  Similarly, the stated aim of the article on policemen was to show that they were “humans, 
just like civilians, placed in a position to exercise authority.”  The article focused on the way the 
individual low-ranking constables were dominated by a “familial community” of officers that 
controlled their life after work, preventing them from organizing into unions and keeping them in a 
state of political apathy.  One example of such control was the practice of police officers asking their 
superior’s permission before settling on a marriage partner, a convention that Hironaka argued 
persisted after the formal abolition of the practice during the postwar reorganization of the police 
forces.252 
 But no one was portrayed as a pure victim of professional circumstances.  The bulk of most 
of these essays was taken up with the task of establishing a basic understanding, or what Kawashima 
interpreting Benedict might have called a “qualitative structural grasp,” of the occupational world 
under discussion.  This allowed the reader to see the unresolved political and ethical dilemmas 
confronting members of these occupations in postwar society.  The task of making these dilemmas 
explicit, often through the interviewer’s questioning, was part of the evacuation of philosophical 
problems. Sekine argued that the mobilization of firemen for crowd-control duty during the 1952 
May Day protests created a situation in which the humanitarian mission of the profession could 
come into conflict with its mobilization for political purposes.  Although the firemen Sekine 
                                                
251 Shisô no kagaku kenkyûkai, op. cit., 120 






interviewed claimed they were sent to the scene of the protests in Hibiya to extinguish the fires of 
burning cars and not to “suppress rioting,” the ambulances and fire trucks were pelted by rocks 
thrown by demonstrators, injuring ten firemen.253 He directly posed the question of political 
ideology to a fire chief: 
We received no notable answers besides, “this has become a problem, and so some kind of 
provision will be discussed.” Nonetheless I pushed further, and to my question as to 
whether he had any desire to take on a role like that of the National Police Reserves254, he 
responded, “We want to be in a neutral space ideologically (思想的).  We want to be in a 
position like the Red Cross.”  There were times when he answered realistically saying, “And 
of course it would [also] mean that firemen would get injured, and that is not agreeable to us.” 
There were also times when he severed ties on the spot with the dilemmas of fire fighting 
humanism, saying things like “firefighting is firefighting, but in that situation we would act as 
Japanese (日本人として行動する).” 255 
 
 After noting the ambivalence of the fire chief toward the peace movement, the article 
concluded by favorably contrasting the man-on-the-street virtues of firemen with implicitly 
reactionary policemen, pointing to incidents like a burglar going to a fire station rather than a police 
station to confess, and an interview with a fireman whose parents forbade him to enter the police 
force.  
 Yet the article on the police argued that if given the freedom to do so, constables might 
organize unions and reform their professional community.  Other articles in the series, while 
similarly critical of the social structure in which the jobs and professions were embedded in, tried to 
uncover emancipatory potential in the implicit philosophical views of the practitioners.  Kawashima 
Takeyoshi argued in “The Philosophy of Geisha” that, despite their feudal appearance, geisha had a 
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modern and materialist mindset.  This explained their dislike of government officials, who retained a 
feudal “bushidô-like” mentality.   Suggesting that geisha were a kind of vanishing mediator, 
Kawashima wrote, “Japan’s sovereign government will have been democratized when government 
officials are loved as “human beings” in the world of geisha.  Yet paradoxically, in such a democratic 
society geisha (or at least geisha of the current type) will probably have already ceased to exist.”256 
 In an article on Diet Representatives, predictable results to standard questions like, “Are you 
in favor of the remilitarization of Japan?”  “Who is your favorite living Japanese politician?” and 
“What are your hobbies?” were overshadowed by documentary descriptions of meeting forty 
individual representatives in their offices, which included multiple attempts to talk back to the 
researchers and comment on the inadequacy of the survey questions.  Typical entries went like this: 
Kaishintô Party: 
Okada Tadashi (b. 1913, Kumamoto, occupation: agriculture) 
Read through the form and said with a wry smile, “This is practically an achievement test, 
eh?”  Then, taking the form nonchalantly, “Ok, ok, I’ll do it.”  Attitude: friendly, seemingly 
serious.  Surrounding situation: two other diet members.  One secretary…257 
 
Communist Party: 
Inokuchi Masao (b. 1895, Hyogo, occupation: agriculture) 
Attitude: friendly, silent. [On the question of remilitarization] “Right now, remilitarization is 
impossible either way, if sovereignty really returns to the people then a liberation army…”  
In the end he added the footnote, “We are not representatives of the ruling stratum so the 
questions on the survey don’t really apply as is.  Please take that into consideration.”258 
 
Okada’s comment that the thought survey was an “achievement test” echoed the Tokyo shinbun’s 
criticism of the Institute’s approach to literature – that they were subjecting works to a “scholastic 
proficiency test.” 
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 Instances of Diet members backing out of their agreement to participate in the survey were 
described in voyeuristic detail.  This included LDP member Ikeda Hayato, who would become 
Prime Minister eight years later in the aftermath of the ANPO protests in 1960.  First the secretary 
tried to do the survey in Ikeda’s place but the (unnamed) researcher was adamant that Ikeda do it 
himself.  In a waiting room, they overheard Ikeda saying something to the effect of  “I meant to turn 
down the Chûô kôron survey, but…”  An aide then emerged and conversed with the researcher. 
“He may have promised [to do the survey], but Mr. Ikeda is adamant that he refused.” 
 
“I see, perhaps it is because he is busy?  Then did he says his refusal is due to a lack of time 
today, or does it have to do with the survey itself?” 
 
“The questions are probably bothersome to him.” 
 
“But he has not seen them…” 
 
Then apologizing, “That’s truly strange, to refuse without looking at them… Please tell this 
to your editor.  I am very sorry.”259 
 
 These capsule accounts, combined with the title “Watch Your Representative!” suggested that 
reading the article was itself an act of surveillance directed toward unrepresentative representatives.  
Like the article on the policeman, it evoked the sense that Science of Thought researchers were on 
the outside looking in, with little hope of getting a clear picture of the common philosophy that 
informed and motivated the behavior of people in these closed networks.  In addition, after the 
success of more naturalistic documentary accounts of everyday life in the early fifties associated with 
the “life writing” and “circle” movements, some critics argued that the growing obsession with 
“abstract” political issues like remilitarization was getting in the way of understanding pressing 
                                                






“bread-and-butter” issues that concerned the everyday life of a majority still suffering the economic 
aftereffects of war.260 
 
Conclusion: Crisis and Rebirth 
 In June of 1952, Tsurumi Shunsuke, having moved from Tokyo to take up an academic 
position in Kyoto, wrote a dispirited letter to Tsuru Shigeto.  Tsuru was about ten years older than 
Tsurumi and had occasionally acted as a mentor to him from the time the two met in Harvard in the 
late thirties.  Tsuru brought his experience with the journal Science and Society to the founding of 
Science of Thought in 1946, yet his day-to-day involvement with the group was limited by the fact that 
he became vice-chairman of the government’s Economic Stabilization Board in 1947.  Tsuru who 
was at the forefront of the effort to promote scientific planning in the Japanese economy, seemed to 
be drifting in a different direction from Science of Thought, members of which had begun to question 
the value of scientific theorizing in the course of their work.  Tsurumi wrote: 
Dear Tsuru Shigeto, 
 
I know you have strong opinions in opposition to matters concerning Science of Thought, and 
with that in mind I offer this letter to you. 
 
I also feel disillusioned with the main topic Science of Thought has been pursuing.  From May 
of last year to the beginning of this year, I wasn’t able to do any work.  I think there are 
conflicts in terms of the point of production of thought (思想), and I have become unable 
to push my ideas forward on the same track as before.  For this reason, I feel uncomfortable 
about Science of Thought and with myself. 
 
I think we’ve reached an impasse for the time being in our attempt to break down the 
framework of philosophy.  Until we are able to insert our lives within that of the masses (民
衆) of Japan, one cannot expect that it’ll be possible to enunciate philosophy in the words of 
                                                
260 See for example Usui Yoshimi’s review of Echo School, “Yamabiko gakkô kara nani o manabu ka,” 






the masses.  For that reason, right now I think it’s best to break our pens and make 
preparations for another day. 
 
Unless we become a different kind of person, an ordinary working person (生活者), I don’t 
think we can bring this project to the point in which it’ll be possible to break down 
philosophy’s framework.  This effort is now at a dead end, and it’s also our most important 
work…261 
 
 Tsurumi’s sense that he was trapped by his subjective position vis-à-vis the masses was 
compounded by financial difficulties. The Rockefeller Foundation had characterized the group as a 
Communist Front and refused to support its project on the effect of the Japanese “emperor system” 
(天皇制) on the lives of ordinary people.262  Sales of the journal were sluggish, and at the time of 
Tsurumi’s letter, it had not been published for over a year.   
 In order to overcome this problem he suggested in the letter that the group try publishing the 
journal in English and building connections with scholars abroad, “not only with America, but with 
India, Australia, and Indonesia.”  He suggested the abstracts be written in Malay.  They should also 
try to get their articles published abroad, “as much as possible in magazines with a market, so as to 
even slightly help the Institute’s finances.”  The journal would continue to be published in Japanese 
because it was essential to the continued existence of the Institute, but unless they switched to a less 
professional mimeographed format, Tsurumi believed it would collapse under the weight of red 
ink.263 
 Tsurumi wished to abolish the journal in its current form but not without holding up the 
possibility of its rebirth: 
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In this way, after reaching a certain point I would like to cease publication of Science of 
Thought.  At such a time, I will want to work to reincarnate it into an association able to make 
assertions from within the lived sensibility of the masses (民衆の生活感情のなかから).  I 
think I want to belong to the same current as the work of Ishimoda Shô and Noma Hiroshi, 
but also to set about doing something that will help insert empiricist (実証主義) methods 
more securely into their work.264 
 
Ishimoda was a Marxist medieval historian and Noma was a novelist.  What the two shared in 
common was a commitment to participating in small study and writing groups called “circles” that 
brought intellectuals and workers together to collaborate toward the production of historical and 
artistic works. 265 
 The journal Science of Thought ceased publication, if temporarily, after the release of its twenty-
third issue in April 1950, the only issue published in mimeographed form. In an open letter 
published in that issue Tsurumi argued that the journal was a victim of its own success.  Many of the 
thinkers the journal worked to introduce to Japanese audiences had been by now translated by major 
publishing companies.  In addition, Tsurumi asserted that, “The perspective we elaborated for 
researching Japan has been deftly adopted by the big commercial magazines.”  As a result, the 
group’s work had been indirectly transmitted to a larger audience; while at the same time the wide 
dissemination of the journal’s perspective caused it to be increasingly overshadowed by better-
financed competitors.  The letter ended by renewing the call for an end to divisions among 
intellectuals and between intellectuals and the public, and by making a virtue out of the journal’s 
own increasingly marginalized position in the intellectual scene.  
In Japanese academia, the divisions between universities, departments, and courses still exist 
today, and each professor drags two or three disciples into hiding deep into a hole of 
specialization, guarding their positions.  Even after defeat, there is no sign of mutual 
cooperation or enjoying fair competition before a judge.  Under these conditions, Science of 
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Thought is naturally marginal.  Yet people in a fix without such a hole, or people expelled 
from such a hole, or people with a splendid hole yet who do not find the act of simply 
protecting that hole a virtue – these are the people who designate the task of Science of 
Thought.266 
 
 The journal ceased publication, but it reappeared after three years in 1953 with a new title, Me 
(Sprouts).  The re-launched journal expressed a new sense of solidarity with eclectic movements 
outside the mainstream Left, devoting less space to book reviews of Anglo-American academic texts 
and more to articles on anti-establishment educational experiments like the “life-writing movement.”  
Rather than trying to empirically analyze the life and mental world of the worker, the group 
promoted the work of small associations that they saw as part of a nation-wide, grass-roots “circle 
movement.”  Circles provided a platform for workers to produce their own documentary accounts 
of daily life.  Along with the shifting political climate during the fifties, methodological and financial 
difficulties alluded to in Tsurumi’s letter nudged the group toward closer involvement with this 
burgeoning movement.  As Tsurumi Kazuko put it, rather than studying the masses “from the 
outside” using a social scientific methodological apparatus, members should study groups they were 
truly committed to and could become equal members of.   
 Okamoto Tarô, one of the few early members of the Institute who was an artist rather than a 
scholar, argued during a criticism session held by the group that it was impossible to observe 
“ordinary people” like “guinea pigs,” and time would be better spent on collaborative activities that 
would make intellectuals into better “humanists.”  Science of Thought and Tsurumi Kazuko’s 
participation in circles was oriented toward subjective transformation that might answer Okamoto’s 
criticism.  Methodological concerns over distortions caused by the researcher’s viewpoint “on the 
outside” thus overlapped with political and ethical concerns encountered by the group in the course 
of their research.   
                                                






 The “Philosophy of Ordinary People” project, which raised the problem of understanding the 
thought of the masses, was only the beginning of Science of Thought’s methodological odyssey to come 
to grips with the relationship between observers and observed. Its significance lay in the experiment 
in redefining the scope of philosophy in postwar Japan.  Insistute members used their empirical 
work as an opportunity to further criticize traditional intellectuals who considered popular culture 
too vulgar to be worthy of serious analysis. The empirical results were of less lasting importance 
than the project’s focus on breaking down the distinction between elite and popular culture by 
treating ordinary people as if they were philosophers.  Although their approaches and politics 
changed during the fifties, Science of Thought’s interest in somehow exploding rigid social and 








Chapter 4: Long-term Revolution 
Life-Writing, Circles, and the People’s Republic of China 
 
The people have been gradually conquered by the bourgeois class, penetrated by their 
thoughts and now want only to resemble them. If you long for a people's art, begin by 
creating a people! 
- Romain Rolland, Le Théâtre du people, 1903 
 
Friends around the country who read this book, 
 
If becoming ever closer, we could have an exchange about these matters through the mail, 
wouldn’t our studies become more and more pleasant?  I think it would be good if, not just 
the friends I mentioned, but all the children of Japan came to exchange letters. 




Near the start of the turbulent fifties, called the “season of politics” by contemporary 
observers, a grass-roots educational movement based in the rural countryside emerged into the 
media spotlight.  In 1951 Muchaku Seikyô’s Yamabiko gakkô (Echo School), an edited collection of 
compositions written by middle-school students in impoverished Yamagata prefecture, became a 
runaway bestseller.  A year later, the film director Imai Tadashi, working outside the studio system 
after being blacklisted during the anti-Communist Red Purge of 1950, made a movie adaptation of 
the book featuring non-professional actors, which became one of the top films of 1952.  In a media 
landscape marked by market segmentation among elite journals, popular magazines, and women’s 
magazines appealing to varying socioeconomic audiences, Yamabiko gakkô was a true crossover hit: 
heated roundtable discussions appeared in intellectual journals like Tenbô and Ningen: Muchaku 
Seikyô’s diary was published in the women’s magazine Fujin kôron: and articles with photographs 
from the film filled pages in the tabloid magazine Heibon.267 The book found supporters among 
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Leftist critics of the centrally administered Japanese educational system even as it received a prize 
from the heart of that system, the Ministry of Education. 
Progressive intellectuals hailed the collection of essays on rural life as evidence of 
democracy-in-action in the countryside, a place so often associated with backwardness, feudal 
customs, and poverty.  Yet the depiction of the countryside in the book did not directly challenge 
this widely shared image.  The essays, writing assignments for a middle school social science class, 
focused on social problems encountered in everyday life and sought solutions to them through 
cooperation with the community of students in the class.  They provided evidence for critics that 
“superstitious beliefs” and “feudal attitudes” were common in the countryside, and almost everyone 
remarked that the text was a testament to the continued existence of the brutal economic inequality 
between town and country.  Rather, it was the fact that essays of this sort could be produced by 
middle-school students that seemed to expand the boundaries of the possible for critics who 
continued to search for ways of making Japan more democratic.  The determination with which the 
middle-school student-authors uncovered social problems in their community through careful 
observation, and their faith and willingness to work toward solutions to these problems through 
cooperation with their classmates, prompted many reviewers to exclaim that reading the text 
completely overturned their preconceived ideas about the daunting barriers to democratic change in 
the countryside. 
The book’s influence went far beyond the subject of children’s education.  Tsurumi 
Shunsuke later called the book and the experiment in education that produced it the “prelude to the 
circle movement” of the fifties.  Around the time of its publication in the early fifties, a nationwide 
movement to form small voluntary associations called circles (saakuru) within workplaces and 
communities throughout Japan was gathering steam.  Some of these circles studied Yamabiko gakkô 






everyday life.  Collections of some of these writings were published as mass-market paperbacks, but 
most were printed in small quantities as mimeographed copies that were distributed within the circle 
and then circulated in the workplace and community. They became material for discussion during 
“review sessions” held by the circle, in which members debated possible solutions to the everyday 
problems addressed in the writings.  Here they often connected local problems to larger issues 
facing the working class and the Japanese nation as a whole.  Observers of the movement believed 
that this cycle of observing, writing, and discussing might produce citizens capable of realizing the 
promise of postwar democracy.  Many intellectuals were moved to participate in circles during the 
early fifties with the expectation that they had much to learn from them. 
Although the scale of these circles was small, the revolutionary expectations projected upon 
them were not.  Encouraged by the success of the Chinese revolution, Takeuchi Yoshimi, a China 
scholar and cultural critic who became head of the Institute of the Science of Thought in 1953, 
believed that circles and the educational movement that produced Yamabiko gakkô were a part of a 
“long-term revolution” that would eventually transform Japanese society from the bottom up.  
Embracing this optimism, intellectuals like Tsurumi Kazuko renounced their earlier commitment to 
producing sociological studies of villages and workplaces and began participating in, facilitating, and 
advocating on behalf of circles. 
The promise of a socialist revolution led by the Japanese Communist Party was historically 
entwined with these revolutionary expectations.  The word “circle” was first used in the 1930s by 
Kurahara Korehito, a leading theoretician of the proletarian art movement in the Japan Communist 
Party (JCP), who defined them as “support organs for spreading the political and organizational 






mobilizing them under the leadership of these organs.”268  In the interest of expanding its influence 
and raising the class-consciousness of workers, the Party facilitated the formation of circles in 
workplaces throughout Japan after the war.   
The activities of the JCP in the fifties caused the circle movement eventually to become 
associated with Leftist extremism and violence.  In January of 1950 the Party split over the question 
of whether or not to engage in Maoist-style armed struggle in the countryside in solidarity with the 
recently established People’s Republics in China and North Korea. Arguing that Japan was on the 
verge of relapsing into militarism as part of the US-Japan Cold War alliance, supporters of armed 
struggle gained control of the Party in 1951.  In 1952 the Party officially labeled Yamabiko gakkô and 
other publications that came out of the circle movement, “creative forms of the struggle for peace” 
waged by the masses on the national “cultural front” (文化戦線) against American imperialism 
during the Korean War.269  To leaders of this faction, the “cultural activities” of the circles were a 
part of a mass campaign that also included student volunteer “mountain village mobilization troops” 
(sanson kôsakutai) armed with Molotov cocktails who engaged in guerrilla warfare in the countryside.  
Their stated objective was to turn the Korean War into an international struggle against American 
imperialism in Asia.270  By 1955, when the Party changed course again and repudiated the supporters 
of rural revolution as “extreme Left-wing adventurists,” its image had already been tarnished.  
Owing to the association of this period of intense circle activity with Leftist violence and radicalism, 
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many participants later disavowed their participation in the movement, and the view spread that 
circles during this productive period were simply a means of transmitting JCP propaganda.271 
Yet recent scholarship resists the reduction of the diversity of activities and texts that came 
out of this period to political directives and propaganda efforts – even if some within the JCP tried 
to interpret them as such. Besides Yamabiko gakkô, the larger circle movement included memoirs 
written by children, whether of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima (Genbaku no ko), growing up near 
American military bases (Kichi no ko), or returning from China to Japan after the war (Kaette kita 
kodomotachi).  It was linked to efforts in popular history education movements (Kokumin no 
rekishigaku), popular science education for adults (Kokumin no kagaku), amateur painting (Atarashii e no 
kai) and drama movements, and collections of poems written by bank employees (Ginkôin no shishû) 
and workers in weapons factories (Nanbu bungaku). Circles devoted to documenting and discussing 
problems in everyday life included textile workers (Take no ko kai, Seikatsu kiroku no kai) and 
housewives (Seikatsu o tsuzuru kai). 272   Intellectuals who participated in these different movements 
held different views of democratic subjectivity and of the Chinese Revolution.  They included the 
authors Noma Hiroshi and Abe Kōbō, the historian Ishimoda Shô, the playwright Kinoshita Junji, 
and many others.  This chaotic but dynamic activity evoked the initial flourishing of publishing after 
the war, when hundreds of new intellectual associations and journals sprang up in the name of 
democracy and science – although now the active participants included many more people without a 
secondary school education. 
Rather than intending solely to wage a struggle against militarism and US imperialism, many 
participants saw the movement as an opportunity to realize the revolutionary promises of “postwar 
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democracy”— a term that meant different things to different people. 273  For some, democracy 
promised new opportunities for creative self-expression. For others, it promised an egalitarian 
society in which workers could take pride in their work and no longer be subservient to their bosses.  
Others thought democracy promised an opportunity for anyone to become an intellectual.  Still 
others imagined it promised a sense of solidarity and mutual understanding among people from 
different classes and walks of life.  What these diverse interpretations shared was the idea that 
realizing the promise of democracy was connected to a new kind of subjectivity, one that might be 
fashioned through active participation in a circle. 
Finally, many believed democratic subjectivity also went hand-in-hand with achieving greater 
material prosperity.  The circle movement reached its peak before the rapid economic growth of the 
late fifties and sixties, and problems connected with poverty loom large in Yamabiko gakkô and the 
essays and poems written in worker circles   The achievement of prosperity did not have to conflict 
with the realization of other promises associated with democracy.  Personal qualities necessary for 
organizing strikes for higher wages might be cultivated in a circle. In addition, some of the more 
optimistic narratives produced by circle members suggested that, despite the time they spent on 
circle-related activities, participation in it made them into more productive workers who were able to 
balance the work-related demands necessary for personal advancement and the needs for solidarity 
with their fellows.  The fact that these two demands came into conflict during the high-growth 
period was one reason for the decline of the circle in the late fifties and sixties.  Some observers of 
this decline voiced the anxiety that growing economic prosperity might threaten democracy by 
turning people into passive consumers. 
Members of the Institute for the Science of Thought, Tsurumi Kazuko in particular, 
participated in the debates surrounding Yamabiko gakkô and in the circle movement.  Like many 
                                                






intellectuals on the Left after 1949, Tsurumi’s encounter was mediated by her fascination with  
“New China” as a model of grass-roots modernization.  She participated in writing circles in Tokyo 
and the factory-town of Yokkaichi inspired by the example of Yamabiko gakkô.  There she tried to 
discover a theory of circle-organizing that could be transposed to other areas of Japan and enable 
more effective intellectual interventions in the realm of mass culture.  Her initial experience in 
Yokkaichi suggested to her that circles could transform its members into active subjects who 
effectively balanced the needs of the group with that of the individual.  She believed that this grass-
roots process of subjective transformation would realize the promise of postwar democracy by 
reconnecting intellectuals with the masses and empowering marginalized workers and women.  Yet 
as the fifties wore on, the onset of economic high-growth and the weakening of the militant labor 
movement neutralized the oppositional stance of most circles, while many became absorbed in 
company culture as apolitical leisure groups.  The rise and fall of circle radicalism revealed anxieties 
about the advent of white-collar hegemony with the era of high economic growth. 
 
Yamabiko gakkô  and the Fifties 
 
Yamabiko gakkô’s success renewed interest in the life-writing movement (生活綴方運動) of 
the 1920s and 1930s, an educational movement that eschewed textbooks and rote memorization in 
favor of encouraging students to write detailed accounts of their daily life.  Although it began as an 
innovative technique for teaching writing skills, progressive postwar educators like Muchaku Seikyô 
transposed this pedagogy to social studies class.  He encouraged students to investigate and write 
about life in their local community.  He emphasized describing things “as they were” in unadorned 
language (ari no mama ni).  Their essays and poems were sprinkled with phrases and words from the 







In their essays, the children uncovered structural poverty and pervasive debt in their 
community, problems that appeared insurmountable by the traditional values of “hard work” and 
“endurance.”  In the most praised and commented-upon essay in the collection, Eguchi Kôichi 
wrote about becoming an orphan forced to take responsibility for his small tobacco farming 
household after the death of his widowed mother. He implied that her deteriorating physical 
condition was related to worries about providing for her poor family.  She continued to voice her 
concerns to Kôichi on her deathbed: 
After being admitted to the clinic, even as she seemed like she might die right now, she 
asked things like “Did you gather firewood?” “Did you pickle the radishes?” “Did you wash 
the greens?” in a fever.  All the while thinking, “This is it for my mom,” I couldn’t do 
anything to comfort her, and, with thoughts of housework filling my head, I went home 
without hardly talking to her at all.274 
 
After she died, he remembered his mother as a tireless worker who – despite her aspiration 
to self-reliance – accumulated mountains of debt.  After recounting his expenses and revenues in 
detail, Kôichi wrote that he realized it was all but impossible to pay back the debts the household 
had accumulated, even if he stopped attending school entirely. 
He recounted that one day in December his teacher, Muchaku, visited him at home and 
tersely told him to draw up a schedule that listed the farm work he had to do and the time it took to 
complete each task.  This way he would be able to tell how many times he would need to miss class 
each month.  Muchaku also told him to come by the school to see his classmates.  He had not 
attended class for a month and a half, and they were worried about him after the death of his 
mother.  The teacher said that Kôichi ought to drop by to “thank them for their concern.”275 
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 Kôichi drew up a work schedule and realized he would only be able to attend school for one 
or two days that month.  He brought the schedule with him to school the next day.  Without 
explaining anything to Kôichi, the teacher took the schedule and gave it to three of his classmates, 
saying, “Look at this.”  The intentions of Muchaku and the class soon became clear.  His classmates 
would come together to help Kôichi with his daily tasks so that he could continue to attend middle 
school.  As Kôichi’s eyes filled up with tears of joy, one of the students added that they would draw 
up a plan so they would know how many students were necessary for each task.276 
 Though they described hardships of village life in detail, in the end Muchaku, Kôichi, and 
the other children authors of Yamabiko gakkô were hopeful that, together, they could surmount their 
problems through mutual cooperation, planning, and study.   In a foreword to the book, the 
children’s author Tsubota Jôji contrasted this hopefulness with another popular collection of 
writings by university students, Listen to the Voices of the Sea, published in 1949 by an association at the 
University of Tokyo (Wadatsumikai), which became central to the peace movement in 1950.277  
Theirs was a collection of letters, diary entries, and poems, many addressed to family members, 
written by students who died during the war when their studies were interrupted by military service. 
The children of Yamabiko gakkô, for whom the possibility of attending college was remote, did not 
just differ from these students socioeconomically.  Tsubota acknowledged that while both books 
were tearjerkers, Listen to the Voices of the Sea came from the “depths of Japan’s winter” while the 
children of Yamabiko gakkô, despite the frigid climate in Yamagata, represented the coming spring.278  
This was crystallized in an optimistic slogan he attributed to Muchaku: 
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Let’s go, always pooling our strength together 
Let’s go, never slinking in the shadows 
Let’s act, making good things better 
Let’s become people who love work 
Let’s become people who ponder “why?” no matter what 
Let’s always search for a better way of doing things279 
 
The children of Yamabiko gakkô supported each other, remained optimistic about change and 
progress, and yet they were realistic about the obstacles that stood in their way.  One reason this 
depiction touched a nerve among intellectuals was that it allowed them to imagine an inversion of 
the ever-problematic relationship between enlightener and enlightened in postwar Japan.  The book 
emerged from a public school, considered the grounds for postwar enlightenment and the formation 
of democratic subjectivity during the US Occupation.  Yet in this case adolescent students were 
empowered to become teachers, educating adult readers about how poverty affected their daily lives 
and inspiring them with their determination against seemingly hopeless odds to overcome it.   
Tsurumi Shunsuke believed that the essence of the life-writing pedagogy employed by 
Muchaku lay in its commitment to equality, not merely as an end to be sought after, but as a quality 
that characterized the day-to-day teaching process itself.  Surveying the influence of the movement 
over the course of the fifties, he wrote: 
I think the principle of egalitarianism-as-teaching-method actually first appeared in such a 
striking form in Muchaku Seikyô’s own work.  Muchaku Seikyô’s policy is, even in the 
middle of speaking, to admit, “Oh, I made a mistake,” (“先生が間違った”) and apologize 
to students.  This is a highly original policy that was nearly inconceivable before the war.  By 
apologizing, the teacher returns to a standpoint of equality.  Humans are equal in their 
original state.  But people say things like, we have to be educated, or we have to engage in 
politics, and then they create an unequal framework in order to achieve some provisional 
objective.  Yet at the same time, that provisional inequality ought to be quickly broken down 
and eliminated once the work is over and the immediate objective is achieved.  This is 
Muchaku Seikyô’s method, and by means of it people have gradually uncovered a way of 
eliminating dictatorial consciousness (指導者意識).  This discovery has not only been 
                                                






influential for education, it has also influenced all sorts of domains of thought more 
generally, and you could say that the philosophy of the circle movement developed over the 
past several years had its origins here.280 
 
Tsurumi summed up the core question that the life-writing educators grappled with, How do you 
prevent ‘dictatorial consciousness’ from emerging while still running a small group efficiently?”  In 
this form of teaching, Tsurumi found an answer to this question, believed to be of great importance 
to intellectuals and activists committed to democratic egalitarianism.  
 Interest in developing an egalitarian pedagogy was connected with a shift in the attitude of 
intellectuals from the late forties to the early fifties.  The view of democracy that Left-leaning 
intellectuals held when the war ended and the US Occupation commenced began to seem naïve.   
Many intellectuals associated with early postwar progressive associations had criticized Nishida 
Kitarô, whose philosophy appeared symptomatic of the decadent prewar culture of kyôyô or bildung. 
For the Institute for the Science of Thought, this critique called for a change in both the form of 
philosophy, from jargon-filled to easy-to-understand, and its content, from “aloof cosmopolitanism” 
and “abstract” theorizing to something more related to everyday life.  At the same time, groups like 
Science of Thought, who contrasted Nishida’s jargon with what they perceived as Anglo-American 
models of philosophical clarity and practicality, were open to the accusation that they were trying to 
impose a foreign (American) philosophical framework on the masses.  This became a more pressing 
issue as anti-American nationalism was embraced by much of the Left around the time of the 
Korean War.281   
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The Institute responded to growing criticism of the “postwar enlightenment” by embracing 
the life-writing movement and circles that tried to adapt its pedagogical and investigative methods 
for adults.  Whereas enthusiasm for the publication of Nishida’s Collected works in 1947 exposed 
anxiety about the lingering gap between high-brow intellectual and popular culture, the “Yamabiko 
gakkô boom” of the early 1950’s seemed to point toward a new way of overcoming that gap – by 
engaging with the masses in a way that used more egalitarian methods to achieve an egalitarian result.   
In 1953, when the Institute of the Science of Thought re-launched its journal, it focused on 
the circles where documentary and artistic productions based upon everyday experience were 
produced.  Members of the Institute did not only observe the circles; they adopted their tactics in an 
attempt to expand participation in the group, connect to readers, and enlist volunteers in research.  
They began opening branch offices (支部) and reading groups throughout Japan hosting voluntary 
“circles” devoted to specific topics of collaborative research published in the  journal.  These 
included groups devoted to semiotics and analytic philosophy (記号の会), the philosophy of 
ordinary people (ひとびとの哲学の会), research on personal advice (身の上相談研究会), and 
tenkô (ideological conversion).  There local branches existed in the large cities of Kyoto, Osaka, and 
Nagoya as well as in provincial cities and towns like Okazaki, Marugame, and Karuizawa.  The 
network eventually stretched from Kagoshima at the southern tip of Kyushu to Kushiro in the north 
of Hokkaidô.282   
Some early reviews of Yamabiko gakkô skeptically raised the question of the students’ 
subjective involvement – to what degree was the students’ writing an authentic product of their own 
initiative and observations as opposed to their teacher Muchaku Seikyô’s guidance and instruction?  
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In a commentary on the text, Kokubun Ichitarô, a leader of the Life Writing Movement, defended 
him and other educators against the suspicion that they were secretly “brainwashing” (洗脳) 
students.  Similar criticism was directed at participation in adult worker circles, many of which were 
organized by militant labor unions.  In part, suspicion of brainwashing reflected the climate of 
paranoia that existed during a time when conspiracies attributed to the Japanese Communist Party 
and the CIA attracted popular attention in Japan.283  Much as participants in the 1930s “cultural 
front” were targeted after World War II in the US, workplace circles in Japan were seen as sites of 
pro-Communist indoctrination.284    
As time went on, the debate over brainwashing receded, and in its place there emerged the 
contentious issue of whether life-writing was susceptible to being co-opted by a “post-ideological” 
politics of high-economic growth. Tsurumi’s question about efficiently running a small group in a 
non-dictatorial fashion was also of interest to corporate managers.  Aside from the Yamabiko gakkô 
craze, the 1950s saw a series of clashes between management and pro-socialist trade unions.  
Corporate executives tried to coax workers into company unions or defanged trade unions that 
cooperated with management in order to raise productivity in return for incremental wage increases 
and improved working conditions, a strategy that bore fruit in the 1960s.285     
Writing with the benefit of hindsight, it appeared that life-writing’s emphasis on eliminating 
structural poverty might have been susceptible to co-optation by the practitioners of an anti-politics 
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of growth.  The author and literary critic Usui Yoshimi exclaimed that upon reading Yamabiko gakkô 
he was most moved by the students’ ability to “uncover the fundamental problem of present Japan 
as their own problem” and their determination to “continue their studies in the interest of solving 
that problem.”  The problem Usui was referring to was structural poverty: “This is poverty not from 
laziness or failure, but poverty that means one cannot eat no matter how much one works.” 286  The 
students uncovered the intractability of this problem and the importance of changing daily habits in 
the community, not through reading Marx, Dewey, or Science of Thought but through their own 
detailed observations of daily life in a community imagined to be worlds away from intellectual 
debates in metropolitan Tokyo.  Although there were antiwar – and some critics argued, pro-
communist – messages in Yamabiko gakkô, in comparison with the problem of eliminating poverty in 
the countryside, overtly political debates concerning the remilitarization of Japan or its alignment 
during the Cold War could seem like secondary issues.  
Was Yamabiko gakkô thus a repudiation of “abstract” debates that had concerned the 
postwar Left, or were geopolitical issues and structural inequality interrelated?  In 1953, Shimizu 
Ikutarô, one of the major intellectual voices of the opposition to the San Francisco Treaty, used 
Yamabiko gakkô’s methods to make the connection between Japan’s “semi-colonial” situation and 
economic hardship explicit, editing a collection of observational essays by school children living in 
the vicinity of American military bases in Japan.287  Yet drawing attention to the connection between 
geopolitics and poverty could backfire for intellectuals who tried to appeal to the average worker, 
since despite local variation economic growth accelerated as a result of the increased exports of 
armaments to the US during the Korean War.288 
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Yamabiko gakkô intersected with long-running debates about mass culture that took on added 
urgency in the 1950s, a decade when political crises unfolded alongside the rapid expansion of the 
entertainment industry and mass journalism.  Sociologist Katô Hidetoshi wrote that the fifties were 
not only the “season of politics” but also the “season of the tabloid.”  The choice of weekly tabloids 
multiplied along with their skyrocketing circulation.289  Repetition of content within this crowded 
marketplace ushered an unfamiliar word into the general lexicon, “boom,” (ブーム) a term that 
could connote a fad or fashion (sometimes artificially concocted) that suddenly “exploded” onto the 
pages of multiple tabloids.290  The “Yamabiko gakkô boom” was one of the first of these	 
phenomena given this name, occurring after the “plastic surgery boom” in 1951 and before the 
“pachinko boom” in 1953.291  
Yet in his early review, Usui Yoshimi tried to draw a sharp distinction between what he 
considered a mass media culture of fads and distraction and the grass-roots writing of Yamabiko 
gakkô.  He wrote that the students in Yamagata had uncovered the problem of structural poverty 
despite the fact that, “newspapers, radio, movies, novels, and sports” had been “mobilized to turn 
the eyes of Japan’s countrymen away from this present reality.”292 A similar distinction pervaded 
early commentary on the circle movement in workplaces. Local union circles provided an 
opportunity for workers to engage in “cultural activities” (文化活動); including choir groups, plays, 
and book and film clubs.  Intellectuals heatedly debated whether or not these groups constituted an 
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autonomous refuge from the narcotizing influence of popular culture.  Supporters lauded the circles’ 
amateurism and political authenticity, while critics argued that the participants were simply 
motivated by a desire to someday become professional producers of popular culture, thereby 
escaping from the monotony of a life of labor.   
Tsurumi Shunsuke, writing from the retrospective vantage point of Japan’s economically 
ascendant “Golden Sixties,” argued that the popularity of Yamabiko gakkô in 1951 and 1952 signaled 
that white-collar workers, who expressed some solidarity with radical working class movements 
during the Occupation, had already given up on the idea of revolution.  The Yamabiko gakkô boom 
in 1951 and the massive defeat of the Japanese Communist Party in the 1952 national election 
marked the moment when the hopes of the public, “switched over from a future revolutionary 
movement to the dream of holding a position as a minor executive in a small company until 
retirement.”293 
Tsurumi’s retrospective linear account of the path from Yamabiko gakkô to white-collar 
hegemony obscured the connections between interest in the book and the revolutionary imagination 
that existed during the fifties.294  Tsurumi tended to stress the indigenous origins of the life-writing 
movement, and both it and the circle movement were often associated with ethnic nationalism and 
autonomy from foreign models.  Yet this interpretation of the life-writing and circle movements as 
indigenous was mediated by the concurrent perception that a successful indigenous revolution was 
underway in the newly established People’s Republic of China.  A sign of this international context 
was visible on the cover of an early edition of Yamabiko gakkô, illustrated by Mita Genjirô.  Mita 
helped found the “New Painting Association” (新しい画の会) in 1951, an artistic counterpart to 
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the life-writing educational movement, and in 1954 he became the chairman of the politically radical 
Japanese Art Association.  In order to promote “democratization from the bottom-up” during the 
fifties this association began promoting artwork by non-professional workers and children in their 
annual exhibition, the Nippon Independent.  Woodcut prints from revolutionary China were an 
important influence on both amateur and professional artists like Mita during this period, an 
influence visible on the cover he designed for Yamabiko gakkô.295  
  
Figure 4.1, Wang Qi, Listening to a Lecture, 1943      Figure 4.2, Mita Genjirô, Yamabiko gakkô   
     (expanded edition), 1951 
 
The influence of China during this period was subterranean in comparison with the 
influence of the United States in the preceding one (1945-1949).  It was not feasible to substitute 
China for the United States as a model to be emulated. Emphasizing the indigenous spontaneity of the 
Chinese revolution connoted a break from ready-made models of social and political development.  
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This was visible for example in Tsurumi Kazuko and Tsurumi Shunsuke’s critique of “imported 
thought” (輸入思想) and  “heterological” thinking that posited a floating intellectual vantage point 
from which different models of development (European, American, and Soviet) could be compared 
and applied to Japan.   The Chinese influence also appeared in the rhetoric of “self reconstruction” 
(jiko kaizô) and “thought reform” (shisô kaizô) employed by Tsurumi and other participants in the 
life-writing and circle movements.  In the US, Chinese thought reform was discussed in the context 
of a sensationalist and Orientalist discourse on coercive “brainwashing” in the 1950s. 296  Tsurumi, 
Takeuchi, and Minami tended to view thought reform campaigns in a more positive light, detecting 
in them a concern with effecting change from the bottom-up which dovetailed with the life-writing 
and circle movements in Japan. 
 
Minami Hiroshi in Beijing 
Defeat in World War II transformed Japan’s relationship with the rest of the world.  It 
brought about the dismantling of a continental empire and tied the nation’s fortune to the United 
States via military occupation and alliance.  1945 signaled a shift away from Asia and toward the 
United States.  The attention, both negative and positive, lavished upon the US-Japan relationship 
may appear to be symptomatic of a kind of collective forgetting of Asia and the legacy of Japanese 
imperialism. A binary obsession with the United States, or in leftist contexts the Soviet Union, 
tended to replace Japan’s triangular relationship with Asia and the West.  The early Science of Thought 
was no exception to this rule, and its articles on the United States far outweighed those concerning 
Japan’s relationship to its former colonies in Asia.  Yet in the early 1950s, after the establishment of 
the PRC, China seemed poised to displace the United States as a site of hope for democracy, 
modernity, and the peaceful overcoming of tradition.  Enthusiasm about worker circles and grass-
                                                






roots democracy during this period was inseparable from imagining the ongoing social revolution in 
China and its “spirit of self-criticism.” 
 These developments partly coincided with the re-launch of the Institute for the Science of 
Thought’s journal under a different title and publisher.  In 1950 the journal Science of Thought went on 
hiatus because of financial difficulties.  In the early fifties, the Institute focused on book projects and 
publishing studies of the “Philosophy of Ordinary People” in the large-circulation general magazine 
Chûô kôron.  In 1953, the group found a publisher, Kenminsha, willing to publish the journal under a 
different, less academic-sounding title Me (or Sprouts). In line with its new “grass-roots” title, the 
Institute renewed its efforts to forge connections with non-academic groups, while its former 
emphasis on translating and reviewing Anglo-American social scientific and pragmatist writings 
faded into the background.   
As with the journal’s earlier publisher Senkusha, descended from Tsurumi Yûsuke’s wartime 
research organ The Pacific Association, Kenminsha’s history was intertwined with Japan’s transition 
from wartime to postwar regime.  Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa ordered its creation in 1945 as an 
organization to assist repatriated veterans and government officials from former colonies and 
occupied territories after fighting ceased. US Occupation officials severed the organization’s links 
with the now defunct Imperial Navy, and it was reorganized as a private corporation that continued 
to provide financial assistance and employment to returnees.  The head of the company, former 
naval accounting officer Takahashi Hajime, became a member of the peace and anti-nuclear 
movements after the war, and in 1952, amidst worries that Japan was heading toward rearmament 
with the formation of a national security force, he published the pacifist essay How to Think About the 
Militarization Problem through Kenminsha.  In this way, Takahashi came into contact with Tsurumi 






Science of Thought after showing him a few issues of the discontinued Senkusha version.297  The 
first issue in 1953 included an article on applying the “life-writing” technique of Yamabiko gakkô to 
adult circle associations, and a report from China by the social psychologist Minami Hiroshi, who 
had returned from a controversial trip to Beijing. 
Originating from the naval bureaucracy, the publisher Kenminsha (健民社) was named after 
a slogan propagated by Wang Jingwei, head of the Japanese-supported collaborationist government 
in wartime China: “Build up the people (kenmin, or jianmin in Chinese), build up the nation, and 
build up Asia.”298  The publisher’s association with China’s “Benedict Arnold” might have seemed 
ironic given the contents of the first issue of Me, which featured on its inside cover a photo of 
Science of Thought member and US-educated social psychologist Minami Hiroshi delivering 
remarks at the 1952 Beijing Peace Conference in the People’s Republic of China, a photo that  
signaled the new interest in developments underway in Asia.   
Minami’s visit occurred barely a year after the PRC had been excluded from the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty which officially ended the US Occupation.  His visa-less visit to China after 
attending the UNESCO-sponsored International Conference of Psychology in Paris was 
controversial, prompting discussions in the Diet over the legality of Minami’s actions and a flurry of 
newspaper articles on his homecoming at Haneda Airport in Tokyo, where he was greeted by 
“bouquets, red flags, and anti-war banners wielded by 150 students and other parties interested in 
China.”299 
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Figure 4.3, Minami Hiroshi at the Beijing Peace Conference, published in Me, Jan. 1953 
 
The article accompanying the photo, titled simply “Beijing,” was the transcription of a 
speech Minami had given at the Institute on his experience in China. The speech suggested that the 
idealistic hopes directed toward America before McCarthyism and the 1950 Red Purge in Japan 
might find a congenial home in China.  After visiting engineering departments at Qinghua University, 
Minami was impressed by the “projects to transform nature,” that “fused learning with production” 
in a way that was reminiscent of the New Deal’s TVA project, executed on an even larger national, 
rather than regional, scale.300   
For Science of Thought, TVA was a symbol of America’s success at combining democracy 
with egalitarian economics, owing in part to the exposure of books such as David Lillienthal’s TVA: 
Democracy on the March in journals like Science of Thought.301  Minami’s comparison was symptomatic of 
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301 Science of Thought founder Tsuru Shigeto was one of the main proponents of TVA in early 
postwar Japan.  See for example Tsuru Shigeto, “TVA to sono shidôsha,” Sekai, (Jul. 1947).  
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a tendency among progressives in the early fifties to substitute America for China as the fount of 
their hope for a modern, democratic future.  This shift was encouraged by former American 
supporters of the New Deal like Edgar Snow, whose Red Star Over China became one of the primary 
sources of information on China during a period when, with the exception of exceptional visitors 
like Minami, travel to the country was restricted.302 Whether or not they supported Communism, 
Americans like Pearl Buck, Agnes Smedley, and Jack Belden encouraged enthusiasm for homegrown  
“coolie democracy” in China, phenomena which were imagined to transcend the political aims of 
the intellectuals associated with the Communist party leadership.303  The writings of Mao, the latest 
example of “imported thought” (輸入思想) to join the ranks of Marx and Dewey, were only 
interesting insofar as they revealed details of what appeared to be a trial-and-error, indigenous 
attempt at village revolution.304   
Minami was in a unique position to make the comparison between Mao’s China and 
Roosevelt’s America since he was one of the few Japanese intellectuals with experience in both 
countries.  After graduating from the Kyoto University department of philosophy, he entered 
                                                                                                                                                       
jikken,” Shisô no kagaku (Mar. 1948). 
302 Red Star Over China was originally published in English in 1937 and translated into Japanese in 
1952, but Snow’s writings had been introduced to Japanese audiences earlier.  Tsurumi Kazuko 
wrote an article about his view of China in 1948: Tsurumi Kazuko, “Edogaa sunô no chûgokuron,” 
in Ajia no shin chûgoku-kan, edited by Hirano Yoshitarô, (Tokyo: Chôryûsha, 1948). For more on 
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graduate school in psychology at Cornell University in 1940, a decision that he later recalled was 
motivated by a desire to bridge the gap between philosophy and the empirical sciences. Unlike many 
of his associates at Science of Thought, he refused to return to Japan when war broke out in 1941, 
choosing instead to finish his requirement for the Ph. D. in 1943.  As an “enemy alien” he was 
barred from leaving the US until 1947.  During that time, he coauthored a technical paper with his 
advisor Karl Dallenbach, “The Effect of Activity upon Learning and Retention in the Cockroach.”  
When he was able to return to Japan in 1947, he quickly became an authority on American social 
scientific methods and on American society more generally.   
 Minami was acutely conscious of polarized views of the People’s Republic.  In the last 
section of the article subtitled – in a possible reference to the title of the journal – “Sprouts of the 
East,” he asserted that he was not being asked to conduct any propaganda work on behalf of China. 
Among the things I have said, one thing that I think bears repeated emphasis is that, when I 
saw various things in China, the attitude of the people there was not something like, “return 
to Japan and praise China,” or “just look at the good points and do propaganda for China,” 
or, “just show them the good things, but the inconvenient things will put us in a fix,” but 
rather to show anything.  Then they went further and requested criticism.  They don’t say 
that everything the Chinese government is doing is good or correct.  Their revolution is in its 
third year; until 49 they were fighting a civil war.  Since construction has just begun, there 
must be places where it is inadequate, mistaken, or has gone too far, so they want foreign 
friends to take a look at these bad points and point them out.305 
 
 Minami then cited an example of visiting a nursery “with extremely good equipment,” but 
expressing his concern that inadequate records were being kept of the results of this “new collective 
education” of children.  Without empirical records it would not be possible to compare this child-
rearing method with other methods or “create a system that could be applied elsewhere.”  When he 
                                                






told officials about this, they “listened happily and demanded I write down my observations.”306 
Minami concluded that, 
Rather than something like great architecture, I felt that the spirit of self-criticism that seeks 
evaluation from elsewhere was thoroughgoing, and because of that feeling, I think that 
China’s future has great prospects.307 
 
 If “workmanlike-ism” (ワリキリ主義), a practical attitude that ignored factional differences 
in the interest of cooperation and empirical observation, was a central component of Science of 
Thought’s early praise of America, then a thoroughgoing “spirit of self-criticism” summed up the 
appeal of China.  These two qualities were far from mutually exclusive, but the emphasis differed.  
The can-do quality ascribed to America was juxtaposed to what was seen as the narcissism of petty 
differences that divided Japanese scholars from one another and from the public during the prewar 
heyday of self-cultivation (kyôyô).  The appeal of the second was in part a response to what was 
perceived on the Left as the haughtiness of Cold War America as “leader of the free world” and also, 
by association, Japanese intellectuals who attempted to “enlighten” the public about democracy and 
freedom since the beginning of the Occupation.  It was in part a return to subjective self-reflection 
prompted by criticism that intellectuals had treated the masses as objects of exhortation or social 
scientific analysis, thus ignoring the continued existence of cultural barriers that inhibited attempts 
to universalize intellectual production among people of different social backgrounds.308 
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Tsurumi Kazuko in Nakatsugawa 
The same year of Minami’s visit, Science of Thought founder Tsurumi Kazuko engaged in her 
own self-criticism in connection with her new involvement in the life-writing and circle movements.  
In a speech delievered in the town of Nakatsuagawa in rural Gifu Prefecture, she criticized her 
earlier social scientific work and committed herself to more direct forms of engagement with 
workers and non-intellectuals. 
This marked another change of course in a varied intellectual career.  At the end of the 
thirties, Tsurumi Kazuko accompanied her brother Shunsuke to the United States.  While he studied 
with pragmatists and logical empiricists at Harvard, she studied philosophy at Vassar College and 
then Columbia University, writing a B.A. thesis critical of John Dewey under the supervision of the 
Marxian humanist Vernon Venable.309  After returning to Japan with her brother and future Science of 
Thought colleagues Tsuru Shigeto and Takeda Kiyoko in 1941, she worked for her father’s wartime 
research organ the Pacific Association, for which she contributed articles to the edited volume 
Research on the American National Character that discussed American weaknesses, including “the lack of 
rational judgment” and naive “faith in the homogeneity of the masses,” which Tsurumi derived from 
the critical writings of John Dewey.310  During this time, Tsurumi made contacts with many of the 
thinkers who would collaborate in founding Science of Thought after the war, including the political 
historian Maruyama Masao and the physicist Taketani Mitsuo.   
After founding Science of Thought, she wrote reviews for the journal and participated in the 
group’s effort to study the “Philosophy of Ordinary People,” but her brother Tsurumi Shunsuke 
claimed that she directed most of her energy to the Association of Democratic Scientists, a popular 
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front organization with closer links to the Communist Party and the militant labor movement than 
Science of Thought or the Institute.  By the early fifties, she had become frustrated by her inability to 
“connect with the labor movement.”311  
After coming in contact with Yamabiko gakkô and the Life-writing Movement, she repudiated 
her earlier sociological approach to studying the lives of ordinary people.  For Tsurumi, the book 
provided an ideal model for the way progressive intellectuals ought to interact with and learn from 
the groups they hoped to influence during the period of transition to democracy.   Her association 
with the Life-writing Movement began in August of 1952, when Tsurumi delivered a speech at the 
first National Composition Education Conference (作文教育全国会議) in rural Nakatsugawa, 
Gifu-prefecture.  Her impressions were published in an essay “Learning from Life-Writing 
Education” in the literary magazine Tosho in October of that same year.312  The essay opened on a 
note of harsh self-criticism, with Tsurumi describing the present as “unbearable” due to feeling that, 
“everything I have done, thought, and wrote up until now sickens me, and I have been terribly 
mistaken somewhere fundamental...”313 She explained her mistake with reference to what her 
brother Tsurumi Shunsuke called the “heterological” way of thinking among Japanese intellectuals, 
which she explained as follows: 
When scholars emphasize that “the Japanese people” need to be “enlightened,” 
“modernized,” or “democratized”, they are not conscious of themselves as members of “the 
Japanese people.”  He thus pointed out that the fact they have been engaged in a discussion 
in which they themselves are out of the bounds of “enlightenment,” “modernization,” and 
“democratization,” is the fundamental weakness of Japanese thought since the Meiji period.  
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In other words, when Japanese scholars talk about “Japan” or the “Japanese” it as if they 
were speaking of a group that did not include them.314 
 
She explained that intellectuals derived this heterological habit from a pattern in Japan’s modern 
history, whereby “bureaucrats stood apart from the people, and in a place substantially above them, 
and commanded Japan’s ‘industrialization.’”   
 Tsurumi wrote that the first time she felt this general observation about Japanese 
intellectuals applied to her own work was after reading Muchaku Seikyô’s Yamabiko gakkô and 
Kokubun Ichitarô’s account of the life-writing movement, Atarashii tsuzurikata kyôshitsu (A New 
Writing Classroom).  She claimed to have been surprised to learn that there existed a movement 
spreading “from the grass-roots” that adopted a way of thinking that was radically different from the 
heterological, “bureaucratic-style” of the past.   
This was in part a repudiation of Tsurumi’s own work in connection with the Institute for 
the Science of Thought’s project to study the “Philosophy of Ordinary People.”  Two years before, 
she accompanied  the legal sociologist Kawashima Takeyoshi during his attitude survey of villagers 
in Tsurugawa.  This kind of field-survey research compared now unfavorably with the work of life-
writing educators.  She wrote: 
The results of ‘objective’ ‘field surveys’ undertaken by third-party scholars are either black or 
white, whereas the life-writing education that treats daily life in the same rural villages or big 
cities is light in the midst of darkness.  This is not to deny the value of the scholar’s ‘field-
surveys’… Yet I think that if we suppose that, both the scholar doing the survey and the 
surveyed village undergo no change at all through the act of surveying, then there is 
something depressing about that.315 
 
According to Tsurumi, life-writing was a way of handling problems that concerned a group 
one actually was, or became, a member of.  Yet the precise nature of belonging or not-belonging to 
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a group was ambiguous.  In her text, the shift from heterological intellectuals who speak about 
enlightening “the Japanese people” to life-writing educators was accompanied by a shift in scale, 
from the nation to the classroom.  Was it ever possible to speak about “the Japanese people” as a 
group (集団) one belonged to at the level of lived experience?  While the question of national 
belonging was left unresolved, the emphasis in Tsurumi’s essay and the life-writing movement as a 
whole was squarely upon the small groups of classrooms and circles. 
 
Self-Reconstruction and China 
In her speech Tsurumi said the conversational and cooperative approach characteristic of 
the life-writing classroom would develop into an educational method that “effected the mutual self-
reconstruction (自己改造) of both teachers and students.” 316 This phrase was also used in reference 
to the reform of intellectuals in the People’s Republic of China.  For example, Minami referred to 
the idea of “human reconstruction” or “human reform” in his account of his visit to Beijing, 
describing it as the official objective of non-coercive, slow-moving campaigns to eliminate social and 
class differences, including the fact that professors wore Western-style suits.317 Takeuchi Yoshimi, a 
scholar and translator of Chinese literature who participated in the Insistute for the Science of 
Thought with Tsurumi, published an article entitled “The Self-Reconstruction of the Chinese 
Intellectual” a month before Tsurumi visited educators in Nakatsugawa.318 Tsurumi, in a book she 
wrote on Pearl Buck, later used the phrase in a similar context to describe the activities of Chinese 
authors during the civil war. 
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The circulation of a term like “self-reconstruction” shows that the intellectual reception of 
Yamabiko gakkô and life-writing was entwined with the perception of reforms and thought 
campaigns underway in “New China.”  It was thought that the apparent success of what was 
perceived as a bottom-up village revolution in China and Tao Xingzhi’s “Commoner Education 
Movement” boded well for the life-writing movement in Japan.  In 1953, Takeuchi Yoshimi 
juxtaposed the life-writing educational movement with progressive education in China, writing that 
both were part of a “long-term revolutionary project” that was predicated on the creation of a “new 
human type.”319  More broadly, the recurring contrast in Takeuchi’s work between the spontaneity 
(自発性) of the Chinese revolution and the superficial “honor student culture” (優等生文化) of 
Japan could easily be used to describe the antagonistic relationship between grass-roots life-writing 
educators, who stressed cooperation, and the hierarchical authority embodied by the Ministry of 
Education. 
The similarity of local educational movements in China and Japan that focused on the 
countryside and grass-roots modernization was taken as evidence of their grounding in universal 
values of equality, autonomy, and reason.  The methods of these movements formed a contrast with 
the efforts to “import” modern thought from abroad and force a top-down model of enlightenment 
on the people.320 
Takeuchi explained that self-reconstruction was a means of overcoming intellectual divisions 
in the aftermath of World War Two and the Chinese Civil War between “earlier liberated regions” 
(旧解放区) that had been under Communist-control (centered at Yan’an) and “newly liberated 
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regions” (新解放区) that had been controlled first by the Japanese and then nationalists (centered 
upon Beijing and Tianjin).321  He explained its methods as follows 
Circles called “small study groups” were organized in every university, school, bureau, and 
workplace.  First, a group plan of study is first discussed within the circle, and then, besides 
individually reading through texts of Marxist-Leninist or Mao Zedong thought in succession, 
round-table discussions, group study, or criticism sessions called “collective debates” (集体
討論会) are held, and collective meetings that involve the whole office or school take place. 
 
Simply put, this is a movement of mutual confession (うちあけあい運動), in which one 
frankly confesses the mistakes one has made in the past and the feelings one has arrived at 
before engaging in mutual criticism.  Further, people go to farms and factories during study 
time, where they try to extract lessons from reality.322 
 
“Self-reconstruction” was often paired with “thought reconstruction” (思想改造), as in the 
ongoing “Thought Reconstruction Campaign” (思想改造運動) in China in the early fifties.  
Takeuchi introduced this movement to Japanese readers in 1953 as a grass-roots movement for the 
intellectual reform of university students and professors.  
Classes still exist and interests still sometimes mutually conflict, but accommodation is 
sought purely by means of education and conversation.  For that reason, a permanent 
intellectual movement (思想運動) is unfolding on a national scale, the Thought 
Reconstruction Campaign.  Narrowly defined, the campaign refers to the spontaneous re-
education movement in the preexisting intellectual class. 
 
This movement first occurred at the end of 1949 among groups of students in Beijing 
centered upon Qinghua University. It eventually spread through the whole country, and 
came to include teachers and intellectuals more generally. 
 
In the autumn of 1951, university professors were the subjects of a thought reconstruction 
campaign unfolding in the region of Beijing and Tianjin.  In one respect, this was a campaign 
to make explicit the responsibilities of teachers in the new university system.  It was meant 
to define the content of university reorganization in preparation for industrial construction.  
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Yet it also gradually brought to light the petit-bourgeois thinking firmly embedded within the 
psychology of professors, as well as the colonial disposition to worship American and 
European scholarship while slighting the national traditions of one’s own country…323 
 
In positing a grass-roots ideal for Japanese thinkers to aspire to, Takeuchi tended to 
exaggerate the non-coercive spontaneity of the movement. 324  Still, the conflict Takeuchi ascribed to 
this campaign, pitting cosmopolitan, urban intellectuals influenced by the Deweyean pragmatism of 
Hu Shih against the communal, rural mindset of Yan’an, hit close to home for the American-
educated intellectuals associated with Science of Thought.325  Tsurumi herself was far from isolated from 
events involving the newly established PRC.  In 1949, she wrote an article on dormitory life among 
women textile workers in China, and one of her earliest books brought up the problem of the “self-
reconstruction” of Chinese intellectuals in order to expose the limitations of their counterparts in 
Japan.   
In 1951, the same year Tsurumi Kazuko came into direct contact with the Life-Writing at an 
educators’ conference in Nakatsugawa, she began writing a book on the China-born American 
author Pearl Buck, which was serialized in part in the woman’s magazine Shinjoen (新女苑).  
Tsurumi had met Buck in America during a trip with her father and brother before she entered 
Vassar.  In 1938, the year Buck received the Nobel Prize for literature; she presented Tsurumi with 
copies of The Good Earth and This Proud Heart.  The latter included a note from Buck dated “Dec. 4, 
1938” and signed, “For Kazuko Tsurumi, with the hope that this may throw some light on our 
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discussion.”326  She continued to correspond sporadically with Buck after the war, writing a letter to 
request the author’s support of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan. 
Pearl Buck, Tsurumi’s first book after an early collection of poetry, was not intended as a 
work of literary criticism but is an attempt to make sense of the triangular relationship among China, 
Japan, and the US through a reading of Buck and contemporary Chinese authors.  Tsurumi framed 
this as an intensely personal task: 
I do not intend to theorize about the literary value of Pearl Buck’s work in this book.  That 
is a task beyond my ability.  It would make more sense to say that I want to pass through (通
過) Pearl Buck in order to shed light on my own problems - perhaps obsessions would be a 
better word.  While being dragged along by these obsessions, I grappled with this book in 
the faint hope that, through Pearl Buck, I could maybe end up in a more certain place than 
before.327  
 
The Vassar-educated Tsurumi, raised in a bilingual household, viewed Buck as a kind of 
kindred spirit, a woman whose life also fell somewhere between two national and cultural worlds.328  
She was particularly impressed with Buck’s relentless criticism of racism in the United States.  Rather 
than inculcating a sense of superiority toward “Chinese backwardness”, Buck’s experience in China 
seemed to have sharpened her critical insight into American race relations and inequality.  Tsurumi 
hoped to draw on her experiences with discrimination in America in the same way - as a source of 
critical insight into the society in which she had been raised. 
Tsurumi was by no means uncritical of Buck’s work.  Yet the more she identified with Buck, 
the more she expressed a kind of ambivalence toward her own position as an intellectual.  Tsurumi’s 
attempt to discover the limitations of Buck’s literary representation of modern Chinese society was a 
self-conscious attempt to discover and move beyond her own limitations as an American-educated 
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intellectual in postwar Japan.  She considered her reflections on Pearl Buck to be part of her own 
“self-reconstruction,” a process that also included her involvement with the Life-Writing and Life-
Documentary Movements.  She prefaced her criticism of Buck with, “Those who criticize others 
must be responsible for the necessary reflection of that criticism onto themselves.”329  
In chapter 3, Tsurumi drew on translated memoirs from the Chinese “Thought 
Reconstruction Campaign” (思想改造運動) to criticize Pearl Buck’s representation of intellectuals 
and the masses in her 1949 novel Kinfolk. This novel features an American-educated Chinese 
educator named James who Buck modeled on one of the founders of the prewar rural “Commoner 
Education Movement,” (平民教育運動) Y. C. James Yen.  James returns to China from America 
and takes up residence as a teacher in a rural village.  He establishes a link to peasants in the 
community through a powerful local family.  Tsurumi likens James’ relationship to the community 
to that of social scientists conducting surveys of village life, the same target of criticism in her essay 
about encountering the Life-Writing Movement in Nakatsugawa.  
The bond between intellectuals and the masses represented by James in Kinfolk, and the self-
reconstructive way of life of Chinese intellectuals engaged in rural reforms is fundamentally 
different. 
 
The first difference pertains to the method of approaching the masses. [In James’ case], the 
method was to go through the boss (ボスのルート), using the ruling power in order to get 
to the masses… 
 
When villages and factories are tightly in the grip of the old interests, as in the case of farm 
and factory surveys that take place in Japan, one is less likely in danger of being expelled if 
one goes through the bosses.  This is sometimes more effective, but the constraints are also 
great.  After liberation, when intellectuals, members of an organized task force (工作隊) 
engaged in land reform,  entered the village, from the start they entered, at least in appearance, 
on the side of the masses who opposed the old interests, including landowners, warlords, 
                                                









Tsurumi characterized James’ activites in a way that echoed ongoing criticism of the 
progressive Commoner Education Movement in China. This movement, which developed in parallel 
to the life-writing movement in its early days, was started in the 1920s by two students of John 
Dewey, Tao Xingzhi and James Yan. It began as a rural literacy campaign and developed into a 
broader movement that aimed at overcoming the separation of schoolwork (intellectual labor) from 
the community at large (manual labor).  This objective was summed up by Tao as the “school-
ification (学校化) of society” - an inversion of Dewey’s call for the “socialization of the school”.  
An illustration of this logic can be seen in Tao’s decision to change his pen name.  He is said to have 
inverted the characters in Zhixing (知行, lit: know-act) to Xingzhi (行知, lit: act-know) on the basis 
of a new understanding of the primacy of action in education.  The life-writing educator Kokubun 
Ichitarô was well aware of Tao’s activities.  While engaging in propaganda activities on behalf of the 
Japanese army in Guangdong during the war, Kokubun discovered Tao’s work and helped introduce 
him to Japanese audiences.331 
Yet by the 1950s, Deweyean reformers like Tao Xingzhi, Yan Yangchu, as well as Hu Shih 
seemed old-fashioned in the eyes of more radical activists and students inspired by the success of 
Mao’s revolution.  These radical reformers were associated with the anti-bourgeois “Thought 
Reconstruction Study Campaign.” Though often hostile to the progressive educators associated with 
John Dewey, the campaign formed the most immediate reference point for intellectuals like Tsurumi 
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and Takeuchi, who were concerned with the problem of personal “self-reconstruction” during the 
fifties.  Takeuchi, based on his assessment of Hu Shih, saw the conflict between members of the 
earlier “Commoner Education Movement” and the “Thought Reconstruction Study Campaign” as 
the inevitable outcome of the logic of Deweyean social criticism.332 Takeuchi implied that the 
ultimate vindication of Hu Shih’s pragmatism could be seen in the harsh criticism he suffered in the 
hands of his Communist critics. 
Tsurumi’s engagement with circles and the life-writing movement was part of her struggle to 
reconcile pragmatism and Marxist determinism.  In 1953, at the same time Tsurumi was participating 
in circles in Yokkaichi and Tokyo, she was also involved in a collaborative study of advice columns 
in the popular media with other members of Science of Thought.  The group struggled with 
problems of historical agency that repeatedly surfaced in discussions about the circle movement. In 
an introduction to the group study, Kazuko’s brother Shunsuke cited the French philosopher Sartre 
and the American psychologist Carl Rogers as pessimistic and optimistic approaches to the study of 
advice.333  For Sartre, the problem was that the person seeking advice could seem to have already 
made up his mind through the very act of seeking advice.  Realistically speaking, asking for advice 
was only another way of making a predetermined decision. 
You may say, "Well, he went to see a professor for advice." But if you consult a priest, for 
instance, it's you who has chosen to consult him, and you already know in your heart, more 
or less, what advice he is likely to give. In other words, to choose one's adviser is only 
another way to commit oneself.  This is demonstrated by the fact that, if you are Christian, 
you will say "consult a priest."  But there are collaborating priests, temporizing priests, and 
priests connected to the Resistance: which do you choose?334 
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Carl Rogers on the other hand believed in the power of advice that came closer to the ideal of self-
transformation, namely, “client-centered therapy” that required the therapist to enter into an 
egalitarian relationship “as a co-worker” with the patient.335   
Between these two poles, Tsurumi tried to express the tension between the need to, on one 
hand, retain a realistic view of the possibilities available within the structure of capitalist society and, 
on the other, the desire to provide some kind of practical guidance or even therapeutic relief through a 
synthesis of perspectives she ascribed to Marx and Dewey.  Among the members of Science of 
Thought, she was always among the most critical of Dewey for what she saw as “optimistic” 
distortions in his work caused by inattention to Marxist issues of class, capitalism, and history. Yet 
she increasingly saw the two thinkers as capable of supplementing each other. She believed Marx 
was necessary to rectify pragmatism’s historical deficit, but Dewey’s belief in the possibility of new, 
unpredictable collisions and combinations among actors and social structures could help Marx think 
about the future. 
The problem for Tsurumi, and a central problem for Science of Thought, was that an 
analysis of capitalism seemed too far removed from, and could even delay, the leap to revolutionary 
praxis, causing Marxists to vacillate between dogmatic commitment and pessimistic resignation. The 
Deweyean emphasis on habit was a potential mediator between theory and praxis. Yet it was 
necessary at least temporarily to bracket the question of the precise relationship between habit and 
the ultimate success of the revolution; otherwise one would relegate vast swathes of everyday 
concern to the dictates of common sense.   
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The Yokkaichi Circle 
While in Nakatsugawa, Tsurumi met Sawai Yoshirô, the organizer of what became the 
“Documenting Daily Life Club” (生活を記録する会) in a predominantly female textile workers 
union branch at a Tôa Wool Spinning and Weaving Company’s factory outside Yokkaichi, about 15 
miles from Nagoya.  The club, mostly composed of young unmarried textile workers, had recently 
put together a mimeographed collection of writings on everyday life in their native poverty-stricken 
villages under the title My House.  They were inspired by Yamabiko gakkô as well as by the activities of 
a writing circle at a neighboring textile factory called “The Bamboo Sprout Club” (竹の子会).336  
Sawai sent the essay collection to Muchaku Seikyô and other intellectuals, soliciting their advice, and 
Tsurumi saw a copy of it sometime in the summer of 1952 before meeting Sawai, who invited her to 
visit the group in Yokkaichi. 
This encounter was the start of a chain of events that led to Tsurumi becoming one of the 
most prominent intellectual spokespersons for the movement to get workers to produce naturalistic 
accounts of their daily life, adopting as a slogan Muchaku Seikyô’s advice to students to simply 
“write things as they are” (ありのままに書く) .  She participated in the writing circle in Yokkaichi 
for two years and co-edited a collection of writings by the group (The History of Mothers) that became 
one of the most widely read and commented upon works of “circle literature” (prolonging the 
debate over whether life-writing was really literature or not).  Playwright Hirowatari Tsunetoshi 
adapted the book and the story of its production into an award-winning play Daughters Who Weave 
Tomorrow in 1957.  Inspired by the Yokkaichi group, Tsurumi started her own writing circle in Tokyo, 
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“The Daily Life Writing Club,” (生活をつづる会) that included working women, housewives, and 
a few husbands, out of which the edited volume Housewives Clutching Pencils appeared in 1954. 
The “Documenting Daily Life Club” in Yokkaichi emerged out of a cultural association or 
“circle” in the factory union led by Sawai.  As a labor organizer, Sawai originally focused on raising 
the class-consciousness of employees through a political newsletter in the factory, but he felt that the 
militant language of the labor movement was an ineffective means of reaching most of the workers.  
He decided to found a chorus group where workers could socialize and hopefully discover their 
common interests in a more relaxed setting. 
Like critics who debated the autonomy of the circle movement from mass-culture, union 
officials were ambivalent about Sawai’s association.  Around the time of its formation, one official 
criticized it for acting like a “second union” (第二組合), a term that referred to new company 
unions beholden to management, which competed with trade unions.  In the early 1950s, the 
majority of Japanese workers belonged to trade unions that adopted an antagonistic stance toward 
management. Many of these unions were affiliated with the national union confederation Sôhyô, 
whose leaders believed socialism could be achieved in Japan “from the bottom-up” through 
workplace activism and strikes.337  Yet the 1950s was a time of intense clashes between unions and 
management, and union leaders were increasingly worried about being supplanted by company 
unions, a fear that was realized in the 1960s with the triumph of unions and management culture.338  
Sawai thus had to overcome the suspicions that his circle was antagonistic to union interests. 
He drew up a mission statement that declared that the “Yokkaichi Cultural Circle” was formed in 
order to “awaken correct class consciousness,” and to “smash reactionary bourgeois culture while 
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establishing a democratic culture that elevates the value and rights of working people.”339  With an 
idea of bourgeois culture in mind, Sawai steered the choir group away from singing popular songs 
from the radio and films.340   
However, in a short history of the group written in 1954, he commented that the original 
mission statement’s talk of raising consciousness and smashing bourgeois culture was more an 
exaggerated plea for the relevance of the group to the labor movement than an accurate description 
of the members’ activities.341 Yet he also argued that it was through seemingly frivolous group 
activities, such as singing songs familiar to the workers from elementary school, that members began 
forming the bonds of friendship necessary for the circle’s later iteration as a writing collective, one 
that involved the frank sharing of details about private life.  Reaching the point where workers were 
able and willing to write about their daily life was important not because it allowed the group to 
write and publish autobiographical literature, but because it helped secure the autonomy of the circle.  
Writing provided an object of group discussion and criticism that could lead to further progress, a 
way to track the evolution of the workers’ own thinking over time, and an alternative to the 
distractions of popular culture,  
Tsurumi wrote in her afterword that Sawai’s history of the circle’s evolution from chorus 
group to reading and life-writing circle revealed a theory of circle building that stressed the gradual 
transformation of the individual.  Yokkaichi’s success could conceivably be reproduced throughout 
Japan, realizing a kind of active, participatory democracy at the level of small, self-governed, 
productive groups.  
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She recalled that her first meeting with the group was awkward, with both parties, perhaps 
self-conscious about their disparate social backgrounds, reluctant to share their feelings.  In the 
evening however she followed the group to a field near a shrine where they sang songs, danced, and 
put on an impromptu performance of an operetta based on the story of Little Red Riding Hood.  
Afterwards exhausted from all the activities, the women let loose their anxieties and troubles in an 
“outpouring” of speech.  It was at this moment that Tsurumi first felt she had been included among 
the circle of friends.342 
 According to Tsurumi, the problematic of friendship was about more than overcoming the 
barrier separating an urban, American-educated intellectual like herself from rural woman textile 
workers.  Solidaristic friendship of the kind she encountered in the circle seemed unusual among 
workers in general. Communication was difficult among women who came from villages in different 
regions of the country and spoke local dialects of Japanese.  Yet they could still participate in chorus 
and dance activities even if they were mostly illiterate, ideally forming lasting bonds of friendship 
with members of the circle.  Tsurumi remembered being told by one of the members during her 
visit, “The best way to make friends is to first of all start a drama or chorus circle.  That way, even 
people who can’t write can join.  Print out copies of the song and have each person give a copy to 
three people, inviting them to the next chorus session.  Making a circle strong means including even 
one more person than last time.”343   
 Besides communication difficulties, Tsurumi saw the factory as a place that encouraged 
competition for advancement and salary increases, and the workers’ collective living quarters as a 
site of mutual surveillance.344 According to Tsurumi, since most of the workers came from poor 
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farming families and had worked grueling hours at home before arriving in Yokkaichi, they were less 
motivated than workers elsewhere to push for higher wages and better working conditions.  No 
matter how bad it got, they felt, “it was easier than being at home,” and “working just eight hours a 
day is too cushy.”  
This touched upon a long-standing dilemma faced by activists concerned with marginalized 
elements of the labor movement (particularly women) and attracted to Yamabiko gakkô’s example of 
rural educational and community reform.  Namely, were stronger unions and substantial 
improvements in working conditions impossible without first improving educational and economic 
conditions in the countryside where many workers came from?  In the first half of the 1950s, this 
question, which was heatedly discussed in the context of the success of Mao’s rural-based strategy in 
China and the ongoing (and ultimately unsuccessful) activities of a Japanese Communist Party 
faction engaged in a violent attempt to unleash armed struggle in the countryside.  Perhaps 
influenced in part by her accounts of a peaceful “rural revolution” underway in China, the project 
Tsurumi actively participated at Yokkaichi centered upon the textile worker’s villages of origin as a 
place to apply lessons learned in the factory circle in the cause of rural reform. 
Tsurumi remarked that most of the workers dreamed of escaping from their economic lot by 
marrying a white-collar worker in a modern “love marriage,” rather than returning home and 
marrying a farmer chosen by their parents.  This dream, circulated in the popular media, both 
undercut their solidarity with other workers and distracted them from improving conditions in the 
factory.345  Remaining single and employed was rarely mentioned as a viable possibility, and the 
woman’s movement in Japan during the early fifties remained committed to motherhood as the path 
to female political and social power.346  
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Given these circumstances, members of the “Documenting Daily Life Circle” tried to turn 
the seeming inevitability of returning home and marrying a farmer into an opportunity for a new 
writing project oriented toward the future improvement of their communities.  Sawai explained their 
situation as follows, “… no matter how much they hated the idea of returning home to a farming 
village and marrying someone, in a workplace in which women outnumbered men nine to one, they 
seemed to have no other choice, but if they wanted to improve their villages they had to toughen 
up.”347  Their first collection of writings, My House, was full of descriptions of the rural poverty the 
women had grown up surrounded with and were reluctant to return to.  One of the members who 
traveled to the conference in Nakatsugawa, Hara Toyoko, spoke with Imai Yojirô, an educator who 
was one of the leaders of the life-writing movement.  Imai praised the work but said it was too much 
about hardships of the past, and that they ought to write more about their daily experiences as 
workers in the present.348  Yet the members of the group believed they would not remain workers 
forever.  In response to Imai’s criticism and the unpalatable prospect of returning to the village, 
marrying, and having children, the group began a project to write and think about how they could at 
least learn from and improve upon the situation their own mothers had faced in anticipation of their 
own return.349   
Tsurumi participated in this project, editing the writings with the playwright Kinoshita Junji 
as The History of Mothers.  Tsurumi remained unmarried and childless throughout her life, an unusual 
choice frequently remarked upon in profiles of her in women’s magazines. In an interview from this 
period of her life in 1955, she seemed somewhat ambivalent about her independent lifestyle.  Living 
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with her wealthy family during the war, she said that she “flew out of her parents house” in 1945 
and began living alone, but that it somehow seemed unreal, as if she were a child pretending to be an 
adult.  She contrasted this lifestyle with the independent mindset of the female textile workers she 
had met, who lived far from home at the factory out of an obligation to their family.  She also 
suggested that she had come to understand these women better after moving back in with her 
parents in order to take care of her ailing mother.350  Unease about the difference between her own 
progressive lifestyle and that of the women she sought to connect with seemed a motive for her to 
travel to Nakatsugawa, regret her social scientific studies of working women, and join the circle in 
Yokkaichi in the first place. 
 In a reading group with Tsurumi, the textile workers read Zhao Shuli’s Wedding Registry (結婚
登記) in Japanese translation, a novel about active married life in a village community in the PRC.  
When members of the circle compared opportunities for women purportedly available in China with 
those in Japan, they seemed dismayed at the gap.   Sawai commented that the only conclusion was 
that, “In China you can do things like that, but here in Japan that’s impossible.”351 
More productive was reading the Marxist medieval historian Ishimoda Shô’s collection of 
writings The Discovery of History and the Nation.  An essay included in Ishimoda’s book, “A Letter 
about Mothers,” was one of the main inspirations for the group’s project on motherhood, and it was 
perhaps both a consolation and encouragement in consideration of the workers’ likely fate after life 
in the factory. The essay was addressed to an anonymous intellectual with a “reactionary” mother.  
Ishimoda began his epistolary response by decrying historians’ neglect of the experience of mothers, 
a neglect that appeared symptomatic of the absence of ordinary people, the constituents of the 
nation, in most historical accounts.  He cited as an example the fact that, while biographers of the 
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socialist martyr Kôtoku Shusui discussed the guilt the man experienced when he neglected his 
mother in order to participate in radical politics, they never bothered to seriously investigate her and 
the way she might have felt.  By extension, the central, yet often hidden, role of mothers 
corresponded to what Ishimoda perceived as a centuries-long struggle waged by the Japanese masses 
against various forms of oppression by the ruling classes that had also been neglected. 
 For Ishimoda, this was not simply a gap in the historical record that needed to be empirically 
filled in the interest of completeness.  He believed that insight into the experience of mothers and 
motherhood would deepen male intellectuals’ empathetic understanding of struggles for national 
independence, including Japan’s struggle for independence from what Ishimoda and most Marxists 
believed was a semi-colonial relationship with the United States.  He approvingly cited an example in 
Lu Xun’s attempt to express his sorrow over the death of the author Rou Shi, a former student of 
his who was secretly executed in 1931 by foreign police in the concession of Shanghai, in terms of a 
mother’s loss of her son.	  
This kind of empathetic understanding was important in part because the struggle for 
national independence required intellectuals, in order to connect with the masses, to sometimes put 
aside a way of thinking that opposed rational, enlightened thought to superstitions and folk beliefs.   
He recounted an incident in his own life involving his parents that seemed to dramatize the false 
choice between reactionary “feudalism” and enlightened “progressivism” among Japanese 
intellectuals: 
When I was in higher school in Sendai, I was dragged to the police for simply being a 
member of a social science research club, expelled from school, and sent back to my 
hometown.  When I appeared at home, my father became extremely angry and scolded me 
harshly.  This was probably out of parental love, but since he said things like being tainted 
“red” would undermine my chances for success, and that would in turn render meaningless 
my being sent to the higher school, I came to despise him.  My father was an atheist and 
compared to my conservative mother, he was much more intellectually (思想的) progressive.  






made me feel certain that people had no reason to be ashamed about doing the right thing.  
However, my inevitable suffering made her suffer and feel anxious.  Wanting to comfort me 
in my bitterness, she took me on a trip to Sapporo, where she had given birth to me.  
Memories of travelling with my mother in Hokkaido, whose natural beauty she had told me 
about time and again as a child, left an impression upon me that I cannot forget.  If I had 
not been expelled, I think I would have ended up with a far more shallow consciousness of 
mothers.  From that time onwards, I became convinced that an awareness of what is right 
does not depend on the progressive or conservative tendencies of one’s thinking (思想), but 
upon the depth of one’s humanity (人間性).  I became convinced that despite the fact that 
my father was in command of “modern” thought, his humanity was poisoned by a bourgeois 
ideology of success (立身出世主義), whereas my mother, even if she was “feudal,” 
expended all her efforts to protect her children from the outside world and from the 
authority of the father, and that this toil and resistance deepened her humanity as a mother 
and her instinctual understanding of what is right.352 
 
Through this story, Ishimoda admonished intellectuals who complained about their own 
“reactionary” mothers, encouraging them to try to understand them better, using a subtle, 
subterranean history of popular resistance (to the father and by extension the ruling classes of 
successive eras) as their guide.   
The proposal to write “a history of mothers” in the spirit of Ishimoda seemed to touch a 
nerve among the textile workers at Yokkaichi.  The “Documenting Daily Life Circle” originally 
consisted of about twenty members, some of whom were ostracized as “odd” by other workers and 
their family members for their participation in the group.  Indeed, this ostracism was a topic of 
several of their documentary essays, yet for this project the number of participants almost doubled 
to ninety women.  They volunteered to write essays based on research they did, mostly in interviews, 
when they visited their home villages for the O-bon festival of the dead. The circle participants were 
apparently among the most productive in the factory, but the growth and activities of the circle 
                                                






worried management enough to fire Sawai, who sued the company in response, eventually winning 
the case.353 
A few essays were chosen for inclusion in the 1954 mass-market paperback that Tsurumi 
helped edit, while others were internally published in the usual mimeographed form of the circle 
movement.  The published essays suggest that the problem of the “reactionary mother” resonated 
with women at Yokkaichi.  One essay by a worker named Tanaka Michiko suggested that distance 
had opened up between mother and daughter owing to the fact that the latter had left home, 
experienced life in a factory and labor union, and participated in a circle of other fellow workers.  
She tried to understand the hardship her mother had experienced through her marriage. Since she 
lived her entire life in the confines of her husband’s household, she “was unable to understand 
people outside her family, and because she did not think, she began to pass on rumors and gossip 
about them.”354  Tanaka ended the essay on the optimistic note characteristic of much life-writing.  
She believed that her participation in life and in the circle had made her into a person for an age 
different from that of her mother, someone who would not repeat the mistake of, “entering into an 
unhappy marriage” and whose “opinions were not under the control of her parents.”  It was for this 
reason that she claimed she would, if given the choice, prefer to participate in circles and self-
governance rather than learn how to perform tea ceremony and make flower arrangements, skills 
associated with middle and upper-class women.355 
The History of Mothers took stock of the progress the circle had made since it was first started 
as a group for choral singing and casual socializing.  Tsurumi Kazuko considered it a successful 
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example of self-transformation, an environment that nurtured social individuals. Members 
“maintained a poise that allowed them to state their thoughts clearly, whether to superiors or to 
friends.” They were also people who “did not demean others, trying to only improve their own lot, 
but acted with an awareness that their joy and sadness was connected to the joy and sadness of their 
friends [in the circle].”356  She later wrote that most of them did become mothers back in their 
villages, where they were active members in the community and occasionally held reunions.357   
For Tsurumi, Sawai’s circle in Yokkaichi became the benchmark against which she would 
often compare her own attempts at circle organizing. Her favorable impression of the Yokkaichi 
group had much to do with the sense that it enabled her to at least temporarily transcend the limits 
of her self-conscious standpoint as a cosmopolitan intellectual and connect with ordinary workers. 
But in order to make this connection and mutual relationship possible, workers had to “be 
themselves,” and not act like aspiring intellectuals – a condition that often ended up reproducing a 
cultural hierarchy, albeit in more subtle ways than a conventional student-teacher relationship. The 
desire for an authentic encounter with non-intellectuals could conflict with the stated aim of 
working toward the creation of an egalitarian space.  This conflict became more visible to Tsurumi 
later. 
 
Tensions within the Circle 
As part of her own attempt at self-transformation, Tsurumi tried to recreate her experience 
at Yokkaichi in Tokyo, founding her own life-writing circle there, the Seikatsu o tsuzuru kai (Writing 
Life Club).  She held meetings in her small apartment that included female workers, housewives, and 
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a few men.  Her participation in this group lasted longer than in Yokkaichi, and she became aware of 
new difficulties over time.  The first was that Tokyo was a far less self-contained environment than 
the relatively isolated factory in Yokkaichi, and myriad popular distractions existed to pull members 
away from commitment to the circle.   Secondly, she became more aware of the fact members of the 
group were reluctant to criticize her as an equal member of the group, in part owing to her prestige 




Figures 4.4-4.8, Photos from an article in Science of Thought about the process of creating life-writing 
essays in the Tokyo-based Seikatsu o tsuzuru kai.  Upper left photo depicts a gathering in Tsurumi 






Photos by Kawase Mitsuo, text by Seikatsu o tsuzuru kai, “Seikatsu tsuzurikata ga dekiru made” 
Shisô no kagaku, (Aug. 1954), 7-9 
             
When a woman textile worker who participated in the circle ventured criticism, it touched on 
a tension within the circle movement that Tsurumi could never fully resolve.  The woman wrote a 
letter to Tsurumi saying she, and the circle in general, was not “dark” enough. She wrote that while 
the circle was a fun, happy, and optimistic space, as soon as she left it and thought about all the 
work she had to do the next day, she became depressed.  She reasoned that she experienced this 
dissonance moving in and out of the circle because Tsurumi was still somehow out of touch with 
the way of life experienced by laborers. “In order to fix the darkness in the world, you had to really 
know darkness.”358 
Tsurumi believed that it was possible to gradually reach a middle ground where she and the 
worker could understand each other and cooperate effectively given enough time.  Yet intellectuals’ 
involvement in the circle movement was haunted by the criticism they had earlier directed at mass 
culture.  Circles and popular entertainment could seem distractions that offered only temporary 
relief from the daily grind while deferring fundamental change to a future that never seemed to 
arrive.   
The revolutionary expectations projected on the circle movement seemed less tenable as 
time went on.  In part, this was due to increasing suspicion directed toward movements affiliated 
with the militant Left as the Japanese Communist Party plummeted in popularity during the fifties.  
But it was also because experience with circles over time began to reveal patterns suggesting that 
committed participants were self-selected, “intellectual types.”   Tsurumi Shunsuke described them 
as skinny and, “though laborers, they were of an intellectual disposition, and thus there is a certain 
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tendency for circles to simply become a places of escape and mutual consolation for them.”  His 
conclusion?  “As long as this is the case, even if the life-writing movement becomes very popular, it 
will always only gather together a person of a certain dispositional and constitutional type.  It can’t 
assemble the masses as a whole.”359  For Tsurumi, this limitation undercut the claim of the circles to 
openness. 
The perceived self-selection of circle participants touched on the contentious issue of the 
relation of life-writings to literature.  The life-writing theorist Kokubun Ichitarô as well as Tsurumi 
Kazuko’s co-editor of History of Mothers, the playwright Kinoshita Junji, both argued that circle 
participants should not aspire to write literature in their attempt to convey “things as they are” in a 
simple, unadorned way.  Yet the observation that participants were “intellectual types” implied that 
they really aspired to leave work in the factory behind and perhaps write professionally.  Some 
participants in the movement like Kamisaka Fuyuko, who were provided a venue in publications like 
Science of Thought, did just that.360   
Yet the alternative to the professionalization of the circles was in some cases political 
ossification.  Sawai started the circle in Yokkaichi in part because he believed that the formulaic 
language of the working class movement did not communicate effectively with ordinary textile 
workers, but once circle-building became a fully-fledged movement endorsed by the Left, it was 
accused of engendering its own formulism.  Although ostensibly voluntary, participation in a circle 
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360 In 1959, Kamisaka published Shokuba no gunzô, a collection of essays documenting human 
relationships at her workplace (Toyota Motor Corp.). Much of the material had been originally 
published in Science of Thought. To the dismay of some of her colleagues at the Institute, Kamisaka 
later became an outspoken conservative commentator.  She intervened in debates pertaining to 
World War II historical revisionism and official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, a controversial shrine 
honoring Japan’s war dead.  For an introduction to many of her political views and her relationship 
with the Institute, see Tsurumi Shunsuke and Kamisaka Fuyuko, Tairon: Ishoku shôwa-shi, (Tokyo: 






within a union came to feel like an obligation for some workers.  This obligation, which made use of 
time that could have been spent more “productively,” could seem to be “holding workers back” in 
the same way as the prohibition against writing literature.  In 1960, Ishimoda looked back on the 
heyday of Left-wing involvement in the circle movement and lamented this development 
If you took the time spent at the circle and applied it to “[productivity] research,” then it 
would certainly be easier to increase efficiency and performance.  Yet the foremost reason 
you participate in a circle is because it is pleasurable work.  The circle gathering is not just 
pleasurable… the formation of a new kind of human relationship, one born out of taking on 
a collective responsibility, imparts to us the joy of creating a group.  This is an aspect of 
creation that the enlighteners of the past did not understand… Circle activity is not “service.”  
The people who went to the circles out of an imposed “obligation” perhaps should have 
never done so.361 
 
Furthermore, Tsurumi Shunsuke thought that the power of a “non-literary” approach to 
writing was limited to people, often manual laborers, whose situations contained problems related to 
poverty and inequality considered easier to document through observation than those of white-collar 
workers.  “Given the method of the life-writing movement today, unless existence itself contains 
problems, it is not possible to produce good life-writing.”  No matter how hard they try, the “petit-
bourgeoisie of the cities” cannot produce good writing of this sort.362   
Economic growth taking off during the second half of the fifties and accelerating in the 
sixties undercut the basis for revolutionary optimism about the entire circle movement.  Intellectuals 
worried that the autonomous space for circles to nurture dreams of radical change were being 
crushed by pressure to conform to the demands to the workplace, transforming them into apolitical 
leisure circles, while at the same time, the transformation of daily life wrought by economic growth 
deprived documentary life-writing of the critical edge it possessed when it could focus on more 
blatant forms of poverty and exploitation.  
                                                
361 Ishimoda Shô quoted in Oguma Eiji, “Minshu” to “Aikoku,” (Tokyo: Senyôsha, 2002), 352-353 







Tsurumi’s ideal of self-transformation posited the creation of democratic subjects out of the 
crucible of collective activity in autonomous circles.  The movement to found and participate in 
these circles throughout Japan was seen as both as an extension of the project to realize postwar 
democracy and a change of course for intellectuals who had become critical of their role as social 
scientific observers and top-down enlighteners.  They gravitated to the egalitarian pedagogical 
methods of Yamabiko gakkô and the life-writing movement in an attempt to break out of a 
hierarchical model of democratic enlightenment, hoping to realize democracy as an ongoing 
egalitarian social process rather than a far-off end result.  The perception that a “long-term 
revolution” that employed gradualist methods was underway in China provided inspiration for 
intellectuals like Tsurumi Kazuko who made this turn. 
A combination of conflicting factors – self-selection, professionalization, political formulism, 
and the loss of revolutionary idealism  – combined to weaken the circle movement as the fifties 
wore on. As the economy began its period of high growth, intellectuals associated with Science of 
Though shifted their attention once again to a research project on “political conversions” during the 
wartime years in order to make sense of the present impasse and reorient themselves toward 







Chapter 5: The Age of Conversion:  
 
The Japanese people, their hopes that Japan would develop into a democratic nation 
betrayed, now became polarized into two extremes; the minority under the banner of 
Marxism; the majority under the banner of entertainment. 
 - Katô Hidetoshi, “Middle-Brow Culture,” 1957 
 
To survive, man must change […] The question, What are we to do? Can no longer be 
answered by directions as to how it is to be done: the question can only be answered by an 
appeal to slumbering possibilities.  Conversion is not enforceable.  All we can do is point to 
realities and make articulate the voices that for centuries have been calling for a change of 
heart. 
             -Karl Jaspers, “The Atomic Bomb and the Future of Man” 1956 
 
Wherever the consumption of abundance has established itself, there is one spectacular 
antagonism which is always at the forefront of the range of illusory roles: the antagonism 
between youth and adulthood.  For here an adult in the sense of someone who is master of 
his own life is nowhere to be found.  And youth – implying change in what exists – is by no 
means proper to people who are young.  Rather, it characterizes only the economic system, 
the dynamism of capitalism; it is things that rule, that are young – things themselves vie with 
each other and usurp one another’s places. 
 -Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 1964 
 
 
In October 1954, in the internal newsletter for the Institute for the Science of Thought, 
Tsurumi Shunsuke placed a call for volunteers to join a new research circle. 
Tenkô research group (supervisor: Tsurumi Shunsuke).  Tenkô does not only exist in Japan.  
In the West, some turn (tenkô) toward Catholicism when they get older for example.  We will 
seek the universal form of this kind of change, investigating how the character of particular 
historical ages, societies, and individuals influences this process. 
 
A number of students and recent graduates from universities in the Tokyo area responded to 
Tsurumi’s announcement.  This was the start of an eight-year long collaborative research project 
(1954-1962) led by Tsurumi Shunsuke on the phenomenon of tenkô, a word with no obvious English 
equivalent but perhaps best translated as “political conversion.”363  Members of the research group 
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tried to explain how and why progressive intellectuals affiliated with a wide variety of organizations 
and ideological factions – including liberal politicians, Communists, and existential philosophers – all 
converted to support for militarism in Japan during the thirties and forties, and then commonly “re-
converted” (逆転向) to supporting democracy after the war.  Although the focus of the project was 
on the past, the researchers’ concerns and the reception of the published work were inseparable 
from contemporary debates about middle-class culture and conformism, generational conflict, new 
debates about war responsibility, and the future of the progressive movement with which Science of 
Thought was affiliated.   
The members were dissatisfied with conventional political oppositions that they believed 
derived much of their force from an overly simple interpretation of the wartime years.  Their 
attempt to redraw the line separating support and resistance was motivated by a desire to think of 
new forms of flexible political association, a desire that also manifested itself in members’ 
participation in emerging citizens movements during the fifties and sixties.  Reinterpreting the past 
was part of an effort to develop a progressive form of political realism that balanced an idealistic 
commitment to popular democracy and a realistic willingness to adapt to social change during the 
fifties.364 
                                                                                                                                                       
define tenkô in contrast to the act of religious conversion while noting that both terms describe 
ideological change.  They write, “… whereas kaishin (conversion) predominantly grasps ideological 
change (思想変化) at the level of religion, tenkô grasps it at the political (政治的) level.”   Tsurumi 
Shunsuke, “Joron: tenkô no kyôdô kenkyô ni tsuite,” Kyôdô kenkyû tenkô edited by Shisô no kagaku 
kenkyûkai, (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1959), 12.  For alternative translations, see Tsurumi Shunsuke, 
“Cooperative Research on Ideological Transformation” Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, 
(Apr. 1964), Tsurumi Kazuko, Social Change and the Individual, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1970), 36-37 
364 In recent scholarship on the thirties in Japan, the Tenkô study has been widely criticized for 
reinforcing false binaries of collaboration and resistance.  Leslie Pincus criticized the study for 
reinforcing  “the claims of modernization historians that the 1930’s represented a deplorable 
deviation from what was otherwise the positive growth of a democratic, capitalist society.” On the 
contrary, I argue that the researchers pathologized the political culture of the thirties not to relegate 






In its completed version, the study, titled simply Collaborative Research: Tenkô, weighed in at 
three volumes and over 1400 pages.  The chapters ranged from detailed biographical studies of 
individual “converts” (tenkôsha) to three long essays by the political theorist Fujita Shôzô that tried 
to describe the overall dynamic behind hundreds of tenkô incidents clustered around historical events 
like the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, and the Japan’s 
surrender in 1945.   
As Tsurumi described in the introduction to the first volume of the study (1959), tenkô was 
originally a juridical term used by the Ministry of Justice before World War II to refer to the 
renunciation of “dangerous thoughts” (危険思想) among thousands of Leftists suspected of  
“thought crimes” (primarily Communism) under the Peace Preservation Law of 1925.  Many of 
those arrested made formal  “tenkô declarations” (転向声明), an act that allowed suspects the 
opportunity to avoid jail or receive a commuted sentence in return for publicizing their renunciation 
of their problematic political beliefs.365  The most famous of such declarations was made in June of 
1933 by two jailed high-ranking members of the Japanese Communist Party, Sano Manabu and 
                                                                                                                                                       
society, albeit in a transformed guise.  Rather than produce another “exposé” (暴露) of forgotten 
support for militarism and covert resistance to it, they tried to bracket ethical judgments of wartime 
intellectual “turns” (tenkô) – a move that led some contemporary reviewers to accuse the group of 
trying to exonerate wartime collaborators under the guise of objectivity.  Yet this attempt was 
motivated less out of a commitment to positivist or value-neutral social science than by the desire to 
create the conditions for new forms of flexible political organization on the Left that would not 
constitute a betrayal of the ideals of popular front democracy. For criticism of the study in English, 
see Leslie Pincus, Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan: Kûki Shûzô and the Rise of National Aesthetics, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 216-217. Other examples include Peter High, The 
Imperial Screen, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), xiii-xiv, and Miles Fletcher, The Search 
for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1982). 
365 Kevin Doak notes that the vast majority of those arrested for thought crimes under the Peace 
Preservation Law after 1928 were never persecuted.  He points to this as evidence of the widespread 
preference for eliciting “Tenkô confessions” among the authorities.  Kevin Doak, “A Naked Public 
Square? Religion and Politics in Imperial Japan” Politics and Religion in Modern Japan edited by Roy 






Nabeyama Sadachika.  Sano and Nabeyama’s joint tenkô statement paved the way for hundreds of 
similar declarations among lower ranking members in the Party over the next several months.   
After the war, writers and journalists stretched the semantic range of the term to refer to 
other changes in political orientation outside this specific historical and juridical context.  For 
example, the conservative political scientist Hayashi Kentarô referred to his turn toward anti-
Communism in the fifties as an act of “tenkô” (in scare quotes).366  This generalized sense of the 
word was important for the group’s later study.  Although the tenkô of Sano and Nabeyama was a 
reference point for the researchers, they made a special effort to make visible less apparent shifts in 
political orientation, particularly among non-Communist intellectuals who had evaded the issue of 
their own war responsibility by maintaining a low profile amid the widespread turn toward 
militarism in the thirties and forties.  
As a result of the association with Sano and Nabeyama, tenkô was a stigmatized term among 
postwar leftists that connoted political and intellectual capitulation.  Intellectuals who lived through 
the war used the term in a postwar context of accusation or repentant confession. Yet unlike 
participants in earlier debates, the researchers who participated in the tenkô study strove to adopt a 
more ethically neutral stance toward the idea of political conversion. In the introduction, Tsurumi 
stated,  “We do not make the value judgment that tenkô in itself connotes something that is wrong.” 
He claimed that the group used the term because it could imply a variable combination of “external 
duress” and “personal spontaneity.”  They perceived both in the wartime political shifts they 
analyzed.367 
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Besides Tsurumi Shunsuke, most of the researchers were members of the “postwar 
generation” (戦後派) born in the thirties. They were too young to have experienced the wartime 
years as adults, and one reviewer claimed that this allowed them to produce a more objective and 
nuanced account of the intellectual turn to fascism, “free from prejudice and emotional 
involvement.”368 Yet despite this distance from the events they described, the younger participants in 
the project did not set out to produce a work of detached historical scholarship. Rather, they hoped 
to transform the intellectual landscape of postwar Japan and rejuvenate a “stagnant” progressive 
movement during the fifties.  Tsurumi was intially driven by a desire to make sense of his own 
experiences during the war, while the concerns of younger researchers were anchored in the political 
situation of the postwar years.    
Like many members of their generation in Europe, they felt caught between the authority of 
the Communist Party and the conformism they associated with middle-class and white-collar culture. 
They searched the past for insight into dilemmas facing the contemporary left, paying particular 
attention to the organizational difficulties encountered by their wartime counterparts.  At the same 
time as they noted parallels between the thirties and fifties, they believed they were facing a new 
political situation, one that roughly corresponded to the descriptions of mass middle-class society in 
the work of David Riesman and C. Wright Mills, both of whom were translated into Japanese while 
the tenkô study was underway. Though they did not intend to depoliticize the past, they believed the 
persistence of the tenkô stigma made political adjustment to this changed situation difficult. 
The researchers worked to further two objectives that had motivated the original formation 
of Science of Thought in 1946.  The first was to reorient intellectual attention away from “pristine 
systems of thought” to the messier ad-hoc philosophies of life implicit in everyday behavior.   
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Focusing on political conversions was an attempt to redefine thought or ideology (思想) in a way 
that emphasized its dynamic relationship with individual experience rather than its “absolute 
correctness.”  Indeed, Tsurumi argued that in the same way artifacts of popular culture were usually 
considered too vulgar or reactionary to warrant serious intellectual attention, the thought and 
behavior of the “politically converted” (転向者) had been ignored or dismissed after the war ended.   
This was not only because focusing attention upon the wartime activities of the converts would add 
to the shame they experienced after the war, but also because the fact that they had performed tenkô 
was considered evidence that their ideas had been proven “wrong” and were thus not worth 
dwelling upon after the war.  Tsurumi criticized the Communist Party for using this logic to ignore 
tenkô while lavishing attention on the heroic actions of “politically unconverted” (非転向) party 
members who chose imprisonment over renouncing their political beliefs.  In the preface to the first 
volume of the tenkô study, he wrote: 
“Researching tenkô is like kicking a weakling while he is down.  It won’t accomplish anything.”  
This way of thinking remains deeply entrenched.”  It is a way of thinking that grasps the 
history of Japanese thought as the development of correct ideology – as progress from one 
correct viewpoint to the next.  In each stage of history there is one form of absolute 
correctness.  On a single elevated line linking together each form of absolute correctness sit 
the successive ideologies of the unconverted. (非転向の思想).  The presupposition that the 
history of Japanese thought ought to be viewed like a precipitous mountain ridge guarantees 
that it will continue to bear little fruit.   Because they want to display the height and 
continuity of the mountain skyline, people make a forced effort to make it seem higher and 
to make the discontinuous areas seem continuous.  However, when you view this history 
fairly, the line is neither high nor continuous.  This is why both the left and the right have 
made a forced effort to beautify it.  This effort only serves to create again and again the same 
hypocritical and whitewashed history of Japanese thought.369 
 
Tsurumi argued that, by viewing intellectual history as a linear succession of “correct 
ideologies” elevated over a landscape of error, postwar intellectuals had ignored the ambiguous and 
often contradictory relationship among ideas, experience, and empirically observable behavior. This 
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was not only a problem of historical representation.  It also impeded another goal of Science of 
Thought: encouraging intellectual and political cooperation among postwar progressives affiliated 
with different “isms” yet all committed to the idea of democracy.   
In the fifties, the group came to believe that a detailed reexamination of wartime years was 
necessary to overcome infighting on the Left.  They argued that the stigma attached to wartime tenkô 
as a form of “ideological capitulation” had pathological effects on political discourse in Japan. In 
their eyes, this stigma impeded a frank discussion of the war and encouraged political inflexibility 
among progressives, while also encouraging cynicism among the rest of the population by erecting 
unrealistic standards of political behavior.   
These polarized reactions to tenkô were symptomatic of a persistent dichotomy that they 
believed had deep roots in Japanese history. There existed an inflexible attitude reminiscent of 
“samurai moralism” at one extreme, and a skeptical “commoner realism” that stressed adaptation 
over political or ethical commitment on the other. They offered this analysis in an effort to supplant 
a conventional “progressive versus reactionary” dichotomy that structured contemporary political 
thinking on the Left.  By asserting that the operative dichotomy was actually one that opposed 
excessive politicization to skeptical disinterest, the group hoped to recalibrate the political in a way 
more in line with an ascendant middle-class culture.  They wanted to complicate the political 
Manicheanism associated with the Communist Party in order to politicize intellectual skeptics and 
the middle-class.370    
In contrast to both extreme moralism and skeptical realism, the need to find a balance 
between flexibility and commitment became a pressing issue due to social changes prompted by 
rapid economic growth and political events connected to the Cold War.  During the 1950s, 
ntellectuals in Europe and Japan who became disillusioned with Stalinism searched for a standpoint 
                                                






from which to criticize the Communist Party without renouncing their commitment to Leftist ideals 
of social transformation and radical democracy. The critique of the bureaucratization of the French 
Communist Party advanced by Cornelius Castoriadis and other contributors to the journal Socialisme 
ou Barbarie (1949-1965) was one example.  Takeuchi Yoshimi’s critique of the Japanese Communist 
Party as an extension of an “honor student culture” that disdained manual labor was another.371   
Yet criticizing the Communist Party was not enough.  The research group argued that the 
failure of non-Communist intellectuals, politicians, and journalists to fully face up to their own 
forms of tenkô during the war was symptomatic of a broader tendency to disguise, ignore, or 
simplistically rationalize changes in political position over time.  Without making any dramatic 
moves, these intellectuals had quietly adapted to the political environment of the wartime years, and 
they continued to adapt to a shifting ideological situation after the war.  The tenkô study suggested 
that this behavior contributed to a widespread sense of contemporary political inertia. 
One contemporary symptom of this inertia cited by the group was the phenomenon of 
unacknowledged “employment conversions” (就職転向) among contemporary student activists 
who shed their radical beliefs upon graduating from university.  Many of the researchers were 
themselves students, and they were acutely conscious of the pressure to suppress one’s anti-
establishment political views in the interest of securing employment.  They accused companies of 
using an array of tactics to screen prospective job candidates for “red” beliefs, which, like 
tuberculosis, were popularly believed to be contagious.  While arguing that the wartime state and 
postwar society enforced political and intellectual conformity through different mechanisms, they 
perceived continuity between their own situation and that faced by the political converts they 
researched.372  
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Members of the Science of Thought tenkô research circle approached their subject from a 
standpoint critical of 1950s conformism and anxious about a repeat of the failure of Leftist anti-war 
movements in Japan.  Through this approach, they challenged the Cold War discourse of political 
realism advanced by conservative thinkers that portrayed the shedding of radical ideas as a natural 
consequence of a life-course progression from idealistic adolescence to sober maturity.  By carefully 
distinguishing tenkô from “maturity” and relating it to the present, these young thinkers tried to 
renegotiate the boundary between a normative life cycle and the arena of Cold War politics.  
 
The Intellectual Origins of Tenkô Research 
Reopening the issue of tenkô was connected with generational conflict over unresolved issues 
of war responsibility.  Tsurumi originally proposed researching political conversions in 1946, and he 
later claimed that his interest in the subject was motivated by anger toward the wartime behavior of 
his father, the liberal politician Tsurumi Yûsuke (1885-1973).  The idea came to him while he was in 
Java as an English translator for the Imperial Navy.  He returned to Japan from studying at Harvard 
in 1942, and that same year he enlisted as a military translator in order to avoid being drafted.  While 
stationed in Java, he agonized over whether he might eventually be forced to take part in combat. 
Under these conditions, he fantasized about killing himself and his father Tsurumi Yûsuke, whose 
actions during wartime inspired his initial “model” of tenkô behavior, a model he generalized to apply 
to actions beyond the scope of formal declarations by suspected Communists.  
The elder Tsurumi was first elected to the Diet in 1928.  Influenced by the internationalism 
of Nitobe Inazô and Woodrow Wilson, he publicly supported stronger ties between America and 
Japan before the outbreak of the Pacific War.  He sent his children Shunsuke and Kazuko to study 
in the US in 1938, at a time of increased diplomatic tension between the two countries.  At the same 






Tsurumi Shunsuke came to regard his father’s support of the war as a betrayal of his liberal, 
cosmopolitan beliefs. He saw this betrayal as representative of a turn among many writers, 
academics, and politicians to embrace the war effort amidst widespread enthusiasm for imperial 
expansion in China. For example, Kurata Hyakuzô, whose books he had avidly read as a teenager, 
seemed to abandon an individualistic, free-spirited philosophy of life in order to conform to the 
demand for total mobilization during the war. Anger toward figures like Kurata and his father fueled 
Tsurumi’s desire to establish an alternative to the intellectual ideals of cosmopolitanism and kyôyô 
after the war. 373 
Tsurumi believed thinkers and politicians ought to pay more attention to the twists and turns 
in their intellectual trajectory.  Ignoring the past was an evasion of responsibility, while simply 
expressing remorse and labeling one’s wartime actions a “mistake” was a means to avoid analyzing 
them in a way that might reveal unexpected continuities between the past and the present.   
 A positive model for him was the Harvard philosopher George Santayana.  He first 
proposed researching tenkô in a long review of Santayana’s multi-volume autobiography Persons and 
Places and his partly autobiographical novel The Last Puritan.  There he argued that Japanese thinkers 
should learn from Santayana’s ability to “follow thought to its origin and show the process of 
intellectual change” – particularly in reference to illuminating the connections between his early 
Catholic beliefs and his later position of philosophical agnosticism.   
The descriptive “individual case-study” approach adopted by the tenkô study was influenced 
by Santayana’s attempt at philosophical autobiography. Tsurumi was impressed by how Santayana 
avoiding framing his intellectual trajectory as a story of linear progress from religious superstition to 
a more enlightened or “correct” worldview.  Santayana, a colleague and critic of the pragmatist 
William James at Harvard, began a section of his autobiographical essay, “A General Confession” by 
                                                






noting that a reader of his earlier humanistic works “may notice a certain change of climate” when 
confronted with recent works by him that assert the primacy of man’s “animal mind.” Despite this 
seeming shift, he argued that a “philosophically religious” attitude linked his Catholic upbringing and 
early humanism with writings that adopted a more naturalistic and agnostic position.   
I had begun philosophising quite normally, by bleating like any young lamb: agitated by 
religion, passionately laying down the law for art and politics, and even bubbling over into 
conventional verses, which I felt to be oracular and irresistible.  But my vocation was clear: 
my earliest speculation was at once intimate and universal, and philosophically religious, as it 
has always remained; yet not exclusively on the lines of that complete Christian system which 
first offered itself to my imagination. I was always aware of alternatives; nor did these 
alternatives seem utterly hostile and terrible… Hesitation and heresy were odious to me in 
any quarter; and I cared more for the internal religious force of each faith than for such 
external reasons as might be urged to prove that faith or to disprove it.374 
 
 This consistent attitude led Santayana to a relativistic position of “radical criticism” toward 
both religious dogma and skeptics that purport to be free of dogmatic beliefs.  
The exposition of my philosophy is still incomplete... Yet virtually the whole system was 
latent in me from the beginning. When in adolescence I oscillated between solipsism and the 
Catholic faith, that was an accidental dramatic way of doing honour both to rigour and to 
abundance. But the oscillation was frivolous and the two alternate positions were self-
indulgent. A self-indulgent faith sets up its casual myths and rashly clings to them as to literal 
truths; while a self-indulgent scepticism pretends to escape all dogma, forgetting its own 
presuppositions. With time it was natural that oscillation should give place to equilibrium; 
not, let us hope, to a compromise, which of all things is the most unstable and 
unphilosophical; but to a radical criticism putting each thing where it belongs. Without 
forgetting or disowning anything, myth might then be corrected by disillusion, and 
scepticism by sincerity. So transformed, my earliest affections can survive in my latest.375 
 
Tsurumi saw Santayana as a philosopher who strove to sustain an ongoing dialectic between 
his philosophical thinking and the experience he had accumulated over the course of his life.  
Skepticism that was internally coherent yet implicitly contradicted by one’s behavior lacked sincerity, 
yet banishing skepticism in order to defend or rationalize one’s behavior meant plunging into myth.   
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Rationalizing or ignoring everyday actions was symptomatic of the sundered relationship 
between philosophy and experience that Tsurumi had hoped to overcome after the war.  At the end 
of his American Philosophy, he argued it was now necessary to “develop techniques to force contact 
between philosophy and every nook and cranny of everyday life.”376  Thought and behavior ought to 
remain in a state of ceaseless cross-pollination. 
Tsurumi suggested that Santayana’s embrace of his outsider status in American society 
demonstrated an acute awareness of the need to reconcile philosophy and everyday life.  Despite the 
weakening of his religious faith, Santayana refused to downplay his Catholic background to blend 
into the predominantly Protestant community in Boston.   
… a déraciné, a man who has been torn up by the roots, cannot be replanted and should 
never propagate his kind. In the matter of religion, for instance, I found myself in this blind 
alley. I was not a believer in what my religion, or any religion, teaches dogmatically; yet I 
wouldn't for the world have had a wife or children dead to religion. Had I lived always in 
Spain, even with my present philosophy, I should have found no difficulty: my family would 
have been Catholic like every other family; and the philosophy of religion, if ever eventually 
discussed among us, would have been a subsequent private speculation, with no direct social 
consequences. But living in a Protestant country, the free-thinking Catholic is in a socially 
impossible position. He cannot demand that his wife and children be Catholics, since he is 
not, in a controversial sense, a Catholic himself; yet he cannot bear that they should be 
Protestants or freethinkers, without any Catholic tradition or feelings. They would not then 
be his wife or children except by accident: they would not to his people. I know that there 
are some who accept this even pretend to have become Protestants, and bury as deep as 
possible the fact that they were born Catholics or Jews. But I am not a man of that stamp. I 
have been involuntarily uprooted. I accept the intellectual advantages of that position, with 
its social and moral disqualifications. And I refuse to be annexed, to be abolished, or to be 
grafted onto any plant of a different species.377 
 
 Tsurumi was impressed by Santayana’s effort to turn his deraciné position into an intellectual 
advantage rather than a source of shame. He believed Santayana understood the critical force of 
“reactionary” religious ideas of original sin that ran counter to deeply rooted tendencies among 
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American intellectuals – the tendency to adopt an optimistic view of progress and human nature in 
particular.  
The Harvard-educated Tsurumi may have wanted to turn his lingering unease around 
intellectuals educated in Japan into a similar advantage.  He argued that it was worth adopting a 
stance similar to Santayana’s in order to oppose the dominant intellectual tendencies in postwar 
Japanese society, which he described as follows: 
In Japan, there is a powerful tendency (A) to perceive August 15, 1945 as a tectonic event, 
such that all words and deeds before that day are called “militaristic” and everything 
afterwards is called “democratic.”  Furthermore, separately from A, there also exists the 
tendency (B) to separate all contemporary words and deeds into two and call one 
“progressive” and the other “reactionary.”  Let us call A and B representative of the two 
opposed powers in Japanese society.  “Militaristic” and “democratic,” “reactionary” and 
“progressive” – it is useful to grasp an object through these broad divisions.  Yet on 
occasion, dividing things in two like this appears to be a means to avoid thinking about them 
in more penetrating detail, concomitant to a type of intellectual laziness.  Observe the way 
“reactionary” is used in literary and intellectual criticism.  Regrettably, it sometimes suggests 
the attitude that since the object (to which the word “reactionary” is affixed like a street 
poster) is bad, there is no need to pay close attention to it or to research it.  I think that 
especially now, the essence of such “reactionary” things ought to be researched with greater 
interest than ever, and that the occult, pejorative (呪詛的) use of the word “reactionary” is 
harmful.  The more August 15th appears a decisive “fault line,” the more we ought to expend 
effort at seeing the continuity that runs across it.  Before and during the war, the potential 
for a democratic movement existed here and there, and during the postwar of today 
militarism remains embedded in various aspects of daily life.	 The basis of the so-called 
democracy of today was already visible in the words and deeds of wartime, and the basis of 
militarism of yesterday still remains a pillar of the daily life of the people.378 
 
 In Tsurumi’s view, there were two ways to approach this continuity.  The first was to try to 
track “value perversion” (価値倒錯) among the masses (大衆) before, during, and after the war, 
explaining the process by which one set of values (postwar) could both replace and be based upon 
an earlier set of values (prewar and wartime).  The difficulty of observing change and continuity at 
the level of “subjective value-orientation” animated articles on American social science that filled up 
                                                
378 Tsurumi Shunsuke, op. cit., 127.  The earliest version of this chapter is Tsurumi Shunsuke, “Hon 






much of the early issues of Science of Thought.  The “Philosophy of Ordinary People” project that 
Tsurumi helped organize was intended as a first step toward applying American social scientific 
methods to the problem.  Drawing upon interdisciplinary attempts to study value change in America, 
participants in the project hoped to form a more accurate picture of popular subjectivity that 
avoided the usual way of dividing the world into “militaristic” and “democratic” or “reactionary” 
and  “progressive” camps during the Cold War.    Yet critics in and outside the group argued that 
the results were distorted by the researchers’ estranged relationship with the ”common people” they 
studied.  
 The second approach to trans-war continuity was to study the tenkô of intellectuals from Left 
to Right.  Besides unearthing the value-systems of ordinary people, one could observe continuity 
and change through an analysis of political conversions, tenkô, among opinion leaders during and 
after the war. 
Since “Tenkô,” a phenomenon that occurred among hundreds of famous opinion leaders, 
might seem peculiar to Japan, it requires special scrutiny.  Yet it resembles the phenomenon 
by which Christianity replaced the various sects of Rome, and it must be discussed from the 
standpoint of world history and in connection with sciences like the psychology of religion.  
We could thus call this research an investigation of the principle of conversion (回心).379 
 
In order to perceive continuity and avoid categorizing this behavior according to the 
conventional “progressive or reactionary” dichotomy, Tsurumi argued that it would be necessary for 
analysts to “extend a hand of sympathy to all people, while also ensnaring them in a net of 
accusations.” 	 Tsurumi shelved the tenkô proposal for eight years, choosing instead to direct his 
energies toward researching the “Philosophy of Ordinary People” together with other members of 
Science of Thought.  He returned to the issue in the mid-fifties – a time when the issue of 
continuities between the pre-1945 past and the present began to attract widespread interest.  
 
                                                






Kôdansha and Middle-class Culture 
Why might Tsurumi have returned to the issue of tenkô in the fifties? One reason might have 
been the growing perception among progressives that they were rapidly heading toward the same 
“defeat” experienced by their Leftist counterparts during the thirties. This perception was provided 
theoretical support by influential cultural analyses of the “semi-feudal” structure of the Japanese 
psyche that informed the tenkô study.  It also seemed to correspond to unfolding social and political 
changes.  The popular-front progressive movement that emerged out of the “revolutionary situation” 
of the early Occupation years entered a period of turmoil from 1951 to 1955.  The Japanese 
Communist Party, whose leaders had commanded respect among progressives owing to their anti-
fascist credentials, split in 1951 over the question of whether or not to support armed struggle in the 
countryside in solidarity with the Communists fighting in the Korean War.  Public opinion turned 
against the party while progressive intellectuals clashed over how to respond to the Communist 
movement at home and abroad.  
Within Science of Thought, one source of anxiety was the disappearance of many 
progressive associations formed in the early years after the war.  Science of Thought was one among 
dozens of associations and intellectual journals during the surge of popular interest in democracy 
from 1945 to 1947.  By 1953, Tsurumi Shunsuke looked back on this origin and ominously noted 
that the almost all of these early associations and journals had disappeared.  The journal and 
Institute had become an “orphans.” 380  At the same time, the increasing popularity and confidence 
of new conservative weekly magazines associated with middle-class culture was a source of concern 
among liberal and leftist progressives. The situation faced by intellectuals during the years leading up 
to total mobilization for war seemed relevant to make sense of the present.  Indeed, when the final 
volume of the study appeared in 1962, it was trumpeted in Science of Thought as “A universal must-
                                                






read during the return of the age of great tenkô!!” (再びめぐりきた大転向の時代に万人必読の
書!!)	  
In 1954, the same year Tsurumi Shunsuke and other members of Science of Thought began 
the tenkô study, the Institute began an ill-fated relationship with the publisher Kôdansha that lasted 
only 11 months.  Unlike the small-scale operations that had put out Science of Thought and Me in the 
past, Kôdansha was a major corporation that published everything from mass tabloids (Kingu) to 
manga (Nakayoshi) to literary journals (Gunzô).  The company had high hopes that Science of Thought 
would appeal to a mass audience, but circulation numbers remained low and its association with the 
Institute was marred by controversy and conflict with the Japanese Communist Party.  The group’s 
experience with Kôdansha raised new questions about the sustainability of a progressive movement 
that tried to bring together different generational, socioeconomic, and ideological groups under a 
single banner. Critics also wondered whether the ascendency of a new middle-class culture during 
the fifties might be rendering the raison-d’être of Science of Thought – overcoming the gap between 
intellectuals and the masses, obsolete. The tenkô study was motivated in part by a desire to imagine a 
progressive movement that could thrive in this new culture without compromising its political ideals 
entirely. 
Kôdansha might initially seem to have been a natural fit for Science of Thought’s vision of a 
common democratic culture. The founders of the group intended the journal Science of Thought to be 
part of a broader “thought movement”  (思想運動) that would overcome the social and cultural 
gap that separated intellectuals from the masses – a gap that many progressives believed had 
contributed to the rise of militarism in Japan during the thirties.   In a 1947 essay, “Cultural 
Revolution and the Task of the Intellectual Stratum,” the Marxist literary theorist Kurahara Korehito 
famously characterized this gap as the continued separation of Japan into two distinct cultures of 






after the publishing house Iwanami shoten, as an elite intellectual culture associated with the 
academicism, kyôyô, and prestigious universities and high schools.381  Iwanami was well known for 
publishing a paperback series of canonical works of literature and philosophy from East and West, 
and its flagship journal before 1945 was the scholarly, philosophical journal Thought (Shisô).  Since 
Science of Thought appeared highly critical of the intellectual “obscurantism” of Iwanami-connected 
philosophers like Nishida Kitarô, some observers were under the impression that the “Thought” (思
想) in the group’s name was part of a subtle dig at the Iwanami publication, an interpretation that 
implied that Iwanami’s journal Thought was unscientific. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Kôdansha culture was associated with mass-market 
peridocials and popular novels.  Science of Thought repeatedly criticized intellectuals for dismissing 
“Kôdansha culture” as crass and unworthy of serious literary criticism.  Early articles in the group’s 
journal tried to demonstrate the shortsightedness of this view of popular culture.  Tsurumi Shunsuke 
and Takeda Kiyoko analyzed best-selling works by Sasaki Kuni, a writer of comic fiction, and 
Yoshikawa Eiji, a writer of historical fiction known for his classic samurai novel Miyamoto Musashi.  
Both of these writers wrote serialized novels in newspapers that were later published books by 
Kôdansha.  Treating their works seriously was part of a multi-faceted attempt to promote a common 
culture of democracy by redefining the boundaries that separated intellectual and popular spheres.   
By teaming up with Kôdansha, the Institute for the Science of Thought sought to bring a 
vision of democratic culture to a larger audience.  Yet in trying to increase the journal’s popular 
appeal, the editors were accused of dumbing it down and succumbing to the temptation of crass 
commercialism.  A particular target of ridicule was a folded insert in the first issue of the re-launched 
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Science of Thought depicting “The Three -isms” (existentialism, Marxism, and pragmatism) in comic 
format.  The comic was intended to accompany a series of published dialogues between academics 
and high school students on the subject of various “isms.”  The intention was to force academics to 
explain complicated philosophical systems of thought to a non-specialist audience.   
 
Figure 5.1 – Detail from fold-out insert, “The Three –Isms” included in May 1954 issue of Science of 
Thought.  The three vertical comics depict the emergence of existentialism, Marxism, and pragmatism 
through the lives of Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, and William James. 
 
The next month, the journal published a sampling of the negative responses to this 
experiment.  One reviewer put it as follows: “The authors argue against reducing thought (shisô) to 
formulaic –isms while at the same time including a meaningless fold-out “Scroll (e-maki) of the 
History of Modern Thought”– an act that makes a mockery both of the masses and of thought.”382   
Although the responses were not all negative, the backlash against the comic both in and 
outside the Institute was symptomatic of the difficulty of broadening the journal’s popular appeal 
                                                






without alienating its regular readers.  This was a particularly sensitive issue in the mid-fifties, when 
divergent predictions regarding the emergence of new expressions of middle-class culture (中間文
化) circulated among intellectuals in Japan, United States, and Western Europe.  Symbols of 
middlebrow culture included Reader’s Digest and the Saturday Review in America and weekly magazines 
(週刊誌) like Sandê mainichi and Shûkan shinchô in Japan. Though weeklies had existed in Japan before 
the war, their circulation increased dramatically in the fifties, and after 1956 major publishers 
scrambled to launch their own to keep up with the demand.   Whereas mass journals like Kingu were 
associated with entertainment and intellectual journals like Sekai with serious discussions of politics 
and culture, new weeklies mixed news, commentary, and entertainment in a way that seemed to blur 
the line between the two.  The popularity of weeklies and the threat they seemed to pose to the 
publishing niche occupied by highbrow journals reawakened latent anxiety over the relationship 
between mass culture and totalitarianism. In America for example, the critic Dwight MacDonald 
argued that the way middlebrow magazines mixed politics and entertainment might enable 
totalitarianism.383  
 Throughout the fifties, Science of Thought was torn between embracing middle-class culture 
and trying to provide a critical alternative to it.  On the one hand, new forms of journalism and 
literature associated with the middle-class might bridge the wide separation between intellectual and 
mass culture that had seemed so problematic in the aftermath of the war.  On the other hand, unlike 
more  “apolitical” forms of popular culture studied by the group, it seemed to the group to run the 
risk of turning politics into a form of entertainment.  Some articles in Science of Thought focused on 
the way consumer culture opened up new avenues for political participation in the progressive 
movement.  The journal ran an article by a Kyoto University student, Nishimura Kazuo, who tried 
                                                






to involve hundreds of young female readers of the weekly Heibon in the Peace Movement by 
corresponding with them through the personals section of the magazine.384  Other articles, such as 
the sociologist Hidaka Rokurô’s essay “On Political Apathy,” adopted a more negative view of the 
overall affect of popular culture on political participation.   
Fujita Shôzô, a student of Maruyama Masao and unorthodox member of the Communist 
Party who became a central member of the tenkô study group, produced one of the more 
sophisticated analyses of the relationship between politics and popular culture.  He argued in 1953 
that “Americanized” mass culture had taken over one of the key ideological functions he ascribed to 
the pre-1945 state – removing the emperor from the messy realm of politics.  Before 1945, official 
propaganda and censorship ensured that the emperor was outside the boundaries of acceptable 
political discussion.  Though some criticism was allowed by the Allied Occupation, Fujita argued 
that the American Occupiers encouraged the mass media to transform him into a different kind of 
transcendent figure, an apolitical celebrity.385 
Fujita’s critique touched on an important difference between new middle-class weeklies and 
intellectual journals associated with progressivism, including Science of Thought – the former carried 
many more articles on the activities of the imperial household.  Some intellectuals associated this 
popular interest in the imperial household with a “reactionary” desire to restore the pre-1945 regime.  
Although Fujita harshly criticized the hidden links between the mass media and remnants of the 
wartime regime, his analysis suggested that intellectuals who ignored the appeal of these new 
expressions of popular culture did so at their own peril.   
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In 1957, Fujita was interviewed by the journal Chûô kôron about his view of the 1956 Soviet 
Invasion of Hungary, an event that deepened the political schism on the Left caused by de-
Stalinization the same year over whether or not to support the Communist Party.  The debate 
focused on whether (1) to express solidarity with the rebels’ fight for “national self-determination” 
(Minzoku kaihô) in light of Japan’s own “semi-colonial” status vis-à-vis the US during the Cold War, 
(2) to oppose the rebels as “reactionary” in order to promote Soviet victory in the struggle for 
international socialism, or (3) to remain silent.  Fujita expressed some dissatisfaction with all these 
views. The Japanese Communist Party’s policy of endorsing the Soviet invasion might be the 
“correct answer,” but it was a form of blind political “a priorism” that alienated the party from the 
masses.  “Active silence,” the position of the Japanese Socialist Party, was an apolitical gesture that 
corresponded to the growing conservative sensibility of the masses outlined in Fujita’s essay on 
Americanization.  He ultimately endorsed the adaptive political “realism” (リアリズム) of the 
Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito.  He argued that Tito made an effort to adapt to a changing 
situation, criticizing the first Soviet deployment of troops to Hungary but endorsing the second 
when he felt the violence of the uprising began to threaten “socialist society.”    Less important than 
Fujita’s specific response was his assertion that the Left had to develop a form of political realism 
that was capable of connecting the conservative “existential moral sensibility” of the masses (taishû) 
to a contingent “universal potentiality” implicit in every unfolding political event.386   
For Fujita, the masses were neither feudal reactionaries nor progressive proletarians.  They 
had a peaceful, inward-looking mindset that was misunderstood by the Left and manipulated by 
promoters of social “tranquility” on the Right.  This was in line with an approach to mass and 
middlebrow culture adopted by critics who were more sympathetic to its aims than Dwight 
McDonald.  For example, in 1949, the American art historian Russell Lynes lauded the middlebrow 
                                                






zeal for self-improvement, and he argued that Virginia Woolf’s critique of it as “betwixt and 
between” implied that the world ought to be forever separated into two classes – lowbrows who 
work and highbrows who create art.387  A few years later, the Science of Thought-affiliated 
sociologist Katô Hidetoshi wrote an article in which he argued that intellectuals who dismissed 
middlebrow culture (his gloss on “chûkan bunka”) were guided by an erroneous conception of the 
emergent new “realities” of postwar society. 
It is possible that as middlebrow culture continues to develop, it will become the core of the 
national culture of Japan...  If this becomes the case, it would be sheer sentimentalism for 
our intellectuals to continue to display contempt for their own petit-bourgeois mentality and 
condemn such expressions of the new mass culture as the weekly magazines and musicals.   
The petit-bourgeois intellectuals of Japan today should free themselves from their 
unreasonable obsessions and re-evaluate what their position in society really is.  If they do so 
they will find that today’s middle-class assumes a far more important role in society than did 
the petite bourgeoisie whose decline was predicted by Marx and Engels. The doctrine of 
class struggle, which mechanistically divides social classes into capitalists and laborers and 
ignores the interests of the middle-class, can on longer be applied to the realities of Japanese 
society.  The members of the middle-class should indeed take pride and confidence in their 
role in society.388 
 
Intellectuals had become incapable of perceiving reality due to their fidelity to a static image 
of class-divided society. Unless they corrected this image, they would become irrelevant.  The logic 
of Katô’s argument resembled one of the new explanations for tenkô during the war.  A year after his 
article appeared, Yoshimoto Takaaki argued that Communists unnecessarily isolated themselves 
from the masses due to their superficial understanding of the semi-feudal, as opposed to purely 
class-based, structure of Japanese society.  This isolation eventually created the conditions for Sano 
and Nabeyama’s “conversion” to fascism in 1933 – a turn that they argued was the result of 
suddenly discovering that revolution had to be adapted to the “particular conditions” of Japanese 
society. 
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The tenkô study was inseparable from the question of how intellectuals ought to relate to 
ongoing transformations associated with the rapid growth of the middle-class.  The question of how 
to adapt to a changing social environment while retaining some form of active political commitment 
appeared to be a key problem for intellectuals during both the thirties and the fifties.  Furthermore, 
one reason why the researchers wanted to overcome the notion that tenkô was a simple black-or-
white issue was because they believed a similar attitude informed intellectual attitudes toward the rise 
of middle-class mass culture.  The goal was not to exonerate wartime converts or become boosters 
for the middle-class, but to somehow prevent repeat of the thirties.  The participants were guided by 
a desire to avoid the collapse of the progressive movement in Japan by recalibrating its course and 
reforming it from within – before it reached a crisis that would lead to a repetition of the past. 
While the tenkô study was underway, Science of Thought confronted an internal crisis that 
touched on its relationship to both the Communist Party and middle-class culture that caused it 
cease publishing the journal for most of the duration of the project. On March 13th 1955, the weekly 
tabloid Sundê Mainichi published an article on an ongoing “internal conflict” within Science of 
Thought. It reported that someone in the organization had accused Tsurumi Shunsuke of 
embezzling funds from Kôdansha to start a new business venture with an unnamed woman.  The 
article noted that “… Science of Thought has less than 10,000 copies in circulation and it mainly focuses 
on youth-oriented “enlightenment activities”… It’s influence is not nearly as great as the journal 
Kaizô, but exposing this internal conflict is a big deal because a number of big name young 
intellectuals are on the advisory board of the Institute, including Takeuchi Yoshimi, Minami Hiroshi, 
Kawashima Takeyoshi, and Taketani Mitsuo.”389  Tsurumi denied the accusation but Kôdansha 
ended its relationship with the Institute shortly after the Sundê Mainichi article appeared. 
                                                






Years later Tsurumi argued that the conflict was part of a plot to have him expelled from the 
group by members of the Japanese Communist Party who had joined the Institute during a period 
of expansion in the early fifties.  The membership of the Institute, which had begun to open local 
branches all over Japan, grew rapidly at that time due to the political turmoil that enveloped the 
Communist Party and the Communist-controlled Association of Democratic Scientists (Minka) 
during around the time of the Korean War.  Intellectuals who were dissatisfied or had been purged 
from these groups gravitated toward Science of Thought, increasing tensions within the group and 
between it and the Party.390   
The chairman of the Institute at the time, Takeuchi Yoshimi, eventually steered the group 
out of this period of internal turmoil and the members, including those affiliated with the 
Communist Party, unanimously voted against censuring Tsurumi.  Yet the scandal had exposed 
sharp divisions within Science of Thought, and an effort was made to make its finances more 
transparent and to strengthen the connection between the Tokyo office and branches in cities like 
Nagoya and Kyoto.391  The Institute, now without a publisher for its journal, was in dire straits, but 
the tenkô study offered the hope that the past might offer insight into how to avoid a total collapse. 
 
Organization Men 
 The young intellectuals who participated in the fifties tenkô study were guided by 
contemporary concerns that were mostly absent in Tsurumi’s original proposal to study the 
phenomenon in 1946.  This included widespread interest in how different “organizations” (組織)  
and “small associations” (小集団) could influence the behavior of their members.  A year before the 
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study began, the sociologist Katô Hidetoshi wrote a short essay entitled “group tenkô” in which he 
argued that the issue of political conversion had been distorted by the tendency of critics to focus on 
dramatic individual declarations made by imprisoned Communists, rather than the more subtle 
political and ideological changes that occurred within the relative anonymity of an organization.  
So-called “tenkô” generally implies a “tenkô declaration” affixed to an “individual” name.  
However, the inconspicuous sort of tenkô I am referring to is generally affixed to the name 
of an “association” (集団) – an association linked to wartime socialist and labor parties for 
example.  The individuals who performed such tenkô are lost in the shadow of the 
organization.  Group control (コントロール) over relationships among individual members 
softens the curve of a political turn (tenkô), and the individual feels little friction in the case 
of collective, gradual tenkô.  In other words, they manage to escape in the midst of a group 
undergoing tenkô, unlike solitary political converts – so-called tenkôsha (転向者).392 
 
Katô wanted to shift the debate about tenkô from questions of individual political subjectivity 
toward the group.  This would link it to ongoing efforts to create autonomous, democratic, and 
resilient organizations that might anchor a revitalized progressive movement in the fifties.   At the 
end of 1954, the internal newsletter for the Institute for the Science of Thought published a 
preliminary report on the tenkô study drafted by Hanzawa Hiroshi, a former high school teacher and 
political activist from Tottori prefecture.  He became involved in Science of Thought after meeting 
Tsurumi, then an assistant professor at Kyoto University, at a local protest against the “Subversive 
Activity Prevention Law” (破壊活動防止法) in 1952.393  In the report, Hanzawa asserted that 
researching tenkô could help overcome organizational difficulties confronted by progressive 
associations.  
We agonize over the organizational problems (組織の問題) confronted by the thought 
campaigns (思想運動) underway in Japanese society, and rigorous tenkô research can be 
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used to improve organizing techniques.  In each historical instance, the collapse of various 
progressive movements in modern Japan finds expression in a burst of political conversions 
that betray the calculations of movement leaders.  These conditions are relevant even today, 
after the war.   
 
Interest in organizational techniques was stimulated by the participation of intellectuals in 
the circle movement during the late forties and early fifties.  The mixed experiences of participants 
and observers inspired dozens of proposals to improve the way circles and labor unions were 
organized. Even as they searched the past for a means to overcome contemporary organizational 
difficulties among progressives, members of the Science of Thought tenkô study circle paid careful 
attention to the organizational structure of their own group.  Unlike looser study groups that had 
been formed as of the Institute in the past, the tenkô group published a plan that outlined the 
division of labor in the circle and proposed a system whereby group members would be in charge of 
preparing informational note cards on the individual intellectuals included in the study, a technique 
intended to facilitate communication within the circle.394 
The search for transparent and egalitarian organizational techniques was also stimulated by 
disillusionment with the hierarchical structure of the Japanese Communist Party. Some critics 
blamed the inconsistent and unpopular decisions of the JCP leadership for causing an “impasse” in 
circle-organizing during the mid-fifties.  They pointed to the “bureaucratization” of the Party as a 
reason for its failures.  In 1956, the literary critic Itô Sei wrote an influential essay “Organization and 
the Human,” in which he argued that Communist writers, insofar as they were “cogs in an 
organization,” were no different from journalists in a corporate bureaucracy.395  Focusing on the way 
different bureaucratic organizations enabled tenkô provided a standpoint from which to advance a 
critique of technocratic tendencies in postwar society that also accounted for the failures of a 
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progressive movement that had earlier succumbed to the anti-fascist prestige surrounding the 
Japanese Communist Party.  In this regard, their standpoint resembled that of Cornelius Castoriadis 
and intellectuals associated with the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie.  In a 1949 essay, Castoriadis 
criticized Stalinists for aligning themselves with “bureaucrats in the economic and the administrative 
fields, and those responsible for ‘managing’ the labor force, namely, the ‘working class’s’ trade-union 
and political cadres.”396 
.   This approach to tenkô reflected increasing interest in organizational techniques and 
management ideas. The number of published articles containing the word “organization” (組織) in 
the title sharply increased at the start of the decade.  By 1960, the number surpassed that of articles 
containing the words “democracy,” “individual,” or “society” in the title combined.397  These articles 
analyzed the organizational strategies of corporations, agricultural co-ops, labor unions, and 
government bureaucracies.  Critics discussed techniques to transform labor unions into “fighting 
organizations” (闘争する組織) and to overcome gender inequality within the “patriarchal 
organization” of the family  (家父長制家族組織).398    
Promoters of new organizational management ideas often held up the promise of 
“democratizing” (民主化) workplaces in a way that avoided the political clashes associated with 
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labor unions.  Much of this writing resumed an interrupted discourse on scientific management and 
Taylorism that had existed in Japan since the 1910s.399  Under the banner of democratization, 
Occupation authorities revived and intervened in this discourse by promoting Human Relations 
(HR) as a means of reducing the dehumanizing aspects of scientific management techniques and 
democratizing the workplace.  These initiatives began to attract popular attention in the early 
fifties.400  Works by the organizational theorist Elton Mayo and the management consultant Peter 
Drucker first appeared in Japanese translation and their ideas were widely disseminated through 
weeklies. 
Yet writers for Science of Thought and other journals associated with progressivism were 
skeptical of popular interest in American management ideas.  In an article in Science of Thought 
surveying the “HR Boom,” Kamisaka Fuyuko noted the journalistic interest surrounding the 
translation of William Whyte’s 1956 bestseller on management in major American corporations, The 
Organization Man, into Japanese.  She acknowledged that the book’s popularity in America and Japan 
showed that “problems concerning the relationship between the organization and the individual are 
of common interest to all modern men,” but argued that in management discourse, “modernization, 
rationalization, and democratization” were nothing more than “skillfully deployed code-words” that 
induced a state of “hypnosis” among white-collar workers.401  Leftists considered HR a disguised 
form of “scientific paternalism” while traditionalists considered it a fad unsuited to Japanese cultural 
conditions.402 
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Yet the content of the completed essays in the tenkô study sometimes suggest a greater 
affinity with ideas of rational management than polemics against Taylorism or HR.  In particular, 
Fujita Shôzô argued that the conditions for tenkô were partly caused by irrational mixing of ethical 
and organizational issues in progressive associations.  He argued that when the Communist Party 
leaders Sano and Nabeyama renounced their opposition to the war and, without leaving the Party, 
declared their intention to reorient the JCP toward support for the emperor in 1933, the rest of the 
Party leadership ought to have treated it less as a “betrayal” and more as a procedural mistake.  
Fujita pointed out that, regardless of the merits or demerits of Sano and Nabeyama’s position, they 
simply were not authorized to arbitrarily abandon the policy enshrined in the 1932 Comintern 
Theses, which included a commitment to abolishing the “absolutist emperor system” in Japan.  The 
fact that Communists were drawn into a discussion of the problematic content of Sano and 
Nabeyama’s position was evidence that the Party was an organization that lacked a coherent or 
transparent “organizational philosophy” (組織の哲学).403 
Fujita argued that this lack of an organizational philosophy was a symptom of a much 
broader tendency to conflate procedural issues with questions that pertained to the “absolute 
correctness” of situational judgments.  This tendency ran through the postwar political 
establishment and the progressive movement.  Drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s notion of positive and 
negative liberty, Fujita suggested that the tendency was linked to the absence of a clearly defined 
notion of positive liberty (積極的自由) in modern Japanese history.  Since the Meiji period, 
intellectuals had defined the struggle for liberty as a struggle to overturn the restraints imposed by 
lingering “feudal tendencies” in Japan.  By doing so, they mapped the opposition between negative 
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liberty (freedom from restraint) and positive liberty (freedom to be one’s own master by enacting 
self-restraining law) onto the opposition between feudalism and modernity.   
This selective reading of history allowed Fujita to hone in on the urgent need for new 
“process-oriented” democratic organizations on the Left. Unless democracy was defined as part of 
the process of group decision-making rather than the endpoint of revolution or modernization, 
progressive organizations and democratic governments were vulnerable to transient crises that 
seemed to close off the possibility of the end goal.  A premature announcement of the “end of 
ideology” could cause the total collapse of an entire movement. 
 This was in line with the overall aim of the group – to strengthen a fragile “progressive 
movement” in Japan through critically examining the past.  Against the notion that paying attention 
to the messy details of the wartime years would harm the movement, Tsurumi advanced the 
following argument: 
Since the end of the war, some, including those in the Communist Party, have argued that 
raising the tenkô problem will weaken or cause the fragmentation of progressive forces.  We 
do not believe in the organizational theory [this argument is based upon].  The stagnation of 
progressive forces was caused by avoiding a discussion of the internal weakness of 
progressive groups as indicated by the tenkô problem and, while preserving that weakness, 
enlarging those groups after the war.  The work of creating organizations with real fighting 
power (戦闘力) means creating them in a way that has passed through and withstood a 
thorough discussion of the tenkô issue.404 
 
The failure to work through the tenkô issue was one source of organizational dysfunction on 
the Left.  Within the Communist Party, Fujita claimed tenkô was the “original sin” that ensured 
passivity on the part of rank-and-file members who had experienced the war. Fujita argued that 
many of them had psychologically transferred their guilt about their wartime behavior into strict 
devotion to the party and its “unconverted” leadership.405  This ensured loyalty but also created a 
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rigid top-down hierarchy and discouraged communication – both targets of the HR critique of 
Taylorism.  
 
Employment Conversion: Infiltration, Bad Faith, or Rite of Passage? 
Fujita also saw that the transferential relationship between former converts and the 
unconverted alienated younger Leftists who had little experience of the war.  Younger members of 
the party felt torn between loyalty to the Communist Party and the need to adapt to local concerns.  
This dilemma corresponded to the experience of several of the younger members of Science of 
Thought who contributed to the tenkô research in various ways.  For example, Suzuki Tadashi (b. 
1928) first became active in the Party while still a high school student at a normal school in Nagoya 
in the late forties.  After graduation, he was barred from securing a teaching position after becoming 
a target of the anti-Communist Red Purge but managed to secure a permanent paid position in a 
local JCP branch. Soon afterwards, he became ill with tuberculosis and was placed in a crowded 
public sanitarium designed to prevent the spread of the disease.  He continued to be involved in 
political activities while institutionalized, helping to organize patients agitate for better living 
conditions.  Through this experience, he became frustrated with the “high-handed” way the JCP, 
caught between representing the interests of patients and hospital workers, dealt with the newly 
formed Japan Patients Alliance.   After his discharge from the sanitarium, he was in the difficult 
position of being blacklisted by both the public school system and the JCP.  While supporting 
himself with part-time teaching jobs, he became involved in the Nagoya branch of the Institute for 
the Science of Thought and contributed articles on tenkô.406 
Suzuki’s experience touched on the relationship between anti-establishment political beliefs 
and unemployment, a vital issue among younger researchers in the study.  Even if one did not join 
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the Communist Party or become the target of a blacklist, students worried that disclosing Leftist 
beliefs or student activism would torpedo their chances for employment after graduation.  The 
pressure to hide or recant Leftist ideas around graduation time led to so-called “employment tenkô” 
(shûshoku tenkô) that dramatized the difference between seeing political conversion as an 
unfortunate yet necessary adaptation to circumstances, a moral betrayal, or a tactic to evade 
detection and continue with covert political activity.  The original short proposal for the tenkô 
research group in 1954 alluded to this connection. 
The fact that students in the progressive camp shed their progressiveness (進歩性) after 
employment constitutes an obstacle to the expansion of a movement, and this phenomenon 
is relevant to the question of how organizations ought to be formed in the immediate future.  
Without pursuing responsibility for tenkô in one’s own camp and among one’s friends and 
associates, without illuminating the rule-governed nature of tenkô [behavior]… it is 
impossible to secure the nucleus of a movement, and this is one reason the movement 
becomes bloated and deceptively fragile.  
 
Universities had long been associated with socialist ideas and radicalism, but the progressive 
tendencies of college students stood out more sharply in the fifties against the backdrop of 
conservative electoral victories.  The newly formed, conservative Liberal Democratic Party began an 
unbroken period of majority rule in 1955 that lasted nearly four decades, yet the party never found 
much support among high school and university students.  Opinion surveys consistently showed the 
majority of students backed the Japanese Socialist Party, and support for the Japanese Communist 
Party was higher at universities in comparison with the general public.  Furthermore, the proportion 
of students backing Leftist parties was markedly higher among upperclassmen as compared to 
freshmen.407  The notion that university life “radicalized” impressionable young people was 
sensationalized in the popular press.   
The political divide separating the majority of college students from the general public took 
on the appearance of a growing cultural divide in the fifties.  In his widely acclaimed novel from 
                                                






1955, Taiyô no kisetsu (Season of the Sun), Ishihara Shintarô portrayed high school students yachting, 
boxing, and chasing after women – an unusual depiction of youth culture at the time.  He based the 
novel in part on the exploits of his younger brother Yûjirô, who became a star after appearing in a 
film adaptation of the novel in 1956. Ishihara claimed that he knew that the depiction of youth in 
the novel would strike many readers as extreme. He wrote it while he was a college student in the 
undergraduate seminar of the social psychologist and Science of Thought member Minami Hiroshi 
at Hitotsubashi University.  There, he became conscious of the stark difference between his life on 
campus and his brother’s freewheeling life in his hometown in Shônan.  After writing the novel, he 
contrasted the ascetic, “Soviet-style,” life he lived in student dorms with the exotic “new customs of 
consumer society” enjoyed by his younger brother.408 
The widespread perception that universities were hotbeds of Leftist radicalism cut off from 
mainstream culture left its mark on company hiring practices.  Surveys showed that companies 
placed “thought” (思想) high on a list of criteria for the recruitment of college graduates.  Using 
euphemistic language, recruiters juxtaposed health and ideological requirements for employment, as 
in this 1955 manuel from a food company: 
Besides ideology-related issues, we emphasize physical fitness, and we perform a physical 
screening of all candidates before they enter the company.  We are receptive to students who 
have firm grasp of academic fundamentals, but so-called “après-guerre” personality types are 
not welcome.  We prefer down-to-earth students instead.409 
 
Recruiters used written examinations and interviews to screen out “red students” in the way 
they used physical exams to screen out job candidates with tuberculosis, as if Communism and 
tuberculosis were contagious.410  Exams included essay questions that touched on political issues 
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related to the Cold War and the peace movement.  Job candidates were asked to discuss their views 
on socialism, Yoshida Shigeru’s foreign policy toward Communist countries, and the 1951 Security 
Treaty Between the United States and Japan.  These questions were less about testing knowledge of 
contemporary political issues than about screening candidates for problematic political beliefs.411 
While Leftists criticized recruitment exams for forcing student activists to renounce their 
political beliefs or “convert” (tenkô) to conservative ideology, from the standpoint of the researchers 
affiliated with Science of Thought, this would have been a misrepresentation symptomatic of the 
simplistic way tenkô had been discussed in reference to the war. A more subtle approach to the 
problem had to deal with the way students responded to attempts at ideological screening by 
developing “tactical maneuvers” (機動作戦) to evade being eliminated during interviews and 
written exams.  This was a delicate task since recruiters were aware that candidates might not be 
entirely forthright about their beliefs. In 1957, the journal Chisei carried an article on recruitment 
examinations that addressed student anxieties about political questions and presented a few 
successful tactical responses: 
The question, “What political party do you support” is also frightening.  Until recently the 
response, “the right-wing of the Socialist Party” served as a protective talisman, but since the 
left and right factions have united, such a convenient response no longer exists.  If you say 
“the Liberal Democratic Party,” you will fall in the enemy’s trap, ensnared by a mean-spirited 
rejoinder like, “aren’t you just saying that because you think it’s safe?”  Here too though, one 
man succeeded with an unexpected tactic: 
 
“As you’d expect, the Socialist Party… I know that I will be at a disadvantage with a 
response like this, but you know, the youth always serve as society’s antithesis.  Young 
people who aren’t dissatisfied with society – who don’t notice society’s flaws – are no longer 
young.  They are called young because they have such sharp perceptions.  Gôshi Kôhei, 
founder of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, said something along these lines.  
Thus I feel secure here responding in such a frank way.” 
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The above response was the tactic of a man who was employed at a textile firm in 
Nihonbashi.412 
     
From the standpoint of the Science of Thought study, the key question would have been 
whether or not these “tactical maneuvers” were a form of “disguised tenkô” (偽装転向).  Tsurumi 
technically defined this term in volume two of the study as “ideological change that appears, to an 
authority exercising coercive force, to correspond to the intention that accompanies that coercive 
force, but to powers outside that authority, appears as the acquisition of an expressive form or tactic 
appropriate to a new situation and its more or less active or passive realization by an ideological 
intention that has hitherto opposed the intentions of said authority.”413  A key factor in his definition 
was that disguised tenkô had to have tangible effects that made it at least potentially recognizable as 
such to an outside observer.   
Disguised tenkô represented an alternative to the stark choice between support and resistance 
to the imperial state. Yet Tsurumi noted that most of the movements that began as disguised tenkô 
during the war ended as purely subjective conditions of “self-deception.”  Tsurumi believed that this 
development explained why, despite the fact that so many intellectuals claimed to have been 
performing covert acts of resistance to the militarist regime through the war, they made no attempt 
to “surface” during the two weeks between surrender and the beginning of the US Occupation.  The 
tendency for infiltration to become a form of bad faith was due to the fact that the “infiltrators 
often became their own witnesses,” as well as “the lack of a concept of a universal observer” in 
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Japanese tradition.414  The first problem was organizational; the second concerned the need to 
cultivate “universal values” in Japan. 
Although Tsurumi was analyzing the early forties, the way he framed the issue of failed 
“disguised tenkô” was reminiscent of a recurrent trope in short stories and memoirs by student 
activists from the mid-fifties throughout the “golden era “ of high GDP growth in the sixties.  This 
included members of the later “ANPO generation” who participated in the epochal US-Japan 
Security Treaty protests in 1960. Konnô Sô, a former student activist who had participated in 
ANPO, wrote in Science of Thought about grappling with his choice of employment after graduation.  
He confessed his disappointment in his former student comrades to the reader, “It would be a lie if 
I told you I had no ill-will toward school friends who fought with me during the ANPO struggle, yet 
seemed to have no compunction over their simple choice of employment.”415 
After agonizing over what to do, he decided that there was no way to fully reconcile his 
political beliefs with the need to find employment.  He resolved however to become a “black 
marketeer of the psyche” at his workplace – a possible reference to a kind of disguised tenkô.   
Yoshimoto Takaaki defined a black marketeer as someone who manifested political revolution as a 
part of daily life outside one of the establishment parties.  
Konnô decided an agricultural co-op was the most appropriate place for the kind of activism 
he wished to engage in.  There he was considered an outcast among his fellow workers, but he 
claimed not to mind.  While continuing to interrogate himself about the nature of the work, he 
arrived at several universal propositions that he disclosed in a letter to a friend sent in 1966:  
1) First grasp work as daily labor.  Labor in present reality means that the more you work, 
the more it becomes a single cheap commodity.  This is nothing other than the self-
alienation of labor 
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2) Work is actually the totality of the division of labor in society.  Through the division of 
labor, humans overwhelmingly diminish their self-potential in capitalist society. 
 
3) While conscious of the inhuman essence of work, turn this negativity into the infinitesimal 
possibility of self-recovery that is a part of each kind of work.  The content of this 
transformation is sometimes resistance within the company and sometimes creation through 
organized effort.  In essence, it is the recovery of the human fusion of self and work, never 
mere sentimentalism. 
 
4) Empirically present the content of this transformation alongside the causes for non-
transformation, and through this presentation enrich the content of collective work, such 
that this makes work-related matters a source of energy.  This is the highest form of the 
“field reports” that are part of the circle movement.416 
 
He devoted himself to his work in order to increase his opportunity for authentic political 
activism, participating in workgroup circles and becoming a leader in the company’s union.  He was 
unconcerned when some of his fellow workers “distanced themselves from the frontline and got 
sucked up into the company.”417  
 Yet after years of working to build an organization in the co-op, he was transferred to 
another workplace after a company merger.  Believing his work had been reduced to nothing 
through the merger, he experienced a deep sense of disillusionment.  He wondered to himself 
whether he had in fact performed an “authentic tenkô.”  The article ended with Konnô claiming that 
he had decided to temper his revolutionary expectations in order to sustain a movement and avoid 
becoming a pariah in the workplace.  He suggested that the “turnabout” (逆転) from the position of 
his student days was representative of the ANPO generation. 
 While Konnô’s disguised tenkô ended in failure vis-à-vis his original intentions, he embodied 
the ideal of postwar political subjectivity enshrined in the tenkô study in several respects. In the 
introduction to the first volume, Tsurumi stated that, “We consider our present work to be the first 
step toward creating a habit among Japanese intellectuals of clearly recording the times and the ways 
                                                







in which they undergo or refuse to undergo political conversion.”418 Leaving a clear record was 
necessary to escape from the trap of repeatedly rationalizing one’s political choices in retrospect.  
Konnô not only confessed and reflected upon his political oscillations, he analyzed letters he had 
written at various stages in his life – records of his changing views on work and the nature of 
Japanese capitalism.  Although the company merger and his transfer contributed to a mid-career 
crisis that influenced his later political views, he never reduced his twists and turns to the outcome 
of purely external events.  
 Yet he also wondered whether his political “wavering” might also have been due to the 
“slow accumulation of years.”  This passing observation touched on the distinction between 
“maturity” (成長) and tenkô in the Science of Thought study.  In the study, the researchers tersely 
distinguished tenkô from the terms “maturity,” “development,” and “growing up” as follows. 
Tenkô is a term used to record the thought of an individual who has already become an 
adult.  One cannot investigate the tenkô of children.419 
 
 They made a similar analytic distinction between tenkô and adaptation, arguing that the latter 
was simply a “biological term.”  Yet in the case of adaptation, the researchers acknowledged that 
some intellectuals tried to reduce tenkô metaphorically to “adaptation to human social life” – a 
gesture that obscured the question of individual responsibility for one’s political choices.  There was 
an element of adaptation in the choice whether or not to tenkô, particularly when one’s life might be 
threatened, but tenkô always exceeded the semantic boundaries of bare adaptation.    
 Distinguishing tenkô from maturity and adaptation was important because both terms were 
believed to naturalize political decision-making.  Yet “maturity” became a centerpiece of the new 
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conservative criticism of progressives, the peace movement, and radical student activism.  This 
critique was associated with the literary critics Fukuda Tsuneari in the fifties and Etô Jun in the 
sixties – after Etô turned away from the progressive movement in the aftermath of US-Japan 
Security Treaty Protests.  Whereas the tenkô study was in part an attempt to adjust progressive 
politics to the emergence of middle-class hegemony, conservative critics focused on how this 
adjustment exacerbated “infantilizing” tendencies that already existed within mass consumer culture.  
Rather than focusing on the tactics necessary to retain political commitment when faced with the 
threat of “employment tenkô,” they sought to depoliticize the whole issue.  They argued that student 
activists learned valuable teamwork skills through political participation at university, but they ought 
to be encouraged by responsible adults, a dwindling species, to renounce their immature idealism 
over time.  Yet despite their opposing views on political issues associated with progressive 
movements (the US-Japan Alliance, remilitarization), both the tenkô researchers and the conservative 
critics tried to rethink politics in light of Cold War political events and cultural changes associated 
with postwar economic prosperity.    They thus both attempted redraw the lines of political 
opposition between progressives and reactionaries that were grounded in a narrative about wartime 
resistance, support, and victimization – a narrative that the tenkô study attempted to revise.  
 
Conclusion 
When the tenkô study began in 1954, progressives had already begun to discuss the 
“revolutionary situation” of the mid-forties in the past tense – as a movement that had either ended 
or was on the verge of ending.  The historian Ôguma Eiji’s distinction between “two postwars” after 
1945 helps makes sense of the transition underway during this period.420 The first postwar refers to 
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the first decade after the war.  It overlapped with the Allied Occupation and was marked by an 
“anarchic condition symbolized by poverty and black-markets.”  Newspapers were filled with stories 
of companies going bankrupt, powerful conglomerates breaking up, and veteran politicians and 
business leaders being driven from public posts by Occupation authorities.  Ôguma argues that this 
decade was broadly perceived as one of extreme social instability, a situation that made predicting 
the course of one’s individual life-trajectory exceedingly difficult.   
Ôguma cites a recollection by the author and citizen- group activist Oda Makoto (1932-
2007) that illustrates this instability in reference to graduates from the university at the pinnacle of 
the educational hierarchy – still named Tokyo Imperial University until 1947: 
The government bureaucracy, a haven for Tokyo University graduates, was unpopular.  The 
large companies that employed them were also in dire straits.  Only the black marketers were 
riding high.  People with no educational background and little more than the shirt on their 
backs (徒手空拳派) were raking in cash while the bureaucrats and salaried men from the 
university were on the verge of starvation… 
 
At that time I once heard from an acquaintance, a salaryman alumnus of the University 
Tokyo, who was approached by a young person asking whether he ought to go to university 
or not.  He said he immediately told the youth that going to university was useless, and that 
it would be better to begin working in the real world.  Half seriously and half jokingly my 
acquaintance added, “From here on out, we’re not in an era in which you can say things are 
going to go this or that way because you’re a university graduate.   This is an age of real merit.  
This is a world of democracy.  Everyone is equal! (Then lowering his voice) I mean, even I 
graduated from the U. of Tokyo…” 
 
At that time he was debating whether or not to quit his job at a large company and start a 
                                                                                                                                                       
within two successive discursive formations linked to political and social change. The first of arose 
around 1945 and the second originated more gradually during the fifties (1955-1956 is a symbolic 
marker due to the fact that it marks the moment when Japan’s long-standing majority party, the 
LDP, rose to dominance and when the government announced that the economy had finally grown 
beyond its peak pre-1945 level).  In the first formation “postwar democracy” connoted poverty, 
anarchy, and a disdain for tradition motivated by the desire to uproot the emotional and intellectual 
remnants of wartime fascism. In the second, the same term connoted prosperity, stability, and a new 
appreciation of “Japanese culture” that differed from much of the earlier discourse on democracy.  
He argues that for many intellectuals shaped by the events of 1945, the transformations associated 
with the “second postwar” entailed a complex negotiation between allegiance to the ideals of the 
“first postwar” and adaptation to the changed political, economic, and social situation of the second.  






business with a friend.  To him, now an executive in a large corporation, his condition at the 
time probably seems like nothing more than one of transitory “hesitation.” (気迷い)421 
 
A degree from the Tokyo Imperial University had long been considered the key to entering 
the ranks of the academic, economic, and political elite (Right or Left), but would it continue to 
serve that function in the changed postwar landscape of “New Japan”? Would it instead become a 
symbol of the corrupt old order that might pass into oblivion – if not by decree of the Allied 
Occupiers then as a natural consequence of democracy or the outcome of a popular revolution?   
Writing in hindsight of Japan’s spectacular economic growth during the sixties, Oda 
suggested that such questions came to seem a mere symptom of momentary confusion brought on 
by the transitory chaos associated with the immediate aftermath of the war.  Ôguma argues that this 
retrospective assessment marked the distance between the “first postwar” and the changed 
discursive environment of the “second postwar,” which was associated with stability and economic 
prosperity.   
In his first book from 1951, Asatte no shuki, Oda wrote that he had already ceased to believe 
in “tomorrow,” a reference to early postwar optimism, but retained faith in an ever-deferred “day 
after tomorrow.”422  His turn to the day-after-tomorrow was one of several new attempts to 
articulate a new critique of the postwar situation that implicated and transcended both sides of the 
political divide.  In hindsight, it appears to anticipate the elision of the chaotic, undecided “first 
postwar” by the stable “second postwar” as the foundation of a historical narrative that emphasizes 
Japan’s “rise from the ashes” after World War II. 
The tenkô study was an attempt to imagine the day after tomorrow through a reexamination 
of the past. The participants believed the unresolved legacy of the war had a continuing corrosive 
affect on Japanese politics.  The complex picture of the wartime years that emerged from the study 
                                                
421 Oda Makoto quoted in Ôguma Eiji, op. cit., 12-13 






was mediated by contemporary anxieties about the political pressure exerted by middle-class society, 
the threat of bureaucratization facing progressive movements, and the generational revolt against the 
authority wielded by figures who claimed the mantle of anti-fascist resistance.  They worked to 
reduce the taboo on tenkô, motivated by much the same impulse that led organizers of a new citizens 







Conclusion: The US-Japan Security Protests and their Aftermath 
 
 
 From April to June of 1960, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets to protest a 
revised US-Japan Security Treaty (ANPO), which would solidify the Cold War alliance between the 
two countries.  On May 26th, 540,000 protested nationwide. On June 11th, 235,000 protesters 
marched around the National Diet Building in Tokyo.  On June 14th, clashes between riot police and 
protesters led to the death of a student, Kanba Michiko, who became a martyr among anti-treaty 
activists. Although the protests failed to prevent the ratification of the treaty on June 19th, they did 
topple the administration of the conservative Prime Minister who signed it, Kishi Nobusuke, who 
resigned on July 15th. 
 The political debate about Japan’s security alliance with the US had begun with the 
simultaneous signing of the Security Treaty with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. 
Conservatives in the majority Liberal Democratic Party supported the treaty, while the second 
largest party, the Japanese Socialist Party, advocated neutrality in the Cold War.   Progressive 
intellectuals opposed to the treaty engaged in a peace movement centered on associations like the 
Japan Memorial Society for Fallen Students (1950), the Peace Discussion Circle (1950), and the 
Society for the Protection of Children (1952).  The 1960 protests were in part an extension of a 
decade-long political struggle for neutrality, which many progressives believed was necessary for 
Japan to secure peace, achieve national autonomy, and overcome its “semi-colonial” status vis-à-vis 
the United States. 
 Yet the scale of the 1960 protests and the diversity of the protesters led many to believe that 
they signaled a break from the oppositional politics of the past.  Intellectuals hailed the participation 
of ordinary citizens (shimin) in the opposition movement.423  Rather than joining because of a deep 
                                                






commitment to progressive causes, some citizen protesters participated out of outrage at the 
parliamentary tactics adopted by Kishi to force the treaty through the Lower House of the Diet in 
anticipation of an official visit by President Eisenhower in June.  As their numbers grew throughout 
the spring, some observers began to believe that much more was at stake than the security alliance 
between Japan and the United States.  Supporters of the protests pinned the fate of postwar 
democracy on its success or failure.  An editorial in the May 22nd Asahi newspaper declared that, 
“We are at a crossroads between preserving democracy and killing it.”424 In a speech delivered to a 
gathering of progressives in Tokyo on June 14th, Takeuchi Yoshimi asserted that, “This fight is a 
clear and simple struggle between democracy and authoritarianism... I want nothing to distract us 
from the fact that our objective is to overthrow tyranny and rebuild democracy with our own 
hands.”425  Success would not only secure the diplomatic autonomy of Japan and score a victory for 
progressives; it would vindicate the participation of ordinary citizens in politics, and it would 
demonstrate that Japan had achieved “democracy from the grass-roots.”426  
 Tsurumi, Takeuchi, and other intellectuals associated with Science of Thought were among the 
most enthusiastic supporters of the citizens’ movement that appeared to coalesce in opposition to 
the security treaty.  Members took part in the protests and tried to push it to transcend the 
conventional political divide between progressives and conservatives by setting an example of 
principled opposition to the government in the name of defending democracy. On May 29th, 1960, 
the Institute for the Science of Thought issued an unprecedented group declaration that called for 
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nullification of the treaty and dissolution of the current government.  In a statement appended to 
the declaration and published in the July “emergency special issue” of Science of Thought on 
“Resistance as a Citizen,” the group reasserted its intellectual raison d’être in the course of justifying 
its actions. 
The Institute for the Science of Thought has, since its inception, engaged in its activities as 
an organization unattached to a particular ideological standpoint (思想的立場), and it has 
sought to facilitate exchange among various systems of thought, ranging from conservatism 
to progressivism.  As a result, the Institute has never asserted a unified standpoint in regard 
to specific political policies, and it ought not to.  In fact, there have been almost no instances 
of complete agreement among members in regard to political problems. Even with the new 
treaty, members’ opinions range from agreement to complete rejection, with many nuanced 
differences in between. 
 
Yet the sudden approval of the treaty by a group within the Liberal Democratic Party 
directly impinges upon our future, and it is tantamount to denying not only its outright 
opponents but also other members of the LDP the opportunity to engage in a full rational 
discussion about an important political policy that divides public opinion in two.  Policy 
makers have publicly exhibited an attitude that suggests they are trying to reach a decision on 
the basis of the power of a few.  Remaining silent in this situation would contradict in 
principle the spirit of the movement our association is engaged in, a movement to reap the 
rewards of a pluralistic exchange among different systems of thought (思想の多元的交流), 
and it would diminish its reason for being. 
 
Dissolving the current Diet is the only way to alleviate this injustice and establish self-
restraint on the part of the political sovereign.  At the same time, we think that this opens a 
way to change the mental state of Japan, described as a system of irresponsibility, into a 
system of responsible debate.  On the basis of this judgment, we thought it necessary to 
make clear our position, a position that transcends the question of our attitude vis-à-vis the 
new treaty.427 
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 By projecting the intellectual diversity of their own association onto the oppositional 
movement as a whole, they hoped to counter Prime Minister Kishi’s suggestion that the silent 
majority, “the voiceless voices,” supported the treaty and that the citizen protests were simply an 
outcome of the “manipulation of individuals by progressive organizations.”428  This was not simply a 
tactic to claim the political high ground against supporters of the treaty.  It also tapped into the 
dissatisfaction the group had felt at the routine opposition between progressive and conservative 
camps that motivated their projects to uncover the “Philosophy of Ordinary People,” to study and 
engage in the circle movement, and to reopen the issue of wartime political conversions in the tenkô 
study.  Although their approaches and objects of analysis changed over time, they consistently strove 
to connect “thought” (思想) with lived experience in a way that defied generalizations about class 
and culture.  The idea of a citizens’ movement thus appealed to the group less because it connoted 
the emergence of bourgeois political subjects in Japan than because the movements seemed to defy 
the generalizations that underlay the sociological predictions of growing political passivity in mass 
society.  The figure of the citizen became a new vehicle for the group’s ongoing struggle to further 
the emancipatory project of democracy while simultaneously opposing the negative effects of 
modernization. 
 After the protests subsided in late June, intellectuals heatedly debated whether or not the 
movement was a success or a failure. Those affiliated with Science of Thought who took an active role 
in the protests declared the movement a success.  Takeuchi argued that the ratification of the treaty 
was insignificant in comparison to the “national experience” (国民的経験) gained in the protests in 
May and June.429  Yet from the perspective of the history of Science of Thought, this rush to proclaim a 
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“summary judgment” (sôkatsu) on the movement as a whole mattered less than the continued effort 
to observe and encourage political activity unfolding on a less dramatic scale in individual 
communities and workplaces.  
 In December of 1961, Science of Thought became embroiled in controversy when its publisher 
Chûô kôron decided to bow to political pressure and cancel a planned special issue of the journal 
that critically analyzed the Japanese imperial institution and explored its possible relationship to 
right-wing violence in the aftermath of the ANPO protests.430  This led to a confrontation between 
the Institute and its publisher over the issue of free speech, which thrust the group into the public 
spotlight.  In 1962, the group began publishing Science of Thought on its own.  In part due to the 
publicity the Institute received during the controversy, early issues of the re-launched journal sold 
well, and Science of Thought continued publication with few interruptions until the fiftieth anniversary 
of its founding in 1996.  In the intervening years, the journal and its core contributors supported 
citizen’s movements dedicated to advancing the rights of women and minorities, opposing the 
Vietnam War, and combating the environmental degradation of Japan brought on by unrestricted 
economic growth.  Many of the organizations founded during this period remain active today.431 
In a notice in the last issue, the doctor and anti-war activist Ueno Masahiro (1934-2002), 
then head of Science of Thought, explained that,  “We have not had ample opportunity to reflect on 
how we have both influenced and been influenced by political and intellectual conditions in Japan 
and abroad and, in connection with these conditions, by the thought and behavior of the masses 
(shomin taishû).”   He announced the journal would go on hiatus while members of the Institute, most 
of whom had reached retirement age, took time to “exhaustively review the past from many 
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different angles.”  He added that the journal might be re-launched, provided its associates found “a 
way to incorporate the energy and wisdom of a new generation.”432 
The precariousness of the journal’s position in the intellectual landscape of contemporary 
Japan was evident long before it ceased publication.  On the basis of a vision of democratic 
intellectual culture that emerged in the months following the end of the war, Science of Thought 
combined academic research, popular journalism, and academic research in a way that proved 
difficult to sustain beyond the generation of its core members.  
 Science of Thought was founded in 1946 with a mission to promote democracy and overcome 
the gap between intellectuals and the public.  The founders of the journal opposed the academic 
establishment in Japan, which they associated with elitism and bureaucratic conformism.  At the 
same time, they believed that the open and democratic form of intellectual collaboration they 
adopted would lead to breakthroughs in the advancement of knowledge.  During the late forties and 
early fifties, the journal carried articles on the cutting edge of research in emergent fields of analytic 
philosophy, semiotics, and communications.  The academic recognition later accorded these articles 
vindicated the cooperative model adopted by the Institute; yet research that proceeded along the 
lines of inquiry it introduced increasingly became the domain of specialists, a trend at odds with the 
journal’s mission to democratize scientific culture.  A surge of interest in French structuralist and 
post-structuralist theories of language in the 1980s reminded some older observers of the attempt 
launched by the journal to transmit American ideas of philosophy and social science in the late 
1940s, although the younger advocates of French thought were critical of the dilettantism they 
detected in the work of the postwar progressives associated with Science of Thought.  As products of an 
economically prosperous and comparatively egalitarian society, they were less concerned with 
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bridging the gap between themselves and the masses than they were with defending the value of 
rigorous intellectual critique against the leveling tendencies of mainstream culture. 
Conflicts between Science of Thought and its publishers convinced its members that 
unrestrained political and intellectual discussion was incompatible with the demands of mainstream 
journalism, but they also believed that completely ignoring the popular demands of the market was a 
form of aloof intellectual escapism.  In 1972, ten years after the journal broke with the large 
publishing house Chûô kôron over its decision to cancel the politically controversial issue on the 
emperor, the concerns of the editors had shifted from the threat of political silencing by the radical 
right to anxiety over the possibility that the advancing commodification of language might render 
freedom of thought an empty right in the era of technocratically managed economic growth.  They 
wrote, “Today, we do not believe that a “freedom of speech and thought” actually worth defending 
can be taken for granted.  We will not be swept away by the onrushing commodification of speech 
and thought, nor will we try to run from it, but by accepting this situation as the condition for our 
activities, we hope to produce a living language and thought that transcends it.”433  This balancing 
act attracted a small yet dedicated following of readers and writers who believed that the journal 
ought to retain its idealistic commitment to both populism and intellectualism even if that meant 
resigning itself to a small readership.  Yet, despite the clear signs of waning relevance, it was clear 
that by sustaining that commitment for so long, the journal had developed a distinctive voice, one 
that had become a part of the discursive repertoire of Japanese public intellectuals. 
The fact that the journal continued publication for fifty years, through all the political 
fissures and headlong changes in Japanese society, is a testament to its adaptability.  On the basis of 
their wartime experiences, the founders brought an experimental mindset to the task of promoting a 
democratic and open intellectual culture, testing different approaches and changing course in 
                                                






response to criticism.  The philosophical pluralism of the group proved difficult to maintain in the 
politically polarized context of the Cold War, but it remained necessary, both to sustain its 
intellectual productivity and to remain true to the democratic ideals its members sought to realize.   
Today, over two decades since the beginning of the economic recession of the 1990s, 
democracy may seem to connote little beyond searching for a way to sustain the society of 
egalitarian consumerism that arose during the high growth era.  Does Science of Thought, which tried to 
enshrine the philosophy of ordinary people, bear some responsibility for this outcome?  The answer 
must be “yes and no.”  Intellectuals who adopted a more pessimistic view of the democratic 
potential of the masses and popular culture maintained a more consistent critical position toward 
postwar society, but Science of Thought never stopped striving for an ideal of popular democracy that 
exceeded – and sometimes became entangled in – the logic of economic growth and middle-class 
consumerism.  They tried to enlist the masses in this pursuit without condemning or condescending 
to them, as so many doctrinaire progressives did. 
Former associates of Science of Thought remain active as public intellectuals in Japan today, and 
they continue to catch glimpses of radically democratic potential embedded in contemporary 
popular culture.  In an article written for the thirtieth anniversary of the group in the seventies, 
Tsurumi Shunsuke took stock of the group’s past and tried to predict its future direction.   
If I were to express it in language that’s a bit hard to understand– though I really don’t need 
to – I would say that the basic space in which the philosophy of Science of Thought takes shape 
now is intersubjective.  It doesn’t stop at the purely subjective side of everyday thought. 
 
For a very long time I didn’t watch television, but recently I’ve enjoyed watching the variety 
show Kindon. When the character Kindon comes out, […] he sets in motion a very large 
intersubjective space.  He reads postcards people send in and turns them into ad-lib sketch 
comedy.  Recently he read a postcard sent in by a three-year-old.  These are skits that even a 
three-year-old child can enjoy. 
 
There is intersubjectivity at work here.  Amazingly, it works through the postcards people 






When I watch this, I think, “the wheel of Japanese history can’t turn back around now.” 
Then somehow I start to feel my blood running again.  Even if it were a direct order from 
the emperor, you couldn’t get a sea of people to respond the way they do here. 
 
I feel something like what Arthur Lovejoy called the “The Great Chain of Being” on Kindon.  
Something like that chain is working through the mass media, and there’s something among 
the masses that responds to it.  I have a feeling it’s possible to create a philosophical 
equivalent to that, something of intellectual value worth preserving.434 
 
Tsurumi, now 90 years old, is still trying to tap into a kind of intersubjectivity as an advocate 
for the anti-war movement.  In 2011, he explained one origin for his views:  
When I was in Singapore during a lull in the war, I saw a group of older low-ranking 
infantrymen.  Among them, there was a private who had let his facial hair grow.  I felt close 
to him.  You really can’t become a lieutenant if you let your beard grow like that, but he 
didn’t care.  He didn’t mind even though privates got beaten and bloodied if they let their 
beard grow.  I thought his whiskers were expressing something.  They were telling a story.  
They said, “I hate war.”  That was transmitted to me, and I a receptacle for it.  Oh days of 
war!  This is not about Left or Right-wing thought.  Leftists become Rightists, and Rightist 
become Leftists.  But simply “I hate war” – that sense of disengagement, of dropping out, 
doesn’t come easily to Left or Right.435 
 
He has outlasted many of the detractors of Science of Thought who criticized the group from 
the Left, from the Right, and sometimes from both directions.  Some of the Leftists and activists 
who attacked the group for not being radical enough in the sixties turned sharply to the Right after 
the waning of the student movement in the seventies and eighties.  
At the mid-point of his career, Tsurumi summed up the “thought movement” represented 
by Science of Thought as follows: 
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I guess you could call it a chaotic movement.  It remains chaotic still.  Should we praise 
Science of Thought or not?  Your answer to that question is going to depend on what you think 
about chaos.436 
 
The chaotic struggle waged by the associates of Science of Thought to realize the emancipatory promise 
of modernity and to overcome its immanent pathological consequences remains unfinished, but the 
experience of its participants retains its relevance for those who would strive for a more democratic 
and equitable society today. 
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